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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
April 4, 1986 Conference l'f\
List 1, Sheet 2
No. 85-1347-CSY
PENNSYLVANIA

Cert to P~ Ct. (McDermott;
Larsen, Hutchinson, diss.)

v.
RITCHIE (sex offender)

1.

SUMMARY:

Petr

erred in holding that the

Timely

State/Criminal

contends

that

~onfrontation

court to grant defense coun:el access to

the

State

Supreme

Court

Clause required the trial

~ child~we~fa;~
~

agency•Sl
~ _::_.)

'r

file on the juvenile complainant.

~2.
his

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

12-year-old daughter

c_-pcz 'w(eye. -to
M~k

Jeanette.

(J~-r

Resp was convicted of raping
The

incident giving

rise to

/ I

- 2 -

the charges occured in June 1979, but

Jeane~te

testified that her

father had abused her over a period of four years.

Before trial,

defense counsel served a subpoena on Pennsylvania's Child Welfare
Services

(CWS), seeking records pertaining to Jeanette.

CWS had

evidently interviewed and examined the child in September 1978,
following

a

report of child abuse from an unidentified source.

CWS claimed its records were confidential and refused to produce
them.

Pennsylvania's Child Protective Services Law provides that

reports made pursuant to the statute shall
be confidential, but
.........
~

shall be made available to certain officials and groups, including
courts of competent jurisdiction pursuant to court order.

11 Pa.

Stat.§ 2215(a)(5).
At a pretrial conference, defense counsel moved for sanctions
and argued that he should be allowed access to the files because
they might contain evidence useful in impeaching or discrediting
the daughter, or they might reveal potential witnesses.
reviewed the records in camera and found "that no medical records
are being held by the Child Welfare Services that would be of
benefit to the defendant in this case."

The motion for sanctions

was accordingly denied.
Following

his

conviction,

resp

argued on appeal

that his

counsel should have been permitted to review the files, or that,
at a minimum, counsel should have been allowed access to any verbatim records of statements made by Jeanette.

The Superior Court

concluded that resp's Sixth Amendment confrontation right entitled
him to inspect "any portion of CWS' files which reflects statements regarding abuse made by Jeanette to the

•'

[CWS]

worker who

1C.

- 3 I

examined her."

Petn App 44a.

The case was . remanded for the TC to

determine in camera whether the records contained any such statements,

and,

if

so,

whether

the court's

failure

to provide resp

with the statements prior to trial was harmless error.
tion,

In addi-

the Superior Court ordered the TC to allow defense counse

access to all of the files "in order to argue the relevance of the
material

in accordance with

this decision.

Counsel,

of course,

are permitted access to this record for this purpose only and are
otherwise bound by the confidential nature of the material in the
record.""

Petn App 46a.

The Pa. Supreme Court affirmed.

The court reasoned that the

State could not accord victims "absolute protections that cancel
the fundamental mandates of [the Sixth] Amendment; all that can be
accomplished is a careful balance between them, the counters always
Child

in

favor

of

Protective

the Amendment."

Petn App Sa.

Construing the

Services

light

principle,

Law

in

of

that

the

court concluded
that the trial court erred in refusing appellee access
to the CWS files.
As in Davis [v. Alaska, 415 u.s. 308
(1974)], we find that the Commonwealth's interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of these records may not
override a defendant's right to effectively confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him • . . . [I]t would
be absurd to read the statute as providing that the
records be made available to a court of competent jurisdiction, while denying any use of them to the litigants
in a criminal case before such courts.
Notwithstanding
the trial court's "finding" that the files contained
nothing that would benefit appellee, it is apparent that
appellee was denied the opportunity to have the files
reviewed with the eyes and the perspective of an advocate.
Neither the confidentiality provision of the
Child Protective Services Law nor any other argument yet
advanced justifies that denial.
Petn App 12a.

(In Davis, this Court held that the Confrontation

- 4 I

Clause was

violated when a defendant charged with burglary was

prevented from questioning the State's principal witness regarding
the witness'

juvenile burglary record and probationary status.)

The case was remanded to the TC with instructions that defense
counsel "be granted access to the CWS files" in order "to argue to
the trial court what use,
files

if any, could have been made of the

in cross-examining the complainant or

evidence."

Id. , at 12a----t3a-.

Jus(ice--;::,rsen dissent; >in
......

in presenting other

Hutchinson.

----

an opinion

joined

by

Justice

The dissenters charged that, "[i] n allowing counse

on remand to scour the entire

[CWS]

( ov\U iV\ c.~ Y\tf

file relating to the young ~~c,Stt'\t' cr

victim in this case on no more than the flimsiest assertion that
he might find some matters or witnesses that would be helpful to
appellee, the majority has licensed a fishing expedition.
any defense attorney

in~

Since

criminal prosecution can always assert

that that there may be some matters that could be helpful to the
accused, the majority's decision today does not just undermine the
confidentiality of child protective service agency files, it eliminates it whenever a case against an accused child abuser is prosecuted."

Petn App lSa.

Davis was distinguishable,

because

in

that case "the defendant's need and request for the information
sought was

specific and would have been quite valuable to the

defendant in helping to establish his defense, to demonstrate the
witness' motivation for testifying and possibly lying, and to cast
the witness as a possible suspect in the burglary."

Id., at 28a-

29a.
Justice Larsen would allow defense counsel in this case ac-

- 5 I

cess only to any verbatim,../ records of Jeanette's statements,

and

not even to those if the TC determined that they fell within Pennsylvania's statutory privilege for confidential communications to
sexual assault counselors, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5945.1.
Justice Hutchinson would instruct the TC to consider the application of that statutory privilege "as affected by" the Confrontation Clause.
3.

See Petn App 3la-34a.

CONTENTIONS:

The decision below was based exclusively on

federal cosntitutional grounds and impermissibly expands the principles

announced

in

Davis

v.

Alaska.

. Davis

authorized only

a

limited foray into privileged information, based on defense counsel' s

narrowly

tailored

conflicting interests.

proffer

and

a

careful

balancing of

the

Counsel in Davis disclaimed any intent to

attack the general character of the State's witness; he proposed
instead

to explore

falsely.

the

witness'

possible

motivation

to

testify

In this case, however, unrestricted access to privileged

files was granted based solely on defense counsel's vague speculation the files might contain matters favorable to the defendant.
Allowing such "fishing expeditions" will severely hamper law enforcement by discouraging family members and friends who wish to
remain anonymous from reporting child abuse.

It is unrealistic to

expect that anonymity will be long preserved after information is
disclosed to defense counsel.
Furthermore,

the decision below conflicts '"i th Cami tsch

v.

Risley, 705 F.2d 351 (CA9 1983), and with State v. Storlazzi, 191
Conn.

453,

464 A. 2d 829

(1983).

In Cami tsch,

th ~he ld that

Davis did not create "a general right to rummage through the oth-

.,.

- 6 I

erwi se confidential case

files of every

The bare allegation that

it

is

juvenile witness.

impossible

to tell how defense

counsel might have been able to use the various information •.. is
insufficient to support a finding of constitutional error in denying access."

705 F.2d, at 353-354.

In Storlazzi, the Connecticut

Supreme Court affirmed the TC's refusal to allow the defense access to psychiatric and social agency records of the victim, because in camera review of the records "failed to disclose material
especially probative ••• so as to justify breaching their confident ial i ty

in disclosing

464 A.2d, at

them to the d-efendant."

833.
4.

DISCUSSION:

This is indeed

from Davis.

It

is one thing to say that the Confrontation Clause requires that a
criminal defendant be permitted to question a
concerning

confidential

matters

that

could

juvenile witness

well

do

"[s]erious

damage to the strength of the State's case," 415 U.S., at
is a very different
granted

thing

"

unrestricted

319~

it

to say that defense counsel must be

access

to

-----confidential

files

Al

regarding

a

juvenile witness merely because it is always possible that the
trial

judge was wrong

in concluding

that nothing

in the

files

would help the defendant.
Moreover, petr is correct that the decision below is in significant tension with Camitsch and with Storlazzi.

Like Davis,

Camitsch concerned the delinquency record of juvenile witnesses,
not the files of a child welfare agency.
why that difference should

matter~

But it is hard to see

in either case, the defendant's

interest in obtaining possibly helpful information conflicts with

- 7 I

the

interest of the State and

the

juvenLle

in keeping
certain
,

potentially embarrassing information confidential.

The CA9 held

in Camitsch that the Constitution was not violated when defense
counsel was not allowed access to various reports and evaluations
in the delinquency files of juvenile witnesses for the prosecution.

As in this case, the trial judge had examined the files and

determined that they contained nothing affecting the competency or
credibility of the witnesses.
Storlazzi concerned records of psychiatric and social agencies.

Unlike the CA9, the Connecticut Supreme Court was not con-

tent to rely on the trial judge's determination that the records
contained no information that would be helpful to defense.

In-

stead of simply ordering the records disclosed to defense counsel,
however,

the court examined them itself, and concluded that the

trial judge had been correct, and therefore that there had been
violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Although the decision below technically rested on the interpretation of state statutory law, that interpretation was expressly guided by the Pa.

Supreme Court's understanding of what the

Sixth Amendment requires.

See Petn App 6a, lla-12a.

It is possi-

ble that the State Supreme Court will back down if the Pennsylvania legislature amends

the statute to forbid

sort of disclosure ordered in this case.

unambiguously the

Justice Larsen suggested

just such a possibility in his dissent by urging "the legislature
to act swiftly to shore up the confidentiality provisions that
have been substantially discarded by the majority today."
App 33a.

.,

Petn

But the importance of the question decided by the Penn-

- 8 sylvania Supreme Court,
flict

this

decision

together

creates

Supreme Court of

with

with the ,relatively sharp condecisions

of

th'"e

~~)the

suggest that cert may well be appro-

priate.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend calling for a response.

There is no response.
March 23, 1986

Sklansky

opn in petn

T•

.

\

To: Justice Powell
From: Mike
Re: No. 85-1347-csy

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie

Date: May 21, 1986

This case is set for discussion at Conference tomorrow.
The response is in.

I have read it and am convinced that the

case merits a grant.
Resp raped his daughter.

,...._______

His lawyer sought confidential

- ·-·--·--

information from the Pennsylvania Child Welfare Services
regarding earlier reports made concerning his abuse of her to the
agency.

His motion to compel access to the reports was denied on

----

the basis of a state statute, the Child Protective Services Law,
which provided that such information would be confidential.

~

examined the material in camera and

The

c~n~~d t~

they contained nothing that would be helpful to the defense.

~ The

----------·--------·---~

Penn. S.Ct. held that the denial of access to the records
---~

violated the Confrontation Clause, and interpreted the state
statute in a way that limited its cloak of confidentiality so as
not to prohibit access to such files by defense attorneys.

From

that interpretation of the state statue, based entirely on the
Penn. S.Ct.'s reading of this Court's Confrontation Clause cases,
the state petitions for cert.
Cert. is proper under 28

-------- --distinctions of the relevant

u.s.c.

§1257(3).

Resp's

cases are entirely unpersuasive.

In

particular, the argument that the cases somehow depend on when

··,

',

the confidential report was prepared is without merit.

This case

,

involves a significant expansion of the rule in Davis v. Alaska,
415

u.s.

308 (1974), and conflicts with the decisions of courts
~-=--~

in the CA9 and the Supreme Court of Connecticut.

I recommend

grant.

.··..
<.

Court ................... .

·voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued .................. . , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ............... . , 19 .. .

Announced ............... . 1 19 .. .
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85-1347 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie
(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania)
MEMO TO FILE:
This

case

presents

a

question

under

Responde~

"confrontation clause" of the Sixth Amendment.
Ritchie

was

corruption
The

tried
of

charges

and

minors",
were

convicted
and

based

of

sentenced

on

"rape,
to

alleged

a

the

incest
prison

sexual

and
term.

abuse

by

-

respondent of his 12/13 year old daughter.
Prior to trial, defense counsel served a subpoena
on the Pennsylvania Child Welfare Services CCWS), seeking
access to all of
(Jeannette).

its records pertaining

Pennsylvania,

like all 50

to the daughter
states,

provides

offices available 24 hours a day to receive complaints and
reports of child abuse.

- ---

--- -----· -· ------........

According to various briefs, such

abuse is widespread in our country.
of

these

reports,

alleged victims.
to trial -

,.

interviews and examinations of

As noted above, defense counsel - prior

sought by subpoena to examine all reports and

records pertaining
these

and of

CWS maintains records

records

to Jeannette.

are

Under Pennsylvania law

"confidential",

but

may

be

made

~

.'
'lr

'·

available to courts and certain other officials pursuant
to court order.
The TC,
found

no

after

records,

reviewing

medical

court's opinion would

or

the

records

otherwise,

in camera,

that

in

be helpful to the defendant.

the
The

motion accordingly was denied.

/

On appeal the Superior Court reversed and ordered
a

new

have

It

trial.
access

to

necessary

"in

relevance

of

concluded

that defense counsel

all

of

the

order

to

[enable

the

files,

that

counsel]

The

material".

and

to

Superior

should

this

was

argue

the

Court

stated

that it was permitting this access to the entire record
only for the purpose of identifying what may be relevant •
The
undertook

Pennsylvania

to

~

Supreme

Court

./

affirmed.

obviou~tate

the

interest

It
in

protecting the confidentiality of sensitive information of
this kind against

t~nstitutional

in criminal court

to confront witnesses.

the

right

state

to

that

obtain

may

facilitate

possible witnesses,
the

accused.

particularly

The
on

evidence

and

cross

generally

Supreme
Davis

in

v.

Court

right of a defendant

the

This

possession of

examination,
facilitate
of

Alaska,

includes

identify
defense of

Pennsylvania
415

the

U.S.

relied
308,

a

. ,.

confrontation

clause

case

that

can

be

distinguished

because there the issue arose during trial and was limited
to

specific

will

have

records

Here,

needs.

access

in

pertaining

by

advance

contrast,
of

defense

trial

to

counsel

examine

all

Three Justices of the

to Jeannette.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court dissented.
The
summarized

rationale

in

opinion.

the

Pet.

of

next

for

the

to

Cert.

court's

the

last

is well

paragraph

In

12 (a).

decision

essence,

of

the

its
court

concluded that despite the state's interest in maintaining
confidentiality of these records, this "may not override a
defendant's
examine
cannot

right

the
be

reviewed

to

effectively

witnesses

"denied
with

the

the

against

and

the

and

Defense

him."

opportunity

eyes

confront

to

have

cross
counsel

the

prospective

file
of

~

advocate".
Justice Larsen,

dissenting,

recognized

that the

confidentiality of these records is "not absolute" under
the

Pennsylvania

legislation.

There

are

including when a court orders disclosure.
reviewed

exceptions,

Justice

Lars~

the record of the trial and concluded that the

defense was not handicapped by the trial court's denial of

------He

---------pretrial
access.

commented

that

Jeannette

was

'

~·.

,,,

subjected to "vigorous and extensive cross examination".
A review of that cross examination "demonstrates that it
was

broad

and

unrestricted".

The

dissenting

judge

concluded that it would be "difficult to imagine . . . how
appellee's rights to confront adverse witnesses •

were

in

were

any

way

infringed".

The

state's

rights

also

described as "compelling".
The dissenting

judges

as well

as

the

amici

briefs on behalf of a number of other states - emphasized
the importance of preserving "the confidentiality of Child
Protective

Service

files".

Justice Larsen's dissent

See

the

last

paragraph

in

(joined by Justice Hutchinson).

This emphasizes that absent confidentiality, parents and
others will not be able to assure "young victims" that the
--~

I

information they give the agency in confidence will not be
----------------------------~--~

"scrutinized

----- --

by

their

abusers".

Nor

~

will

the

confidentiality of the identity of those reporting child
abuse -

a critical

factor

to the success of

Protective Services law - be guaranteed.

the Child

Parents, friends

and others who suspect or witness child abuse will be less
inclined to report it, if it is likely that their identifY
will be revealed.

.

'

I

have

Davis.

A number

judge

that

not

mentioned

nature
and

confidentiality,

of

the

of cases are cited by

the

("compelling"),

any

of

the

the

except

the parties.
state

importance

generally are well

cases

of

recognized.

I

interest
preserving
Equally

well recognized is the basic component of our law that a
defendant is entitled to confront witnesses against him or
her.
Perhaps we made a mistake in taking this case,
as

in the end these cases probably will be decided on a

"fact specific" basis.

I do think the one discrete issue,

t:erhaps not easily described,

is whether prior to trial,

defense counsel may be accorded the right to examine the
entire confidential file on his or her accuser.
cases

a

camera and

good

trial

court

could

examine

possibly with counsel for

identify

what

if

anything

the

In most
record

in

both sides present -

properly

may

be

made

available to defense counsel.
As I

fully understand the facts,

the issue,

and

the interest of the state, a summary bench memo suggesting
the appropriate analysis would be helpful.
L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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BENCH MEMORANDUM ,a_-/-~"

To:

Mr.

From:

Andy

Re:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, No.

85-1~

Oral Argument: Wednesday December 5, 1986
Cert. to the Pa.

s.

Ct.

(McDermott, Larsen [dis], Hutchinson
[dis])

QUESTION PRESENTED
This case

involves a

state
statute
that protects the
....
.......

£1

,,

confidentiality of child protective service records.
fendant

charged

with

records

containing

rape

and

information

incest
about

sought

the

A de-

access

alleged

to

victim.

~he

6th

access

to

The question presented is whether and to what extent
amendment

requires

that

the

defendant

be

given

these records.

I. BACKGROUND
Respondent

George

Ritchie

was

charged

with

sexually

molesting his 12 year old daughter over a 4 year period.

In

preparing for trial, resp learned that the victim had spoken
with Child Welfare Services

CCWS),

a state agency designed

to protect and counsel children who suffer from abuse.

Re-

spondent

any

served

a

subpoena on CWS,

seeking

access

--~

information "pertaining" to the victim.

to

CWS refused to com-

ply, claiming that its records were privileged under state
law.

The Pennsylvania statute then in effectl provided that
---~

all information given to CWS concerning incidents of child
abuse

is

--

confidential.

The

rule was

subject

to 11 excep-

!but__

tions, one of which was that the agency could disclose the ~~
reports to "a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to
~

court order."

~

11 P.S. S2215Ca) CS): See Petr Brief at 3.

Respondent moved to compel production.

a ~~

~ ~ ~

At a pre-trial

hearing, Ritchie argued that the CWS file might contain the
names of favorable witnesses, as well as other, unspecified
information that could prove exculpatory.

In addition, resp

1 The statute subsequently was amended to broaden the number of
people who had access to the information. See Cert Petn at 7a n.
12.

claimed that a doctor had examined the victim on behalf of
I

CWS, and that the medical report also should be

disc~ losed.

A CWS representative who attended the hearing claimed that
there was no medical report in the agency records.
a somewhat confusing order,
~ere

Then in

the trial judge determined that

~

was no relevant medical report, and that resp was not

entitled to access to the CWS information.

See Cert Petn at

2a-3a.
At

trial,

--

the

Defense

daughter.

main

witness

against
in

engaged

counsel

Ritchie

his ~)._~

was

vigorous

cross-

~

examination of the victim, questioning her on all aspects of ~~
the alleged abuse.

Ritchie was convicted by a jury, and the

judge sentenced him to 9 to 18 years.
On

appeal

to

the

state

superior

that the failure to disclose the
confrontation clause and
the 6th
tion,

amendment.

cws

court,

resp alleged

file violated both the

the compulsory process clause of

The court agreed,

vacated the convic-

and remanded for further proceedings.

The court did

~~

_ hoid4hat the Ent~ filji} must be disclosed immediately,
Instead,

it fashioned a remedy whereby the

~Uj
trial ~

judge first would examine the records in camera, and would
disclose any verbatim statements made by the victim to a CWS
counselor.
inspect

the

Then

respondent's

entire

record,

lawyer

would

to determine

if

be

allowed

to

there was any

other information that would have assisted the defense.

The

prosecution should be present at these proceedings, said the
court,

to argue that the relevant information (if any)

was

,,
,_

immaterial, and that thus the failure to disclose was
, harmless.

th~

Finally, if the trial judge concluded that

was prejudicial, resp was to be given a new trial.

error

See Cert

Petn 45a-46a.
The Pa. S. Ct. affirmed, finding that the confidentiality provision in the state statute was insufficient to overcome the defendant's 6th amendment rights.

The state court

was unpersuaded by the tc "finding" that there was no relevant information in the file; the constitutional infirmity,
said the court, was that resp was denied the opportunity to
have the information ·reviewed by an advocate, rather than by
a neutral judge.

Id., at 12a.

The court agreed that de-

fense counsel must be given the opportunity on remand to

~ustice

Larsen dissented.

P-<- ..s. c:...c~~
~
~~-

~

~~o

First, he said that resp had

not made any showing of need for the evidence.

Second, he

said there was no 6th amendment violation because there had
been no restriction on defendant's ability to cross-exam the
victim at trial.

Finally, the dissent was "distress[ed]" at

the effect the court's decision on the state's ability to
protect abused children.

Id., at 32a.

II. DISCUSS ION
The main question in this case is whether resp should
be ~ ~_Ecc~s~ to the CWS records.
Court

reaches

that

issue,

however,

it

q

Before the

must

consider

··'

·-

Ritchie's allegation that the case should be dismis1'3ed for ~~
lack of jurisdiction.
A. Not A Final Decision

Resp~

a threshold claim that the Court has no ju-

1._ -

risdiction because
decision on

the Pa.

the merits.

S.

Ct.

See 28

did not

u.s.c.

render a final

§1257.

He argues

that there are several procedural steps that must occur before

the rights of

the parties become final:

the tc must

examine the record in camera, must determine which information should have been disclosed, and must determine whether
the failure was harmless error.
it was prejudicial,

If there was an error and

the case then would proceed to trial.

Resp points out that the case could be moot at any of these
stages,

and that therefore the decision of the Pa. S. Ct.

was interlocutory.
Ritchie also asserts that the interests underlying the
finality doctrine would be best served by waiting for fur_/
ther proceedings.
Not only will it preserve judicial resources if Ritchie's claim becomes moot,

it also will pre-

vent the Court from conducting piecemeal review.

Resp notes

that if the tc concludes that he is not entitled to a new
trial,

there will be 2 federal

amendment

issue

concerning

issues for appeal: the 6th

access

to

the

file,

plus

the

question of whether the failure to disclose other information was harmless error.

Resp Brief at 11.

Ritchie there-

fore concludes that the Court should "DIG" the case until
either: a)

the prosecution disobeys the court order to turn

,.

"'

'I;

over the records; or, b) the tc decides that a new trial is
warranted.

Resp Brief at 19.

Even though the case may become moot on remand,
it

is clear

merits now.
the

that

the Court has

I

think

jurisdiction to reach the

The Court has recognized several exceptions to

traditional

finality

doctrine,

at

least one of which

seems to apply here.
420

I

u.s.

469 (1975), the Court outlined

--

appeals l where jurisdiction is proper even though

4

-

the decision below is not technically final.
is where
had,
481.

"later

review of

the

One category

federal question cannot be

whatever the ultimate outcome of the case."

Id.,

at

In the case at bar, the nature of the later proceed-

ings will make it difficult or impossible for petr to preserve the 6th amendment

issue.

If the tc determines that

there was no error in the failure to disclose

Cor that the

error was harmless), Ritchie's conviction will be reinstated.

Because

it

prevailed,

the State obviously

could

not

take an appeal; at best it could cross-appeal on this point
should resp challenge his conviction.

There is no guarantee

that resp would take his appeal to this Court, however, and
thus petr would be precluded from obtaining review of the
state court's 6th amendment ruling.
On

the

other

hand,

if

the

tc

determines

that

there

should be a new trial,

the State still might be unable to

challenge

below.

case

the decision

is terminated;

If

resp

is

if resp is convicted,

acquitted,

the

then once again

the State will have to preserve this issue in cross-appeals.
See New York v. Quarles 467 U.S. 649, 651 n. 1 (1984) '. (pretrial decision to suppress evidence "final" for purposes of
review

since

state will be barred

from pressing claim by

either mootness or double jeopardy).
Two other facts point toward considering the case now.
First,

there is little danger of piecemeal litigation,

be-

cause it is unlikely that the Court would be interested in
considering

resp' s

"other"

federal

issue:

whether

it was

harmless error to withhold particular parts of the CWS file.
Second, the harm alleged by the State will occur regardless
of what happens on remand.

The danger the State is trying

to prevent is disclosure of confidential information.

Be-

cause there has been a final decision on this point, consideration by the Court seems proper •

Me~

. The

two substantive questions before the Court:
(1)

was the lower court correct in finding a 6th amendment

violation:

(2) if yes, was the remedy proper?

1. Sixth amendment violation.
somewhat

murky,

the

Pa.

S.

Ct.

Although its opinion is
apparently

found

that

the

failure to disclose the CWS file violated both the confrontation

clause

and

the

compulsory

process

clause.

The

~

State's

first

argument

is

that the court misconstrued the

defendant's right to confront his accusers.

Petitioner cor-

rectly notes that this right has two elements: the right to
physically face adverse witnesses,

;,

.

and the right to engage

in cross-examination.

See Delaware v. Fensterer, 106 , S. Ct.

292,

curiam) •

294

(1985)

Cper

was met by virtue of

Since the former coridi tion

the victim testifying at trial,

the

state court must have concluded that there was an impermissible restriction on resp's right to question the daughter.
But, petr argues,

here there was no restriction: the trial

judge did not limit the scope of the questioning,

and the

record shows that counsel asked the victim about all aspects
of the crime,

including the content of her discussion with

the the CWS counselors.

App.

at 47a-50a.

The State notes

that while Ritchie might have been able to conduct better
cross-examination had the files been disclosed, the confrontation clause only guarantees "an opportunity for effective
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective."
Fensterer,
n.

12

supra,

(1980)

at 295: Ohio v. Roberts, 448

(except

in

"extraordinary cases,

u.s.

56, 73

no

inquiry

into 'effectiveness' is required").
Petr claims that the lower court reached the wrong re- ?~hr
sult in part because it misconstrued Davis v.

u.s.

308 (1974).

Alaska,

415

~

In Davis, you will recall, defense counsel

was ordered not to question a key witness about his record
of juvenile delinquency, because an Alaska statute made this
information presumptively confidential.

Petitioner in this

case argues that the Court reversed the conviction in Davis
primarily

because

counsel at trial:

of

the

restrictions

placed

on

defense

the judge put a direct limitation on the

types of relevant questions that defendant could ask.

The

•·.

proper reading of Davis and its progeny, says petr, is that
the confrontation clause is implicated only when there ' is an
interference with defendant's trial rights.

Since in this

case Ritchie only was denied pretrial access to confidential
material,

there is no 6th amendment violation.

at 15-17.

See also Barber v. Page, 390

u.s.

Petr Brief

719, 725 (1968)

(right of confrontation is a "trial" right).
The precedent favors the

Stat~'s

argument.

Although I

have not found a factually similar decision by this Court,
the leading

-----

opinions

-----------

in this area all

involve a

specific

limitation placed on the scope of questioning at the trial
itself.2

The Court has indicated that it places some sig-

nificance on this point.

Last term, for example, the Court

considered a confrontation clause claim in Fensterer, supra.
Defendant was convicted in part on the testimony of an expert witness, who could not remember which scientific test
he had used to form his opinion.

Although this inability to

recall frustrated defense counsel's efforts to discredit the
testimony,
cause,

this Court found no 6th amendment violation, be-

inter

alia,

there

right to cross-examine.

had

been

no

restriction on

the

The Court said that "the Confronta-

tion Clause normally is satisfied when the defense is given

2 See, e.g., Smith v. Illinois, 390 u.s. 129 (1968) (d~l of
right at trial to ask witness's real name and address); Douglas
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 Cl965) (de~l of right to cross-examine
co-defendant); Davis, supra. Cf. ~cCray v. Illinois, 386 u.s.
300 (1967) (no 6th amendment violation where defendant was denied
chance to discover informant's name at pre-trial hearing).

full and fair opportunity to probe and expose th[e)

~nfirmi

ties [in the testimony] through cross-examination."

'106 S.

Ct., at 296.
The best argument in response is that the Court in the
past has suggested that there may be a constitutional interest in allowing the defendant access to the pre-trial statements

made

States, 384

by

witnesses.

u.s.

855

See,

(1966).

e.g.,

Dennis

v.

United

Ritchie asserts that one of

the harms he suffered is that he did not have access to the
verbatim statements made by the main witness against him,
and thus in effect he was denied the right to cross examine,
even if not in practice.Y
Although this claim is intuitively appealing, the Court )
rejected a similar argument

s. Ct. 3375 (1985).

in ~ ited

States v. Bagley, 105

In Bagley, as in this case, defendant

made a pre-trial request for a witness's prior statements.
The request was denied, and defendant claimed an abridgment
of the right to cross examination.
lation,

-

This Court found no vio-

emphasizing again that there was no limitation at

-----------------------------------------The Court

trial on the right to question witnesses.

then

h eld that the failure to disclose prior statements should be
analyzed under the due process clause, not the 6th
(see discussion of due process claim, below).

amendment ~~~

Th e refore it

~ ~

3 Note that if this were a federal criminal case, respondent
would have a statutory right to the daughter's prior statements
after she testified on direct examination. See 18 u.s.c. §3500.
(Jenck's Act)

.'

l

does not appear that the tc committed a confrontation , clause
violation

in

this

case

by

allowing

CSW

to

wi thhoi'd

its

records.
Resp's second claim is that the tc violated the compulsory process clause.

Although the Pa.

s.

Ct. did not make a

separate ruling on this point, its opinion could be read to
say that Ritchie was prevented from learning both the names
·of favorable witnesses and all other relevant evidence that
might be contained in the file.
There does not seem to be any established framework for
evaluating these claims,

since the Court has not rendered

many recent compulsory process opinions.
to have analyzed a

request for

The Court appears

exculpatory witnesses and
\

information

in part under the 6th amendment,

and

in part

under the 5th/14th amendment due process clauses.
The case law suggests the following guidelines.

When a

defendant claims that he was denied the right to have a witness testify in his favor, the Court will vacate a conviction only when it appears that the witness would have given
evidence that is "relevant and material, and ..• vital to
the defense."

Washington v. Texas, 388

Likewise when

the defendant

requests

u.s. 14, 16 (1967).
information

that

is

necessary to his defense, an appellate court will find a due
process

violation

when

the

either guilt or punishment.

information

is

"material"

Brady v. Maryland, 458

to

u.s. 83

(1963); see also Bagley, supra (access to prior statements
of witnesses conditioned on showing of materiality).

Clear-

12.

ly the defendant's burden to make such a showing is relatively

low where,

as

here,

he cannot know precisely what

information is being withheld.
Bernal, 458

u.s.

858 {1982).

United States v. Valenzula-

Nevertheless, Ritchie had some

obligation to show what evidence could be contained in the
CWS

file,

or

what

they been called.

the witnesses could have
In short,

testified had

he must have done more than

make general allegations that the CWS files "might" contain
useful evidence.

Id., at 870-871.

It is a close call whether Ritchie made the required
-

showing.

----;t

Resp spent most of his time at the pre-trial hear-

ing trying to obtain the CWS doctor's medical report.

The

rest of the request for information went like this:
defense counsel: There is a possible
available out of these reports.
The other thing is this.
records would disclose
known to this defendant.

witnesses

Whether or not [the CWS]
witnesses that are not

the court: What kind of witnesses?
de: I don't know.

Could be lots of witnesses.

court: I don't know what you are asking for.

) ~~
~

~.

~
1-<J~~

~

de: There could be a defense witness disclosed by
their records here.
There could be matters in
there that would be favorable to the defendant.
App. GSa, 69a {incoherence in original).
I am hard pressed to conclude that this discussion represents a showing by resp that he needed to review the file.
There was no suggestion of who the other witnesses might be,
or what the other matters were that might be favorable to
Ritchie.

Even the medical report seems to be of question-

~

Ritchie presumably believes that the qoctor 's

able value.

examination would show that the extent of the sexual' abuse
was

less

than

the daughter

claimed.

girl was examined,

the fear

not

examination

molested:

the

But at

the time the

was that she had been be a ten,
took

place because CWS

had

received information that the victim and her siblings were
being physically abused.

It is not clear that the medical

exam would have revealed the occurrence vel non of incest.
Thus on balance,

it strikes me that respondent's request to

examine the CWS file was little more than a "fishing expedi-

------------This Court

tion."

------------------has disapproved

routinely

quests in the past.

u.s.

of

such

re-

See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418

683, 700 {1974).

I

am inclined to say that there was no 6th amendment

violation
decision

----------------------------------------~
and that therefore the Pa. S.

in this case,
should

be

reversed.

Two

facts

suggest

Ct.

caution,

however: ~ , I am troubled that resp might have been denied access to verbatim statements made by the victim to the
CWS

counselor.

relevant

to

the

This

type of

defense

if,

information could
for

be

example,

the

with

earlier

highly

daughter's

---~

trial
ments.

testimony

was

inconsistent

the

state-

This type of evidence might have had great impeach-

-----------

ment value, and therefore 'l perhaps should have been disclosed
See Bagley, supra (impeachment evidence
falls w ftll"fn Brady rule).

A remand for examination of the

file might be appropriate on this important point.

/

~

--

.·

Second, the factual record is in

·-of

The trial judge who considered the disclosure request was
definitely unprepared and probably inept, 4 so it is difficult to draw any conclusions from the pre-trial hearing.

It

also is not clear that either the intermediate court or the
Pa.

S.

Ct.

had

the disputed file before it

worth asking counsel at oral argument},

(this may be

but each decided

that more facts were necessary before a final decision could
be made.

I

~ order

therefore

am hesitant

to recommend

that

~

t+re

that the conviction be reinstated, when it may

be that no one in either the state or federal judiciary ever
has reviewed this information.
Consequently

(and reluctantly),

I think that a remand

---

Jl~
~

is ~ ry to d ~~~-~-~ was in fact exculpa ~ ~
tory .evidence in the file.
---------~

The remaining task is to deter-

mine the proper procedures for disclosing the file should
~

the Court agree that a remand is necessary.
2. What remedy?
mand

is

required,

(through his lawyer}

it

Petitioner argues that even if a re-

~

Ritchie

1c.flc_ ~

is

not

necessary

to

give

access to the file.

that at most the file should be reviewed in camera to deter-

4 The trial judge admitted that he had not read parts of the
CWS file. App. 72 ("We [?] didn't read 50 pages or more of an
extensive record"). The judge also admitted "I don't know a damn
thing about this case," a point that was obvious from judge's
earlier questions. ("Is the father the defendant in this case?").
Id., at 68a. Sadly, the tenor of the whole pre-trial hearing is
one of incompetence. See id., at 63a-72a.

,"t-''

...

,

..

)

15.

mine if there is any relevant information contained therein.
Only

after

it was clear

that

there

is

relevant material,

argues petr, should the state's interest in confidentiality
be overcome by the 6th amendment.

The courts below rejected

this option, and ruled that defense counsel must be allowed
to review the entire file.
I

agree with petr

that

it

is unnecessary to give de-

*::~

fense counsel access to all the material.
that

the

state's

lower

court's

interest

in

did

not

keeping

attempt

the

file

It seems clear
to

reconcile

confidential

the
with

Ritchie's interest in having all favorable evidence brought
forth.

See

United

States v.

Nixon,

418

U.S.,

at

709-710

(recognizing that right to "every man's evidence" is subject
to privilege claims).

This remedy seems particularly dras-

tic on the facts of this case, when there is no clear allegation that the disputed file contains exculpatory information.

---

It seems that the better balance of the competing inll

,,

terests is to trust the trial J"udge to evaluate the informa-

-

tion in camera.
made by a

witness

naturally

they should

should

disclose

during

the

(or

only

course

of

rc

if

..;;....-- •

be disclosed.
that
the

material
trial.

that
If,

for

becomes

relevant

example,

a

CWS

counselor testified at trail as to the results of a CWS investigation,

resp should

-: k

~~

~

have access to any file material

that could be used to discredit the testimony.

Should the

16.

judge determine that the arguments of counsel are necessary
on a close question,
assistance.

he retains the discretion to request

Nixon, supra, at 715 n. 21.

If the court finds

that none of the information is relevant, and defense counsel objects, the entire file then should be sealed and sent
to

the

appellate

court

for

post-conviction

We berman v. NSA, 668 F. 2d 676 (CADC 198 2)

review.

Cf.

(record should be

sealed for appeal after in camera review in FOIA case).
To be honest, the case law does not compel such a solution

As resp points out, the Court has emphasized the im-

e~
~

~

portance in having the "eye of an advocate" review disputed d+-L<JLLq
~
information. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S., at 875.
_/

1-o

Other considerations,

~

review only,

the~s1fate's
Nixon,

though, point toward allowing in cam- ~~~

rather than immediate

at 705-706

so

factually complex

~nd1

that the trial

the information is
judge necessarily

would benefit from the assistance of the parties.
Brief at 42.

See

(higher the secrecy need, greater

showing of need to gain access).
not

disclosure.~t, ~

interest in confidentiality is quite high.

supra,

See Resp

, there simply is no evidence that such

a broad remedy is necessary to protect resp's 6th amendment
interests;

!) tn./'- J

Ritchie has not made any

substant~ve

allegation

about the CWS file that could not be resolved in a more limited, in camera proceeding.

III. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION
Despite respondent's claims, I think that the Court has
jurisdiction to hear

this case.

Although there are more

procedures to come, under this Court's precedent it appears
that the decision below was "final" for purposes of review.
I

am doubtful

violation.

that the tc committed a 6th amendment

It appears that the Court will find a confronta-

___

....__

is a restriction on the right to conduct cross-examination
~~~~~----~--~---------------------------

The compulsory process claim is more difficult to
, because there is no clearly established framework
for analysis.

--

At: a minimum it appears that the defendant is

required to make some showing of need.
-----~_...--"'-__..__~

While I am not con-

vinced that Ritchie made such a showing, it does seem that
certain information that he requested may be in the file,
and may be material.
decision to remand,
(perhaps for

I recommend that the Court affirm the
so that the tc can examine the record

the first

time)

-----------------------

to ensure that there was no

exculpatory evidence in the CWS file.
The Court should modify the remedy ordered by the state
------------court, however, to make it clear that respondent is not entitled ___to
fulJ.
_.....----

acc ~tQ_.tluL. file.

The trial judge first

l_-~-

should review the material in camera; he then should release
those portions of the file that become material as the trial
progresses.

In this way the state's interest is protected

without significantly intruding on the defendant's right to
have favorable evidence revealed •

.

•'.

I

recommend

that

the

decision

of

the

Pennsylvania

Supreme Court be affirmed in part and modified in part'.

."

,,
'

..

~

)!<

'

December 3, 1986

To:

Justice Powell

From:

Andy

Re:

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, No. 85-1347: supplement to bench
memo.

~

Two points that might interest you:

u:s~antiated rumor that Ritchie is a
justice~oes this change anything? I suppose

(1) There is an

fugitive from

will moot the case if Ritchie is never re-captured.

it

It might be

worth asking at oral argument whether the rumor is true.
(2) Some clerks think that the Court should DIG this case,
because the Pa. statute in question has been amended to broaden

__

the category of people who have access to the CWS fi~e. Their
__..._..._............
argument is complicated (and strained), so I will not go through
the gory details.

~

--

Suffice it to say that the statutory exception
--,

before this Court (files may be released "pursuant to a court
order") is still part of the amended law, and thus the case
~-

-··

w

"""-"

remains a live and important controversy.

I will be happy to

draft a separate memo on this point if you think it necessary: I

1ul:J."

bring it to your attention in case the issue comes up during
argument.

·.

~

85-1347
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To:

Justice Powell

From:

Andy

Re:

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, No. 85-1347

fv-t-~

~~~~I'm afraid I have hit a stumbling block in my efforts to
outline the opinion in this case.

Simply stated, the problem is

that I am not sure how much we want to say about the compulsory
process clause.

There is so little case law from this Court on

the subject I am hesitant to press forward without discussing the
matter with you.

Two concerns come immediately to mind.

(1) To address the compulsory process claim in this case, we
must make a threshold ruling on whether the clause is available

.le

~. J

criminal defendants to assist them in discovering the

~~~

~

~

identities of witnesses.

~

~

....

We also must decide whether the CPC

~

requires the state to assist the defendant in uncovering other

~

exculpatory i :;:rmation.

Nothing in the 6th amendment case law

.l ~
(?,.1' IYf.. suggests that the clause extends this far.

ff'-'1

If we decide that

,.
~1 these rights are incorporated in the CPC, a further problem
~

-!:!.r;f
I
v-

/

arise.

We will be making the 6th amendment a constitutional

~~ iscovery

~-·~·

tool that would appear to be distinct from the 14th

~~- amendment requirements of Brady, Bagley, etc.

This may or may

not be a good idea (I tend to think it is not), but at a minimum
we risk creating great confusion among the lower courts.

If, on

the other hand, we decide the CPC only preserve the right to have
~~
------------~--~--------~----~----------------a witness appear and testify, this case is over and no remand is
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necessary.

There is no

.. / v-r· q~(V
"""~~
had any witnesses

suggestion ~-: ~itchie

that he wanted to call but did not, and the remainder of his
request went to exculpatory evidence, not witnesses.

We

therefore would have no occasion to consider the State interest
in its child-protective statutes, which I thought was one of the
primary reasons we granted cert.

vv

~~~

1-v~~

b

(2) An alternative theory for deciding this case is the 14th
amendment.

We could find that the 6th amendment is not

applicable, but that the claims for access to the file should be
viewed in light of the defendant's right to receive exculpatory
information from the government.

See Brady.

In many respects

this would be easier, but it still would present difficulties.
First, this is not the basis on which the case was argued, nor
was the basis for the Conference's decision.

Second, we still

would have to say something about the CPC, because this was the
rationale for the Pa. S. Ct. decision.

If we decided that the

6th amendment did not govern this case, we would be limiting (sub
silentio) the compulsory process clause to the right to compel
the production of witnesses, and the right to introduce their
testimony.

Again, I am not sure that this is a bad idea, but

this option for deciding the case was not briefed or presented to
the Conference.

So I am reluctant to go forward, at least until

I am sure what your position is.
I will be happy to discuss these matters with you at your
convenience.

<r-k

~~

December 30, 1986

To:

Justice Powell

From:

Andy

Re:

First draft in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, No. 85-1347.

Here is a first attempt in this case.

Although I am

reasonably satisfied, three things still trouble me.
(1) It is too long.
(2) I am quite concerned abotit part II, the finality
./

section.
~

L.---------;

I think what has .been written is mildly persuasive, but
//

I do not think that I h~~ covered all of the bases.
/

discovered

yesterday ~no

I

thanks to the parties) that if the case

is dismissed as non-final, and if the trial court determines that
the failure to disclose was prejudicial, the Commonwealth has the
right to take an immediate appeal of the new trial order itself;
it does not have to wait until the trial is complete.
App. P. 311Ca) (5).

See Pa. R.

This weakens our argument, I think, because

it is no longer true that the 6th amendment issue inevitably will
disappear on remand.

I did not discuss this point in the draft

because I want to give it more thought, and I did not want to
delay giving you a draft.

I would like to talk with you about

this matter at your convenience, however.

There may be trouble

down the road.
Also on the finality issue, I recognize that footnote 6 is
long and, in the abstract, unnecessary.

The reason I included it

is that Justice Scalia apparently will dissent on this point,

'

'

• ~.

k

.

...
f

,.
"

'

~

'•'

'·

...

relying specifically on Ryan.

I prefer to present our argument

to the Court first.
(3) I think that the opinion is not strong enough.

I think

we want to say that criminal defendants never get to see the CYS
files under

~circumstances.

Is this message clearly conveyed

in part III(B)?

I recognize that other parts of the draft are inadequate,
specifically the last paragraph before the conclusion (my
description of the state interest is bland), and footnote 14 (do
you want a 50 state survey on other confidentiality laws?).

But

instead of continuing my incessant tinkering, I simply will await
your changes.

""'

J usttce Hrennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice. Stevens
Justice ',O'Connor
Justice Scalia

.
..

From:

Justice Powell
JAN 7 1987

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No.

85- 1347

PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONER v. GEORGE
F. RITCHIE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA, WESTERN DISTRICT
[January - , 1987]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether and to what
extent a State's interest in the confidentiality of its investigative files concerning child abuse must yield to a criminal defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to discover
favorable evidence.
I
As part of its efforts to combat child abuse, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has established Children and Youth
Services (CYS), a protective service agency charged with
investigating cases of suspected mistreatment and neglect.
In 1979 respondent George Ritchie was charged with rape,
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and corruption of a minor. The victim of the alleged attacks was his 13year-old daughter, who claimed that she had been assaulted
by Ritchie two or three times per week during the previous
four years. The girl reported the incidents to the police, and
the matter then was referred to the CYS.
During pre-trial discovery, Ritchie served CYS with a subpoena, seeking access to the records concerning the daughter. Ritchie requested disclosure of the file related to the
immediate charges, as well as certain records that he claimed
were compiled in 1978, when CYS investigated a separate report by an unidentified source that Ritchie's children were

"·

·-
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being abused. 1 CYS refused to comply with the subpoena,
claiming that the records were privileged under Pennsylvania law. The relevant statute provides that all reports and
other information obtained in the course of an CYS investigation must be kept confidential, subject to eleven specific exceptions. 2 One of those exceptions is that the Agency may
disclose the reports to a "court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order." 11 P. S. §2215(a)(5).
Ritchie moved to have CYS sanctioned for failing to honor
the subpoena, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion
in chambers. Ritchie argued that he was entitled to the information because the file might contain the names of favorable witnesses, as well as other, unspecified exculpatory evidence. He also requested disclosure of a medical report that
he believed was compiled during the 1978 CYS investigation.
Although the trial judge acknowledged that he had not exam1

Although the 1978 investigation took place during the period that the
daughter claimed she was being molested, it is undisputed that the daughter did not tell CYS about the assaults at that time. No criminal charges
were filed as a result of this earlier investigation.
1
The statute provides in part:
Except as provided in section 14 [11 P. S. § 2214], reports made pursuant
to this act including but not limited to report summaries of child abuse . . .
and written reports ... as well as any other information obtained, reports
written or photographs or X-rays taken concerning alleged instances of
child abuse in the possession of the department, a county children and
youth social service agency or a child protective service shall be confidential and shall only be made available to:
(5) A court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order. 11
P. S. § 2215(a).
At the time of trial the statute only provided five exceptions to the general
rule of confidentiality, including the exception for court-ordered disclosure.
The statute was amended in 1982 to increase the number of exceptions.
For example, the records now may be revealed to law enforcement officials
for use in criminal investigations. § 2215(a)(9). But, the identity of a person who reported the abuse or who cooperated in the investigation may not
be released if the disclosure would be detrimental to that person's safety.
§2215(c).
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ined the entire CYS file, he accepted a CYS representative's
assertion that there was no medical report in the record. 3
The judge then denied the motion and refused to order CYS
to disclose the files. 4 See App. 72a.
At trial, the main witness against Ritchie was his daughter. In an attempt to rebut her testimony, defense counsel
cross-examined the girl at length, questioning her on all aspects of the alleged attacks, and her reasons for not reporting
the incidents sooner. Except for routine evidentiary rulings, the trial judge placed no limitation on the scope of crossexamination. At the close of trial Ritchie was convicted by a
jury on all counts, and the judge sentenced him to three to
ten years in prison.
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Ritchie
claimed, inter alia, that the failure to disclose the contents of
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, as applied to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The court
agreed that there had been a constitutional violation, and accordingly vacated the conviction and remanded for further
proceedings. 324 Pa. Super. 557,472 A. 2d 220 (1984). The
Superior Court ruled, however, that the right of confronta1

The trial judge stated that he did not read "50 pages or more of an
extensive record." App. 72a. The judge had no knowledge of the case
before the pretrial hearing. See id., at 68a.
• There is no suggestion that the Commonwealth's prosecutor was given
access to the file at any point in the proceedings, or that he was aware of its
contents.
5
The Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution protects both the
right of confrontation and the right of compulsory process:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."
Both clauses are made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 403-406 (1965) (Confrontation
Clause); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (Compulsory
Process Clause) .

~

.... .
~
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tion did not entitle Ritchie to the full disclosure that he
sought. It held that on remand, the trial judge first was to
examine the confidential material in camera, and release only
the verbatim statements made by the daughter to the CYS
counselor. But the full record then was to be made available
to Ritchie's lawyer, for the limited purpose of allowing him to
argue the relevance of the statements. The court stated
that the prosecutor also should be allowed to argue that the
failure to disclose the statements was harmless error. If the
trial judge determined that the lack of information was prejudicial, Ritchie would be entitled to a new trial. I d., at--,
472 A. 2d, at 226.
On appeal by the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania agreed that the conviction must be vacated and
the case remanded to determine if a new trial is necessary.
509 Pa. 357, 502 A. 2d 148 (1985). But the court did not
agree that the search for material evidence must be limited to
the daughter's verbatim statements. Rather, it concluded
that Ritchie, through his lawyer, is entitled to review the entire file to search for any useful evidence. 6 It stated: "When
materials gathered become an arrow of inculpation, the person inculpated has a fundamental constitutional right to examine the provenance of the arrow and he who aims it." I d.,
at - - , 502 A. 2d, at 153. The Pennsylvania Court concluded that by denying access to the file, the trial court order
had violated both the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause. The court was unpersuaded by the
Commonwealth's argument that the trial judge already had
examined the file and determined that it contained no rele• The court noted that the trial court should take "appropriate steps" to
guard against improper dissemination of the confidential material, including, for example, ''fashioning appropriate protective orders or conducting
certain proceedings in camera." 509 Pa. 357, - , n. 16, 502 A. 2d 148,
- , n. 16 (1985). These steps were to be taken, however, subject to "the
right of [Ritchie], through his counsel, to gain access to the information."
Ibid.
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vant information. It ruled that the constitutional infirmity
in this trial court's order was that Ritchie was unlawfully denied the opportunity to have the records reviewed by "the
eyes and the perspective of an advocate," who may see relevance in places that a neutral judge would not. Ibid.
In light of the substantial and conflicting interests held by
the Commonwealth and Ritchie, we granted certiorari. - U. S. - - . We now affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
II

Before turning to the constitutional questions, we first
must address Ritchie's claim that the Court lacks jurisdiction, because the decision below is not a "final judgment or
decree." See 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3); Market Street R. Co. v.
Railroad Commission of California, 324 U. S. 548, 551
(1945). Normally the finality doctrine contained in § 1257(3)
is not satisfied if the state courts still must conduct further
substantive proceedings before the rights of the parties as to
the federal issues are resolved. Ibid.; Radio Station WOW,
Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 123-127 (1945). Ritchie argues that under this standard the case is not final, because
there are several more proceedings scheduled in the Pennsylvania courts: at a minimum there will be an in camera review
of the file, and the parties will present arguments on whether
the lack of disclosure was prejudicial; after that, there could
be a new trial on the merits. Ritchie claims that because the
Sixth Amendment issue may become moot at either of these
stages, we should decline review until these further proceedings are completed.
Although it is true that this Court is without jurisdiction to
review an interlocutory judgment, it also is true that the
principles of finality have not been construed rigidly. As we
recognized in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469
(1975), there are at least four categories of cases in which
jurisdiction is proper even when there are further proceed-

85-1347-0PINION
6

PENNSYLVANIA v. RITCHIE

ings anticipated in the state court. One of these exceptions
states that the Court may consider cases:
"where the federal claim has been finally decided, with
further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to
come, but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had, whatever the outcome of the case. . . . [l]n
these cases, if the party seeking interim review ultimately prevails on the merits, the federal issue will be
mooted; if he were to lose on the merits, however, the
governing state law would not permit him again to present his federal claims for review." I d., at 481.
We find that the case before us satisfies this standard because the Sixth Amendment issue will not survive for this
Court to review, regardless of the outcome of the proceedings on remand. If the trial court decides that the CYS files
do not contain relevant information, or that the nondisclosure
was harmless, the Commonwealth will have prevailed and
will have no basis to seek review. In this situation Ritchie's
conviction will be reinstated, and the issue of whether defense counsel should have been given access will be moot.
Should Ritchie appeal the trial court's decision, the Commonwealth's only method for preserving the constitutional issue
would be by cross-claims. Thus the only way that this Court
will be able to reach the Sixth Amendment issue is if Ritchie
eventually files a petition for certiorari on the trial Court's
adverse ruling, and the Commonwealth filed a cross-petition.
When a case is in this procedural posture, we have considered it sufficiently final to justify review. See, e. g., New
York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 651, n. 1 (1984); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 558, n. 6 (1983).
Alternatively, if Ritchie is found to have been prejudiced
by the withholding and is granted a new trial, the Commonwealth still will be unable to obtain a ruling from this Court.
On retrial Ritchie either will be convicted, in which case the
Commonwealth's ability to obtain review again will rest on
Ritchie's willingness to appeal; or he will be acquitted, in
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which case the Commonwealth will be barred from seeking
review by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See ibid.; California v. Stewart, 384 U. S. 436, 498, n. 71 (1966) (decided with
Miranda v. Arizona). Therefore, if this Court does not consider the constitutional claims now, it will lose the chance to
do so in the future. 7
7

Nothing in our decision in New York v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971),
requires a different result. In that case the respondent was served with a
subpoena requiring him to produce business records for a grand jury. The
District Court denied a motion to quash, and respondent appealed. We
concluded that the District Court order was not appealable. ld., at 532.
We rejected the contention that immediate review was necessary to avoid
the harm of disclosing otherwise protected material, noting that parties
who face such an order have the option of making the decision ''final" simply by refusing to comply with the subpoena.
Although there are similarities between this case and Ryan, the analogy
is incomplete. In Ryan the Court was concerned about the "necessity for
expedition in the administration of the criminal law," id., at 533, an interest that would be undermined if all pretrial orders were immediately appealable. Ryan also rests on an implicit assumption that unless a party
resisting discovery is willing to risk being held in contempt, the significance of his claim is insufficient to justify interrupting the ongoing proceedings. That is not the situation before us. Here the trial already has
taken place, and the issue reviewed by the Commonwealth appellate
courts. The interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of delay,
rather than being hindered, would be best served by resolving the issue.
Cf. Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U. S., 469, 477-478 (1975) (exceptions
to finality doctrine justified in part by need to avoid economic waste and
judicial delay).
We also reject Ritchie's suggestion that we should dismiss this action
and allow the case to return to the trial court, so that the Commonwealth
can formally refuse to comply with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision. Here we are not faced merely with an individual's assertion that a
subpoena is unduly burdensome, but with a holding of a State Supreme
Court that the legislative interest in confidentiality will not be given effect
on these facts. The Commonwealth's interest in obtaining immediate review is obvious. On the facts of this case, we do not think the finality doctrine requires a new round of litigation and appellate review, simply to determine whether the Commonwealth is adamant about not disclosing the
CYS records. The interests that the finality doctrine seeks to preserve
would be disserved by prolonging this litigation. See generally, Bradley

85-1347-0PINION
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The Sixth Amendment issue has been finally decided by
the highest court of Pennsylvania, and unless we review that
decision, the harm that the Commonwealth seeks to avoidthe disclosure of the entire confidential file-will occur regardless of the result on remand. Although this consideration is not dispositive, we have noted that "statutorily
created finality requirements, should if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost
and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered."
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 331, n. 11 (1976). We
therefore reject Ritchie's claim that the Court lacks jurisdiction, and turn to the merits of the case before us.

III
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Ritchie,
through his lawyer, has the right to examine the full contents
of the CYS records. The court found that this right of access
is required by both the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause. We discuss these constitutional
provisions in turn.
A

The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face
those who testify against him, and the right to conduct crossexamination. Delaware v. Fensterer, - - U. S. - - , - (1985) (per curiam). Ritchie does not allege a violation of
the former right. He was not excluded from any part of the
trial, nor did the prosecutor improperly introduce out-ofcourt statements as substantive evidence, thereby depriving
Ritchie of the right to "confront" the declarant. See Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980). Cf. United States v. lnadi,
- - U. S. - - (1986). Instead, Ritchie claims that by denying him access to the information necessary to prepare his
v. Richmmui School Board, 416 U. S. 696, 722, n. 28 (1974) ("This Court
has been inclined to follow a 'pragmatic approach' to the question of finality") (citation omitted).
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defense, the trial court interfered with his right of crossexamination.
Ritchie argues that he could not effectively question his
daughter because, without the CYS material, he did not
know which types of questions would best expose the weaknesses in her testimony. Had the files been disclosed,
Ritchie argues that he might have been able to show that the
daughter made statements to the CYS counselor that were
inconsistent with her trial statements, or perhaps to reveal
that the girl acted with an improper motive. Of course, the
right to cross-examine includes the opportunity to show that
a witness is biased, or that the testimony is exaggerated or
unbelievable. United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 50 (1984);
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 316 (1974). Because this
type of evidence can make the difference between conviction
and acquittal, see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264, 269
(1959), Ritchie argues that the failure to disclose information
that might have made cross-examination more effective undermines the Confrontation Clause's purpose of increasing
the accuracy of the truth-finding process at trial. See
United States v. Inadi, supra, at--.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted this argument,
relying in part on our decision in Davis v. Alaska, supra. In
Davis the trial judge prohibited defense counsel from questioning a witness about the latter's juvenile criminal record,
because a state statute made this information presumptively
confidential. We found that this restriction on cross-examination violated the Confrontation Clause, despite Alaska's
legitimate interest in protecting the identity of juvenile
offenders. 415 U. S., at 318-320. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court apparently interpreted our decision in Davis
to mean that a statutory privilege cannot be maintained when
a defendant asserts a need, prior to trial, for the protected
information that might be used at trial to impeach or otherwise undermine a witness' testimony. See-- Pa., at--,
502 A. 2d, at 152-153.
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If we were to accept this broad interpretation of Davis, the
effect would be to transform the Confrontation Clause into a
constitutionally-compelled rule of pretrial discovery. Nothing in the case law supports such a view. The opinions of
this Court show that the right of confrontation is a trial right,
designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of
questions that defense counsel may ask dur~g cross-examination. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 157 (1970)
("[l]t is the literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time
of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the
Confrontation Clause."); Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719, 725
(1968) ("The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.").
The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does not
include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any
and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony. 8 Normally the right to confront one's accusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at
trial to question witnesses. Delaware v. Fensterer, supra,
at - - . In short, the Confrontation Clause only guarantees
"an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective." ld., at - - (emphasis in
original). See also Ohio v. Roberts, supra, at 73, n. 12 (except in "extraordinary cases, no inquiry into 'effectiveness'
[of cross-examination] is required").
We reaffirmed this interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause last term in Delaware v. Fensterer, supra. In that
case, the defendant was convicted in part on the testimony of
the State's expert witness, who could not remember which
• This is not to suggest, of course, that there are no protections for pretrial discovery in criminal cases. See discussion in Part Ill(B), post. We
simply hold that with respect to this issue, the Confrontation Clause only
protects a defendant's trial rights, and does not compel the pretrial production of information that might be useful in preparing for trial. Also, we
hardly need say that nothing in our opinion today is intended to alter a trial
judge's traditional power to control the scope of cross-examination by prohibiting questions that are prejudicial, irrelevant, or otherwise improper.
See Delaware v. VanArsdall,- U. S. - , - (1986).

. \.'
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scientific test he had used to fonn his opinion. Although this
inability to recall frustrated defense counsel's efforts to discredit the testimony, we held that there had been no Sixth
Amendment violation. The Court found that the right of
confrontation was not implicated, "for the trial court did not
limit the scope or nature of defense counsel's cross-examination in any way." - - U. S., at - - . F ensterer was in full
accord with our earlier decisions, that have upheld a Confrontation Clause infringement claim on this issue only when
there was a specific statutory or court-imposed restriction at
trial on the scope of questioning. 8
The lower court's reliance on Davis v. Alaska therefore is
misplaced. There the state court had prohibited defense
counsel from questioning the witness about his criminal
record, even though that evidence might have affected the
witness' credibility. The constitutional error in that case
was rwt that Alaska made this infonnation confidential; it
was that the defendant was denied the right "to expose to the
jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness."
• See, e. g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra (denial of right to crossexamine to show bias); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974); Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973) (denial of right to impeach own witness);
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U. S. 129 (1968) (denial of right to ask witness' real
name and address at trial); DO'U{llas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965) (denial of right to cross-examine codefendant). Moreover, the Court normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted
interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial. Compare
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300 311-313 (1967) (no Confrontation Clause
violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's
name at pretrial hearing), with Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53
(1957) (on the facts presented, Government required to disclose informant's
name at trial). See generally, Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause,
73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 125-126 (1974) ("The right of confrontation is exclusively a trial right . . . . It does not ... require the government to
produce witnesses whose statements are not used at trial, or to produce
the underlying information on which the witnesses base their testimony.")
(footnotes omitted) (hereinafter Westen).
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415 U. S., at 318. Similarly, in this case the Confrontation
Clause was not violated by the withholding of the CYS file; it
only would have been impermissible for the judge to have
prevented Ritchie's lawyer from cross-examining the daughter. Because defense counsel was able to cross-examine all
of the trial witnesses fully, we find that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court erred in holding that the failure to disclose
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause.

B
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also suggested that the
failure to disclose the CYS file violated the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of compulsory process. Ritchie asserts
that the trial court's ruling prevented him from learning the
names of the ''witnesses in his favor," as well as other evidence that might be contained in the file. Although the basis
for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling on this point is
unclear, it apparently concluded that the right of compulsory
process includes the right to have the State's assistance in
uncovering arguably useful information, without regard to
the existence of a state-created restriction-here, the confidentiality of the files.
1

This Court has had little occasion to discuss the contours of
the Compulsory Process Clause. The first and most celebrated analysis came from a Virginia federal court in 1807,
during the treason and misdemeanor trials of Aaron Burr.
Chief Justice Marshall, who presided as trial judge, ruled
that Burr's compulsory process rights entitled him to serve a
subpoena on President Jefferson, requesting the production
of allegedly incriminating evidence. 10 United States v. Burr,
The evidence consisted of a letter that was sent to President Jefferson
by General James Wilkinson that allegedly showed that Burr was planning
to invade Mexico and set up a separate government under his control.
After being ordered to do so, Jefferson eventually turned over an edited
version of the letter. For an excellent summary of the Burr case and its
implications for compulsory process, see Westen 101-108.
10
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25 F. Cas. 30,35 (No. 14,692d) (CCD Va. 1807). Despite the
implications of the Burr decision for fed~ral criminal procedure, the Compulsory Process Clause rarely was a factor in
this Court's decisions during the next 160 years. 11 More recently, however, the Court has articulated some of the specific rights secured by this part of the Sixth Amendment.
Our cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants
have the right to the Government's assistance in compelling
the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to
put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt. 12
This Court has never squarely held that the Compulsory
Process Clause guarantees the right to discover the identity
of witnesses, or to require the Government to produce exculpatory evidence. But cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S.
683, 709, 711 (1974) (suggesting that the clause may require
the production of evidence). Instead, the Court traditionally
has evaluated claims such as those raised by Ritchie under
the broader protections of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Bagley,-U. S. (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963).
See also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470 (1973). Because
the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to this type of case
is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth Amendment precedents addressing the fundamental fairness of trials establish
a clear framework for review, we adopt a due process analysis for purposes of this case. Although we conclude that
compulsory process provides no greater protections in this
The pre-1967 cases that mention compulsory process do not provide an
extensive analysis of the clause. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375,
378, n. 1 (1966); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 442 (1932);
United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 169, 173 (1891); Ex parte Harding,
120 U. S. 782 (1887). See generally, Westen 108, and n. 164.
11
See, e. g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973); Cool v.
United States, 409 U. S. 100 (1972) (per curiam); Washington v. Texas,
388 U. S. 14 (1967). Cf. Webb v. Texas, 409 U. S. 95 (1972) (per curiam)
(decision based on Due Process Clause) .
11

... ,,...,
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area than those afforded by due process; we need not decide
today whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory
Process Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is enough to conclude that on these facts, Ritchie's
claims more properly are considered by reference to due
process.
2
It is well-settled that the Government has the obligation to
turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to
the accused and material to guilt or punishment. United
States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland,
supra, at 87. Although courts have used different terminologies to define "materiality," a majority of this Court has
agreed, "[e]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." United States v. Bagley,
supra, at-- (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.); id., at-- (opinion of WHITE, J.).
At this stage, of course, it is impossible to say whether any
information in the CYS records may be relevant to Ritchie's
claim of innocence, because neither the prosecution nor defense counsel has seen the information, and the trial judge acknowledged that he had not reviewed the full file. The Commonwealth, however, argues that no materiality inquiry is
required, because a statute renders the contents of the file
privileged. Requiring disclosure here, it is argued, would
override the Commonwealth's compelling interest in confidentiality on the mere speculation that the file "might" have
been useful to the defense.
Although we recognize that the public interest in protecting this type of sensitive information is strong, we do not
agree that this interest necessarily prevents disclosure in all
circumstances. This is not a case where a state statute
grants CYS the absolute authority to shield its files from all

,_
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eyes. Cf. 42 P. S. §5945.l(b) (unqualified statutory privilege for communications between sexual assault counselors
and victims). 18 Rather, the Pennsylvania law provides that
the information shall be disclosed in certain circumstances,
including when CYS is directed to do so by court order. 11
P. S. § 2215(a)(5). Given that the Pennsylvania legislature
contemplated scnne use of CYS records in judicial proceedings, we cannot conclude that the statute prevents all disclosure in criminal prosecutions. Specifically, we conclude that
the relevant information may be disclosed when a court of
competent jurisdiction determines that the information is
"material" to the defense of the accused.
We therefore affirm the decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to the extent it orders a remand for further
proceedings. Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file reviewed by the trial court to determine whether it contains
information relevant to the validity of his conviction. If it
does, he must be given a new trial. If the records maintained by CYS contain no material information, or if the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the
lower court will be free to reinstate the prior conviction. 14
uwe express no opinion on whether the result in this case would have
been different if the statute had protected the CYS files from disclosure to
anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial personnel.
14
The Commonwealth also argues that Ritchie is not entitled to disclosure because he did not make a particularized showing of what information
he was seeking or how it would be material. See Brief for Petitioner 18
(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 109-110 (1976) ("The mere
possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the
defense ... does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense.")).
See also United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S. 858, 869-871
(1982). The obligation to disclose exculpatory material, of course, does
not depend on the presence of a specific request. We note, however, that
the degree of specificity of Ritchie's request for the information may have a
bearing on the trial court's assessment on remand of the materiality of the
nondisclosure. See United States v. Bagley,- U- S . - , - (1985)
(opinion of BLACKMUN, J .); id., a t - (opinion of WHITE, J.).
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c
This ruling does not end our analysis, because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did more than simply remand. It also
held that defense counsel must be allowed to examine all of
the confidential information, both relevant and irrelevant,
and present arguments in favor of disclosure. The court apparently concluded that whenever a defendant alleges that
protected evidence might be material, the appropriate
method of assessing this claim is to grant full access to the
disputed information, regardless of the State's interest in
confidentiality. We cannot agree.
A defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence does
not include the unsupervised authority to search through the
Commonwealth's files. See United States v. Bagley, supra,
at--; United States v. Agurs, supra, at--. Although
the eye of an advocate may be helpful to a defendant in
ferreting out information, Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S.
855, 875 (1966), this Court has never held-even in the absence of a statute restricting disclosure-that a defendant
alone may make the determination as to the materiality of the
information. Settled practice is to the contrary. In the
typical case where a defendant makes only a general request
for exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, supra, it
is the State that decides which information must be disclosed.
Unless defense counsel becomes aware that other exculpatory evidence was withheld and brings it to the court's attention, 15 the prosecutor's decision on disclosure is final. Defense counsel has no constitutional right to conduct his own
search of the State's files to argue relevance. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545 (1977) ("There is no general
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2); Pa. R. Crim. P. 305(E) ("if at any time
during the course of the proceeding it is brought to the attention of the
court that a party has failed to comply with this rule [mandating disclosure
of exculpatory evidence], the court may ... enter such ... order as it
deems just under the circumstances.").
15

.
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constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady
does not create one.").
We find that Ritchie's interest (as well as that of the Commonwealth) in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by
requiring that the CYS files be submitted only to the trial
court for in camera review. Although this rule denies
Ritchie the benefits of an "advocate's eye," we note that
there are several checks on the trial court's discretion.
First, if a defendant is aware of specific infonnation contained in the file (e. g., the medical report), he is free to request it directly from the court, and argue in favor of its relevance. Second, the duty to disclose is ongoing; infonnation
that may be deemed immaterial upon original examination
may become important as the proceedings progress, and the
court has the obligation to release material infonnation as the
evidence dictates. Finally, should a defendant be dissatisfied with the trial court's decision on the amount or types of
disclosure, he may have the file sealed and transmitted to the
appellate court, where a panel of judges also may conduct an
in camera examination. This combination of safeguards is
sufficient to protect against an unjust conviction, while still
preserving the Commonwealth's interest in confidentiality.
To allow full disclosure to defense counsel in this type of
case would sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth's compelling interest in protecting its child abuse infonnation. If
the CYS records were made available to defendants, even
through counsel, it could have a seriously adverse effect on
Pennsylvania's efforts to uncover and treat abuse. Child
abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses except the victim. A child's feelings of vulnerability and guilt,
and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly
acute when the abuser is a parent. It therefore is essential
that the child have a state-designated person to whom he
may turn, and to do so with the assurance of confidentiality.
Relatives and neighbors who suspect abuse also will be more

'
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willing to come forward if they know that their identities will
be protected. Recognizing this, the Commonwealth-like
all other States 16-has made a commendable effort to assure
victims and witnesses that they may speak to the CYS counselors without fear of general disclosure. The Commonwealth's purpose would be frustrated if this confidential material had to be disclosed upon demand to a defendant
charged with criminal child abuse, simply because a trial
court may not recognize exculpatory evidence. Neither
precedent nor common sense requires such a result.
IV
We agree that Ritchie is entitled to know whether the CYS
file contains information that may have changed the outcome
of his trial had it been disclosed. Thus we agree that a remand is necessary. We disagree with the decision of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the extent that it allows defense counsel access to the CYS file. An in camera review
by the trial court will serve Ritchie's interest without destroying the Commonwealth's need to protect the confidentiality of those involved in child-abuse investigations. The
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so- ordered.

16
All 50 states and the District of Columbia have statutes that protect
the confidentiality of their official records concerning child abuse. See
Brief for State of California, et al. as Amicus Curiae 12, n. 1 (listing illustrative statutes). See also Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting
Known and Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 Vill. L. Rev. 458,
508-512 (1978).

•r

•

I

V~/VV

~

v.

~

uc v u.u:a

tJ

u~

LtJ.\...'C

Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
J ustic~ Blackmun
J ustice'• Stevens
Justice O'Connor
Justice Scalia
From:

--1

N ,.

f

AJ
· (/

Justice Powell

Circulated:_--.-:;:.L/--=-?..!/. _~?_7.:....__ _ __
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No.

"'--.c..- P'r~-,
.lA

..; --

85-1347

PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONER v. GEORGE
F. RITCHIE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA, WESTERN DISTRICT
[January-, 1987]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether and to what
extent a State's interest in the confidentiality of its investigative files concerning child abuse must yield to a criminal defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to discover
favorable evidence.
I
As part of its efforts to combat child abuse, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has established Children and Youth
Services (CYS), a protective service agency charged with
investigating cases of suspected mistreatment and neglect.
In 1979 respondent George Ritchie was charged with rape,
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and corruption of a minor. The victim of the alleged attacks was his 13year-old daughter, who claimed that she had been assaulted
by Ritchie two or three times per week during the previous
four years. The girl reported the incidents to the police, and
the matter then was referred to the CYS.
During pre-trial discovery, Ritchie served CYS with a subpoena, seeking access to the records concerning the daughter. Ritchie requested disclosure of the file related to the
immediate charges, as well as certain records that he claimed
were compiled in 1978, when CYS investigated a separate report by an unidentified source that Ritchie's children were
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being abused. 1 CYS refused to comply with the subpoena,
claiming that the records were privileged under Pennsylvania law. The relevant statute provides that all reports and
other information obtained in the course of an CYS investigation must be kept confidential, subject to eleven specific exceptions. 2 One of those exceptions is that the Agency may
disclose the reports to a "court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order." 11 P. S. § 2215(a)(5).
Ritchie moved to have CYS sanctioned for failing to honor
the subpoena, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion
in chambers. Ritchie argued that he was entitled to the information because the file might contain the names of favorable witnesses, as well as other, unspecified exculpatory evidence. He also requested disclosure of a medical report that
he believed was compiled during the 1978 CYS investigation.
Although the trial judge acknowledged that he had not exam'Although the 1978 investigation took place during the period that the
daughter claimed she was being molested, it is undisputed that the daughter did not tell CYS about the assaults at that time. No criminal charges
were filed as a result of this earlier investigation.
2
The statute provides in part:
Except as provided in section 14 [11 P. S. § 2214], reports made pursuant
to this act including but not limited to report summaries of child abuse ...
and written reports ... as well as any other information obtained, reports
written or photographs or X-rays taken concerning alleged instances of
child abuse in the possession of the department, a county children and
youth social service agency or a child protective service shall be confidential and shall only be made available to:
(5) A court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order. 11
P. S. § 2215(a).
At the time of trial the statute only provided five exceptions to the general
rule of confidentiality, including the exception for court-ordered disclosure.
The statute was amended in 1982 to increase the number of exceptions.
For example, the records now may be revealed to law enforcement officials
for use in criminal investigations. § 2215(a)(9). But, the identity of a person who reported the abuse or who cooperated in the investigation may not
be released if the disclosure would be detrimental to that person's safety.
§ 2215(c).
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ined the entire CYS file, he accepted a CYS representative's
assertion that there was no medical report in the record.3
The judge then denied the motion and refused to order CYS
to disclose the files. 4 See App. 72a.
At trial, the main witness against Ritchie was his daughter. In an attempt to rebut her testimony, defense counsel
cross-examined the girl at length, questioning her on all aspects of the alleged attacks, and her reasons for not reporting
the incidents sooner. Except for routine evidentiary rulings, the trial judge placed no limitation on the scope of crossexamination. At the close of trial Ritchie was convicted by a
jury on all counts, and the judge sentenced him to three to
ten years in prison.
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Ritchie
claimed, inter alia, that the failure to disclose the contents of
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, as applied to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The court
agreed that there had been a constitutional violation, and accordingly vacated the conviction and remanded for further
proceedings. 324 Pa. Super. 557, 472 A. 2d 220 (1984). The
Superior Court ruled, however, that the right of confronta3

The trial judge stated that he did not read "50 pages or more of an
extensive record." App. 72a. The judge had no knowledge of the case
before the pretrial hearing. See id. , at 68a.
• There is no suggestion that the Commonwealth's prosecutor was given
access to the file at any point in the proceedings, or that he was aware of its
contents.
& The Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution protects both the
right of confrontation and the right of compulsory process:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. "
Both clauses are made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas , 380 U. S. 400, 403-406 (1965) (Confrontation
Clause); Washington v. Texas , 388 U. S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (Compulsory
Process Clause).
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tion did not entitle Ritchie to the full disclosure that he
sought. It held that on remand, the trial judge first was to
examine the confidential material in camera, and release only
the verbatim statements made by the daughter to the CYS
counselor. But the full record then was to be made available
to Ritchie's lawyer, for the limited purpose of allowing him to
argue the relevance of the statements. The court stated
that the prosecutor also should be allowed to argue that the
failure to disclose the statements was harmless error. If the
trial judge determined that the lack of informatio·n was prejudicial, Ritchie would be entitled to a new trial. I d., at - - ,
472 A. 2d, at 226.
On appeal by the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania agreed that the conviction must be vacated and
the case remanded to determine if a new trial is necessary.
509 Pa. 357, 502 A. 2d 148 (1985). But the court did not
agree that the search for material evidence must be limited to
the daughter's verbatim statements. Rather, it concluded
that Ritchie, through his lawyer, is entitled to review the entire file to search for any useful evidence. 6 It stated: "When
materials gathered become an arrow of inculpation, the person inculpated has a fundamental constitutional right to examine the provenance of the arrow and he who aims it." I d.,
at - - , 502 A. 2d, at 153. The Pennsylvania Court concluded that by denying access to the file, the trial court order
had violated both the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause. The court was unpersuaded by the
Commonwealth's argument that the trial judge already had
examined the file and determined that it contained no releThe court noted that the trial court should take "appropriate steps" to
guard against improper dissemination of the confidential material, including, for example, "fashioning appropriate protective orders or conducting
certain proceedings in camera." 509 Pa. 357, - , n. 16, 502 A. 2d 148,
, n. 16 (1985). These steps were to be taken, however, subject to "the
right of [Ritchie], through his counsel, to gain access to the information."
Ibid.
6
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vant information. It ruled that the constitutional infirmity
in this trial court's order was that Ritchie was unlawfully denied the opportunity to have the records reviewed by "the
eyes and the perspective of an advocate," who may see relevance in places that a neutral judge would not. Ibid.
In light of the substantial and conflicting interests held by
the Commonwealth and Ritchie, we granted certiorari. - U. S. - - . We now affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
II

Before turning to the constitutional questions, we first
must address Ritchie's claim that the Court lacks jurisdiction, because the decision below is not a "final judgment or
decree." See 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3); Market Street R . Co. v.
Railroad Commission of California, 324 U. S. 548, 551
(1945). Normally the finality doctrine contained in § 1257(3)
is not satisfied if the state courts still must conduct further
substantive proceedings before the rights of the parties as to
the federal issues are resolved. Ibid.; Radio Station WOW,
Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 123-127 (1945). Ritchie argues that under this standard the case is not final, because
there are several more proceedings scheduled in the Pennsylvania courts: at a minimum there will be an in camera review
of the file, and the parties will present arguments on whether
the lack of disclosure was prejudicial; after that, there could
be a new trial on the merits. Ritchie claims that because the
Sixth Amendment issue may become moot at either of these
stages, we should decline review until these further proceedings are completed.
Although it is true that this Court is without jurisdiction to
review an interlocutory judgment, it also is true that the
principles of finality have not been construed rigidly. As we
recognized in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469
(1975), there are at least four categories of cases in which
jurisdiction is proper even when there are further proceed-
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ings anticipated in the state court. One of these exceptions
states that the Court may consider cases:
"where the federal claim has been finally decided, with
further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to
come, but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had, whatever the outcome of the case. . . . [I]n
these cases, if the party seeking interim review ultimately prevails on the merits, the federal issue will be
mooted; if he were to lose on the merits, however, the
governing state law would not permit him again to present his federal claims for review." ld., at 481.
We find that the case before us satisfies this standard because the Sixth Amendment issue will not survive for this
Court to review, regardless of the outcome of the proceedings on remand. If the trial court decides that the CYS files
do not contain relevant information, or that the nondisclosure
was harmless, the Commonwealth will have prevailed and
will have no basis to seek review. In this situation Ritchie's
conviction will be reinstated, and the issue of whether defense counsel should have been given access will be moot.
Should Ritchie appeal the trial court's decision, the Commonwealth's only method for preserving the constitutional issue
would be by cross-claims. Thus the only way that this Court
will be able to reach the Sixth Amendment issue is if Ritchie
eventually files a petition for certiorari on the trial Court's
adverse ruling, and the Commonwealth filed a cross-petition.
When a case is in this procedural posture, we have considered it sufficiently final to justify review. See, e. g., New
York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 651, n. 1 (1984); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 558, n. 6 (1983).
Alternatively, if Ritchie is found to have been prejudiced
by the withholding and is granted a new trial, the Commonwealth still will be unable to obtain a ruling from this Court.
On retrial Ritchie either will be convicted, in which case the
Commonwealth's ability to obtain review again will rest on
Ritchie's willingness to appeal; or he will be acquitted, in

....

85-1347-0PINION
PENNSYLVANIA v. RITCHIE

7

which case the Commonwealth will be barred from seeking
review by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See ibid.; California v. Stewart, 384 U. S. 436, 498, n. 71 (1966) (decided with
Miranda v. Arizona). Therefore, if this Court does not consider the constitutional claims now, it will lose the chance to
do so in the future. 7
7

Nothing in our decision in New York v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 (1971),
requires a different result. In that case the respondent was served with a
subpoena requiring him to produce business records for a grand jury. The
District Court denied a motion to quash, and respondent appealed. We
concluded that the District Court order was not appealable. Id., at 532.
We rejected the contention that immediate review was necessary to avoid
the harm of disclosing otherwise protected material, noting that parties
who face such an order have the option of making the decision "final" simply by refusing to comply with the subpoena.
Although there are similarities between this case and Ryan, the analogy
is incomplete. In Ryan the Court was concerned about the "necessity for
expedition in the administration of the criminal law," id., at 533, an interest that would be undermined if all pretrial orders were immediately appealable. Ryan also rests on an implicit assumption that unless a party
resisting discovery is willing to risk being held in contempt, the significance of his claim is insufficient to justify interrupting the ongoing proceedings. That is not the situation before us. Here the trial already has
taken place, and the issue reviewed by the Commonwealth appellate
courts. The interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of delay,
rather than being hindered, would be best served by resolving the issue.
Cf. Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U. S., 469, 477-478 (1975) (exceptions
to finality doctrine justified in part by need to avoid economic waste and
judicial delay).
We also reject Ritchie's suggestion that we should dismiss this action
and allow the case to return to the trial court, so that the Commonwealth
can formally refuse to comply with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision. Here we are not faced merely with an individual's assertion that a
subpoena is unduly burdensome, but with a holding of a State Supreme
Court that the legislative interest in confidentiality will not be given effect
on these facts. The Commonwealth's interest in obtaining immediate review is obvious. On the facts of this case, we do not think the finality doctrine requires a new round of litigation and appellate review, simply to determine whether the Commonwealth is adamant about not disclosing the
CYS records. The interests that the finality doctrine seeks to preserve
would be disserved by prolonging this litigation. See generally, Bradley
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The Sixth Amendment issue has been finally decided by
the highest court of Pennsylvania, and unless we review that
decision, the harm that the Commonwealth seeks to avoidthe disclosure of the entire confidential file-will occur regardless of the result on remand. Although this consideration is not dispositive, we have noted that "statutorily
created finality requirements, should if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost
and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered."
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 331, n. 11 (1976). We
therefore reject Ritchie's claim that the Court lacks jurisdiction, and turn to the merits of the case before us.

III
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Ritchie,
through his lawyer, has the right to examine the full contents
of the CYS records. The court found that this right of access
is required by both the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause. We discuss these constitutional
provisions in turn.
A

The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face
those who testify against him, and the right to conduct crossexamination. Delaware v. Fensterer, - - U . S . - - , - (1985) (per curiam). Ritchie does not allege a violation of
the former right. He was not excluded from any part of the
trial, nor did the prosecutor improperly introduce out-ofcourt statements as substantive evidence, thereby depriving
Ritchie of the right to "confront" the declarant. See Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980). Cf. United States v. Inadi,
- - U. S. - - (1986). Instead, Ritchie claims that by denying him access to the information necessary to prepare his
v. Richmond School Board, 416 U. S. 696, 722, n. 28 (1974) ("This Court
has been inclined to follow a 'pragmatic approach' to the question of finality") (citation omitted).
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defense, the trial court interfered with his right of crossexamination.
Ritchie argues that he could not effectively question his
daughter because, without the CYS material, he did not
know which types of questions would best expose the weaknesses in her testimony. Had the files been disclosed,
Ritchie argues that he might have been able to show that the
daughter made statements to the CYS counselor that were
inconsistent with her trial statements, or perhaps to reveal
that the girl acted with an improper motive. Of course, the
right to cross-examine includes the opportunity to show that
a witness is biased, or that the testimony is exaggerated or
unbelievable. United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 50 (1984);
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 316 (1974). Because this
type of evidence can make the difference between conviction
and acquittal, see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264, 269
(1959), Ritchie argues that the failure to disclose information
that might have made cross-examination more effective undermines the Confrontation Clause's purpose of increasing
the accuracy of the truth-finding process at trial. See
United States v. Inadi, supra, at--.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted this argument,
relying in part on our decision in Davis v. Alaska, supra. In
Davis the trial judge prohibited defense counsel from questioning a witness about the latter's juvenile criminal record,
because a state statute made this information presumptively
confidential. We found that this restriction on cross-examination violated the Confrontation Clause, despite Alaska's
legitimate interest in protecting the identity of juvenile
offenders. 415 U. S., at 318-320. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court apparently interpreted our decision in Davis
to mean that a statutory privilege cannot be maintained when
a defendant asserts a need, prior to trial, for the protected
information that might be used at trial to impeach or otherwise undermine a witness' testimony. See - - Pa., at--,
502 A. 2d, at 152-153.
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If we were to accept this broad interpretation of Davis, the

effect would be to transform the Confrontation Clause into a
constitutionally-compelled rule of pretrial discovery. Nothing in the case law supports such a view. The opinions of
this Court show that the right of confrontation is a trial right,
designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of
questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-examination. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 157 (1970)
("[I]t is the literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time
of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the
Confrontation Clause."); Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719, 725
(1968) ("The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.").
The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does not
include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any
and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony. 8 Normally the right to confront one's accusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at
trial to question witnesses. Delaware v. Fensterer, supra,
at - - . In short, the Confrontation Clause only guarantees
"an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective." Id., at - - (emphasis in
original). See also Ohio v. Roberts, supra, at 73, n. 12 (except in "extraordinary cases, no inquiry into 'effectiveness'
[of cross-examination] is required").
We reaffirmed this interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause last term in Delaware v. Fensterer, supra. In that
case, the defendant was convicted in part on the testimony of
the State's expert witness, who could not remember which
8

This is not to suggest, of course, that there are no protections for pretrial discovery in criminal cases. See discussion in Part III(B), post. We
simply hold that with respect to this issue, the Confrontation Clause only
protects a defendant's trial rights, and does not compel the pretrial production of information that might be useful in preparing for trial. Also, we
hardly need say that nothing in our opinion today is intended to alter a trial
judge's traditional power to control the scope of cross-examination by prohibiting questions that are prejudicial, irrelevant, or otherwise improper.
See Delaware v. VanArsdall,- U. S . - , - (1986).
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scientific test he had used to form his opinion. Although this
inability to recall frustrated defense counsel's efforts to discredit the testimony, we held that there had been no Sixth
Amendment violation. The Court found that the right of
confrontation was not implicated, "for the trial court did not
limit the scope or nature of defense counsel's cross-examination in any way." - - U. S., at - - . F ensterer was in full
accord with our earlier decisions, that have upheld a Confrontation Clause infringement claim on this issue only when
there was a specific statutory or court-imposed restriction at
trial on the scope of questioning. 9
The lower court's reliance on Davis v. Alaska therefore is
misplaced. There the state court had prohibited defense
counsel from questioning the witness about his criminal
record, even though that evidence might have affected the
witness' credibility. The constitutional error in that case
was not that Alaska made this information confidential; it
was that the defendant was denied the right "to expose to the
jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness."
9
See, e. g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra (denial of right to crossexamine to show bias); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974); Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973) (denial of right to impeach own witness);
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U. S. 129 (1968) (denial of right to ask witness' real
name and address at trial); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965) (denial of right to cross-examine codefendant). Moreover, the Court normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted
interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial. Compare
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300 311-313 (1967) (no Confrontation Clause
violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's
name at pretrial hearing), with Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53
(1957) (on the facts presented, Government required to disclose informant's
name at trial). See generally, Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause,
73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 125-126 (1974) ("The right of confrontation is exclusively a trial right . . . . It does not . . . require the government to
produce witnesses whose statements are not used at trial, or to produce
the underlying information on which the witnesses base their testimony.")
(footnotes omitted) (hereinafter Westen).
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415 U. S., at 318. Similarly, in this case the Confrontation
Clause was not violated by the withholding of the CYS file; it
only would have been impermissible for the judge to have
prevented Ritchie's lawyer from cross-examining the daughter. Because defense counsel was able to cross-examine all.
of the trial witnesses fully, we find that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court erred in holding that the failure to disclose
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause.
B

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also suggested that the
failure to disclose the CYS file violated the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of compulsory process. Ritchie asserts
that the trial court's ruling prevented him from learning the
names of the "witnesses in his favor," as well as other evidence that might be contained in the file. Although the basis
for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling on this point is
unclear, it apparently concluded that the right of compulsory
process includes the right to have the State's assistance in
uncovering arguably useful information, without regard to
the existence of a state-created restriction-here, the confidentiality of the files.
1

This Court has had little occasion to discuss the contours of
the Compulsory Process Clause. The first and most celebrated analysis came from a Virginia federal court in 1807,
during the treason and misdemeanor trials of Aaron Burr.
Chief Justice Marshall, who presided as trial judge, ruled
that Burr's compulsory process rights entitled him to serve a
subpoena on President Jefferson, requesting the production
of allegedly incriminating evidence. 10 United States v. Burr,
10

The evidence consisted of a letter that was sent to President Jefferson
by General James Wilkinson that allegedly showed that Burr was planning
to invade Mexico and set up a separate government under his control.
After being ordered to do so, Jefferson eventually turned over an edited
version of the letter. For an excellent summary of the Burr case and its
implications for compulsory process, see Westen 101-108.
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25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (CCD Va. 1807). Despite the
implications of the Burr decision for federal criminal procedure, the Compulsory Process Clause rarely was a factor in
this Court's decisions during the next 160 years. 11 More recently, however, the Court has articulated some of the specific rights secured by this part of the Sixth Amendment.
Our cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants
have the right to the Government's assistance in compelling
the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to
put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt. 12
This Court has never squarely held that the Compulsory
Process Clause guarantees the right to discover the identity
of witnesses, or to require the Government to produce exculpatory evidence. But cf. United States v. Nixon , 418 U. S.
683, 709, 711 (1974) (suggesting that the clause may require
the production of evidence). Instead, the Court traditionally
has evaluated claims such as those raised by Ritchie under
the broader protections of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Bagley, - U. S . - (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
See also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470 (1973). Because
the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to this type of case
is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth Amendment precedents addressing the fundamental fairness of trials establish
a clear framework for review, we adopt a due process analysis for purposes of this case. Although we conclude that
compulsory process provides no greater protections in this
The pre-1967 cases that mention compulsory process do not provide an
extensive analysis of the clause. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375,
378, n. 1 (1966); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 442 (1932);
United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 169, 173 (1891); Ex parte Harding,
120 U. S. 782 (1887). See generally, Westen 108, and n. 164.
12
See, e. g. , Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973); Cool v.
United States, 409 U. S. 100 (1972) (per curiam); Washington v. Texas ,
388 U. S. 14 (1967). Cf. Webb v. Texas, 409 U. S. 95 (1972) (per curiam)
(decision based on Due Process Clause).
11
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area than those afforded by due process, we need not decide
today whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory
Process Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is enough to conclude that on these facts, Ritchie's
claims more properly are considered by reference to due
process.
2

It is well-settled that the Government has the obligation to
turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to
the accused and material to guilt or punishment. United
States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland,
supra, at 87. Although courts have used different terminologies to define "materiality," a majority of this Court has
agreed, "[e]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." United States v. Bagley,
supra, at-- (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.); id., at-- (opinion ofWHITE, J.).
At this stage, of course, it is impossible to say whether any
information in the CYS records may be relevant to Ritchie's
claim of innocence, because neither the prosecution nor defense counsel has seen the information, and the trial judge acknowledged that he had not reviewed the full file. The Commonwealth, however, argues that no materiality inquiry is
required, because a statute renders the contents of the file
privileged. Requiring disclosure here, it is argued, would
override the Commonwealth's compelling interest in confidentiality on the mere speculation that the file "might" have
been useful to the defense.
Although we recognize that the public interest in protecting this type of sensitive information is strong, we do not
agree that this interest necessarily prevents disclosure in all
circumstances. This is not a case where a state statute
grants CYS the absolute authority to shield its files from all
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eyes. Cf. 42 P. S. § 5945.1(b) (unqualified statutory privilege for communications between sexual assault counselors
and victims). 13 Rather, the Pennsylvania law provides that
the information shall be disclosed in certain circumstances,
including when CYS is directed to do so by court order. 11
P. S. § 2215(a)(5). Given that the Pennsylvania legislature
contemplated some use of CYS records in judicial proceedings, we cannot conclude that the statute prevents all disclosure in criminal prosecutions. S~ecifically, W€ conclude that
the relevant information maY')te disclosed~hen a court of
competent jurisdiction determines that the information is
"material" to the defense of the accused.
We therefore affirm the decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to the extent it orders a remand for further
proceedings. Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file reviewed by the trial court to determine whether it contains
information l!ele;v nt to the validity of his conviction. If it
does, he must be given a new trial. If the records maintained by CYS contain no material information, or if the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the
lower court will be free to reinstate the prior conviction. 14
8
' We express no opinion on whether the result in this case would have
been different if the statute had protected the CYS files from disclosure to
anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial personnel.
14
The Commonwealth also argues that Ritchie is not entitled to disclosure because he did not make a particularized showing of what information
he was seeking or how it would be material. See Brief for Petitioner 18
(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 109-110 (1976) ("The mere
possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the
defense . . . does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense.")).
See also United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S. 858, 869-871
(1982). The obligation to disclose exculpatory material, of course, does
not depend on the presence of a specific request. We note, however, that
the degree of specificity of Ritchie's request for the information may have a
bearing on the trial court's assessment on remand of the materiality of the
nondisclosure. See United States v. Bagley, - - U. S. - - , - - (1985)
(opinion of BLACKMUN, J.); id., at-- (opinion of WHITE, J.).
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c
This ruling does not end our analysis, because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did more than simply remand. It also
held that defense counsel must be allowed to examine all of
the confidential information, both relevant and irrelevant,
and present arguments in favor of disclosure. The court apparently concluded that whenever a defendant alleges that
protected evidence might be material, the appropriate
method of assessing this claim is to grant full access to the
disputed information, regardless of the State's interest in
confidentiality. We cannot agree.
A defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence does
not include the unsupervised authority to search through the
Commonwealth's files. See United States v. Bagley, supra,
at--; United States v. Agurs, supra, at--. Although
the eye of an advocate may be helpful to a defendant in
ferreting out information, Dennis v. United States , 384 U. S.
855, 875 (1966), this Court has never held-even in the absence of a statute restricting disclosure-that a defendant
alone may make the determination as to the materiality of the
information. Settled practice is to the contrary. In the
typical case where a defendant makes only a general request
for exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, supra, it
is the State that decides which information must be disclosed.
Unless defense counsel becomes aware that other exculpatory evidence was withheld and brings it to the court's attention, 15 the prosecutor's decision on disclosure is final. Defense counsel has no constitutional right to conduct his own
search of the State's files to argue relevance. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545 (1977) ("There is no general
'"See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2); Pa. R. Crim. P. 305(E) ("if at any time
during the course of the proceeding it is brought to the attention of the
court that a party has failed to comply with this rule [mandating disclosure
of exculpatory evidence], the court may ... enter such ... order as it
deems just under the circumstances.").

(
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constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady
does not create one.").
We find that Ritchie's interest (as well as that of the Commonwealth) in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by
requiring that the CYS files be submitted only to the trial
court for in camera review. Although this rule denies
Ritchie the benefits of an "advocate's eye," we note that
there
several checks 811 the trial court's discretion/
First, Jf a defendant is aware of specific information contained in the file (e . g., the medical report), he is free t~ ("W"-4-'-"- • ~
quest it directly from the court, and argue in favor of it8.,lr9W.,
vaaGQI. Second, the duty to disclose is ongoing; information
that may be deemed immaterial upon original examination
may become imP,ortant as the proceedings progress, and the
court bas he obligation to release materia mR>rmation as the
evidence dictates.
inally, should a defendant be dissatis' fied with the trial court's decision on the amount or types of
disclosure, he may have the file. sealed and transmitted to the
1
. appellate court, where a panel of judges also may conduct an
in camera examination. This combination of safeguards is
f sufficient to protect against an unjust conviction, while still
I ,.Preserving the Commonwealth's interest in confidentiality. )
To allow full disclosure to defense counsel in this type of
case would sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth's compelling interest in protecting its child abuse information. If
the CYS records were made available to defendants, even
through counsel, it could have a seriously adverse effect on
Pennsylvania's efforts to uncover and treat abuse. Child
abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses except the victim. A child's feelings of vulnerability and guilt,
and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly
acute when the abuser is a parent. It therefore is essential
that the child have a state-designated person to whom he
may turn, and to do so with the assurance of confidentiality.
Relatives and neighbors who suspect abuse also will be more

we
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willing to come forward if they know that their identities will
be protected. Recognizing this, the Commonwealth-like
all other States 16-has made a commendable effort to assure
victims and witnesses that they may speak to the CYS counselors without fear of general disclosure. The Commonwealth's purpose would be frustrated if this confidential material had to be disclosed upon demand to a defendant
charged with criminal child abuse, simply because a trial
court may not recognize exculpatory evidence. Neither
precedent nor common sense requires such a result.
IV
We agree that Ritchie is entitled to know whether the CYS
file contains information that may have changed the outcome
of his trial had it been disclosed. Thus we agree that a remand is necessary. We disagree with the decision of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the extent that it allows defense counsel access to the CYS file. An in camera review
by the trial court will serve Ritchie's interest without destroying the Commonwealth's need to protect the confidentiality of those involved in child-abuse investigations. The
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

16
All 50 states and the District of Columbia have statutes that protect
the confidentiality of their official records concerning child abuse. See
Brief for State of California, et al. as Amicus Curiae 12, n. 1 (listing illustrative statutes). See also Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting
Known and Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 Vill. L. Rev. 458,
508-512 (1978).
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PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONER v. GEORGE
F . RITCHIE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA, WESTERN DISTRICT
[January-, 1987]

JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether and to what
extent a State's interest in the confidentiality of its investigative files concerning child abuse must yield to a criminal defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to discover
favorable evidence.
I
As part of its efforts to combat child abuse, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has established Children and Youth
Services (CYS), a protective service agency charged with
investigating cases of suspected mistreatment and neglect.
In 1979 respondent George Ritchie was charged with rape,
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and corruption of a minor. The victim of the alleged attacks was his 13year-old daughter, who claimed that she had been assaulted
by Ritchie two or three times per week during the previous
four years. The girl reported the incidents to the police, and
the matter then was referred to the CYS.
During pre-trial discovery, Ritchie served CYS with a subpoena, seeking access to the records concerning the daughter. Ritchie requested disclosure of the file related to the
immediate charges, as well as certain records that he claimed
were compiled in 1978, when CYS investigated a separate report by an unidentified source that Ritchie's children were

'
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being abused. 1 CYS refused to comply with the subpoena,
claiming that the records were privileged under Pennsylvania law. The relevant statute provides that all reports and
other information obtained in the course of an CYS investigation must be kept confidential, subject to eleven specific exceptions. 2 One of those exceptions is that the Agency may
disclose the reports to a "court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order." 11 P. S. § 2215(a)(5).
Ritchie moved to have CYS sanctioned for failing to honor
the subpoena, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion
in chambers. Ritchie argued that he was entitled to the information because the file might contain the names of favorable witnesses, as well as other, unspecified exculpatory evidence. He also requested disclosure of a medical report that
he believed was compiled during the 1978 CYS investigation.
Although the trial judge acknowledged that he had not examAlthough the 1978 investigation took place during the period that the
daughter claimed she was being molested, it is undisputed that the daughter did not tell CYS about the assaults at that time. No criminal charges
were filed as a result of this earlier investigation.
2
The statute provides in part:
Except as provided in section 14 [11 P. S. § 2214], reports made pursuant
to this act including but not limited to report summaries of child abuse . . .
and written reports .. . as well as any other information obtained, reports
written or photographs or X-rays taken concerning alleged instances of
child abuse in the possession of the department, a county children and
youth social service agency or a child protective service shall be confidential and shall only be made available to:
1

(5) A court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order. 11
P. S. § 2215(a).
At the time of trial the statute only provided five exceptions to the general
rule of confidentiality, including the exception for court-ordered disclosure.
The statute was amended in 1982 to increase the number of exceptions.
For example, the records now may be revealed to law enforcement officials
for use in criminal investigations. § 2215(a)(9). But, the identity of a person who reported the abuse or who cooperated in the investigation may not
be released if the disclosure would be detrimental to that person's safety.
§ 2215(c).
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ined the entire CYS file, he accepted a CYS representative's
assertion that there was no medical report in the record. 3
The judge then denied the motion and refused to order CYS
to disclose the files. 4 See App. 72a.
At trial, the main witness against Ritchie was his daughter. In an attempt to rebut her testimony, defense counsel
cross-examined the girl at length, questioning her on all aspects of the alleged attacks, and her reasons for not reporting
the incidents sooner. Except for routine evidentiary rulings, the trial judge placed no limitation on the scope of crossexamination. At the close of trial Ritchie was convicted by a
jury on all counts, and the judge sentenced him to three to
ten years in prison.
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Ritchie
claimed, inter alia, that the failure to disclose the contents of
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, as applied to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 . The court
agreed that there had been a constitutional violation, and accordingly vacated the conviction and remanded for further
proceedings. 324 Pa. Super. 557, 472 A. 2d 220 (1984). The
Superior Court ruled, however, that the right of confrontaThe trial judge stated that he did not read "50 pages or more of an
extensive record." App. 72a. The judge had no knowledge of the case
before the pretrial hearing. See id., at 68a.
'There is no suggestion that the Commonwealth's prosecutor was given
access to the file at any point in the proceedings, or that he was aware of its
contents.
5
The Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution protects both the
right of confrontation and the right of compulsory process:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."
Both clauses are made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas , 380 U. S. 400, 403-406 (1965) (Confrontation
Clause); Washington v. Texas , 388 U. S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (Compulsory
Process Clause).
3
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tion did not entitle Ritchie to the full disclosure that he
sought. It held that on remand, the trial judge first was to
examine the confidential material in camera, and release only
the verbatim statements made by the daughter to the CYS
counselor. But the full record then was to be made available
to Ritchie's lawyer, for the limited purpose of allowing him to
argue the relevance of the statements. The court stated
that the prosecutor also should be allowed to argue that the
failure to disclose the statements was harmless error. If the
trial judge determined that the lack of information was prejudicial, Ritchie would be entitled to a new trial. I d., at - - ,
472 A. 2d, at 226.
On appeal by the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania agreed that the conviction must be vacated and
the case remanded to determine if a new trial is necessary.
509 Pa. 357, 502 A. 2d 148 (1985). But the court did not
agree that the search for material evidence must be limited to
the daughter's verbatim statements. Rather, it concluded
that Ritchie, through his lawyer, is entitled to review the entire file to search for any useful evidence. 6 It stated: "When
materials gathered become an arrow of inculpation, the person inculpated has a fundamental constitutional right to examine the provenance of the arrow and he who aims it." I d.,
at - - , 502 A. 2d, at 153. The Pennsylvania Court concluded that by denying access to the file, the trial court order
had violated both the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause. The court was unpersuaded by the
Commonwealth's argument that the trial judge already had
examined the file and determined that it contained no releThe court noted that the trial court should take "appropriate steps" to
guard against improper dissemination of the confidential material, including, for example, "fashioning appropriate protective orders or conducting
certain proceedings in camera." 509 Pa. 357, - , n. 16, 502 A. 2d 148,
, n. 16 (1985). These steps were to be taken, however, subject to "the
right of [Ritchie], through his counsel, to gain access to the information."
Ibid.
6
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vant information. It ruled that the constitutional infirmity
in this trial court's order was that Ritchie was unlawfully denied the opportunity to have the records reviewed by "the
eyes and the perspective of an advocate," who may see relevance in places that a neutral judge would not. Ibid.
In light of the substantial and conflicting interests held by
the Commonwealth and Ritchie, we granted certiorari. - U. S. - - . We now affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
II

Before turning to the constitutional questions, we first
must address Ritchie's claim that the Court lacks jurisdiction, because the decision below is not a "final judgment or
decree." See 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3); Market Street R. Co. v.
Railroad Commission of California, 324 U. S. 548, 551
(1945). Normally the finality doctrine contained in § 1257(3)
is not satisfied if the state courts still must conduct further
substantive proceedings before the rights of the parties as to
the federal issues are resolved. Ibid.; Radio Station WOW,
Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 123-127 (1945). Ritchie argues that under this standard the case is not final, because
there are several more proceedings scheduled in the Pennsylvania courts: at a minimum there will be an in camera review
of the file, and the parties will present arguments on whether
the lack of disclosure was prejudicial; after that, there could
be a new trial on the merits. Ritchie claims that because the
Sixth Amendment issue may become moot at either of these
stages, we should decline review until these further proceedings are completed.
Although it is true that this Court is without jurisdiction to
review an interlocutory judgment, it also is true that the
principles of finality have not been construed rigidly. As we
recognized in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469
(1975), there are at least four categories of cases in which
jurisdiction is proper even when there are further proceed-

..
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ings anticipated in the state court. One of these exceptions
states that the Court may consider cases:
"where the federal claim has been finally decided, with
further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to
come, but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had, whatever the outcome of the case. . . . [I]n
these cases, if the party seeking interim review ultimately prevails on the merits, the federal issue will be
mooted; if he were to lose on the merits, however, the
governing state law would not permit him again to present his federal claims for review." !d., at 481.
We find that the case before us satisfies this standard because the Sixth Amendment issue will not survive for this
Court to review, regardless of the outcome of the proceedings on remand. If the trial court decides that the CYS files
do not contain relevant information, or that the nondisclosure
was harmless, the Commonwealth will have prevailed and
will have no basis to seek review. In this situation Ritchie's
conviction will be reinstated, and the issue of whether defense counsel should have been given access will be moot.
Should Ritchie appeal the trial court's decision, the Commonwealth's only method for preserving the constitutional issue
would be by cross-claims. Thus the only way that this Court
will be able to reach the Sixth Amendment issue is if Ritchie
eventually files a petition for certiorari on the trial Court's
adverse ruling, and the Commonwealth filed a cross-petition.
When a case is in this procedural posture, we have considered it sufficiently final to justify review. See, e. g., New
York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649·, 651, n. 1 (1984); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 558, n. 6 (1983).
Alternatively, if Ritchie is found to have been prejudiced
by the withholding and is granted a new trial, the Commonwealth still will be unable to obtain a ruling from this Court.
On retrial Ritchie either will be convicted, in which case the
Commonwealth's ability to obtain review again will rest on
Ritchie's willingness to appeal; or he will be acquitted, in

.
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which case the Commonwealth will be barred from seeking
review by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See ibid.; California v. Stewart, 384 U. S. 436, 498, n. 71 (1966) (decided with
Miranda v. Arizona). Therefore, if this Court does not consider the constitutio al claims now, it will lose the chance to
7
~-_.....-~
in the futur .
Nothing in our decision in New York v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 (1971),
requires a different result. In that case the respondent was served with a
subpoena requiring him to produce business records for a grand jury. The
District Court denied a motion to quash, and respondent appealed. We
concluded that the District Court order was not appealable. I d., at 532.
We rejected the contention that immediate review was necessary to avoid
the harm of disclosing otherwise protected material, noting that parties
who face such an order have the option of making the decision "final" simply by refusing to comply with the subpoena.
Although there are similarities between this case and Ryan, the analogy
is incomplete. In Ryan the Court was concerned about the "necessity for
expedition in the administration of the criminal law," id., at 533, an interest that would be undermined if all pretrial orders were immediately appealable. Ryan also rests on an implicit assumption that unless a party
resisting discovery is willing to risk being held in contempt, the significance of his claim is insufficient to justify interrupting the ongoing proceedings. That is not the situation before us. Here the trial already has
taken place, and the issue reviewed by the Commonwealth appellate
courts. The interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of delay,
rather than being hindered, would be best served by resolving the issue.
Cf. Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U. S. , 469, 477-478 (1975) (exceptions
to finality doctrine justified in part by need to avoid economic waste and
judicial delay).
We also reject Ritchie's suggestion that we should dismiss this action
and allow the case to return to the trial court, so that the Commonwealth
can formally refuse to comply with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision. Here we are not faced merely with an individual's assertion that a
subpoena is unduly burdensome, but with a holding of a State Supreme
Court that the legislative interest in confidentiality will not be given effect
on these facts . The Commonwealth's interest in obtaining immediate review is obvious. On the facts of this case, we do not think the finality doctrine requires a new round of litigation and appellate review, simply to de~
·
r the Commonwealth iii adamant abGYt Rot;..di~.~-wt<~·""'
OYS 1 eeel'ds '"IJ1fol interests that the finalit
WGuld be disserved by proiGnging this litig~ee generally, Bradley
7
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The Sixth Amendment issue has been finally decided by
the highest court of Pennsylvania, and unless we review that
decision, the harm that the Commonwealth seeks to avoidthe disclosure of the entire confidential file-will occur rea.~ tj II / -= gardless of the result on remand.y Although this consid~
~
eration is not dispositive, we have noted that "statutorily
1. _
created finality requirements, should if possible, be conas 'I hJl
strued so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost
.J.~·n
e
J
, L
and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered."
7 I~
jtJ&fC.(~t'JI ur
1
r .[o ~~Ll' Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 331, n. 11 (1976). We
rJl>~
'I . if therefore reject Ritchie's claim that the Court lacks jurisdic•
tion, and turn to the merits of the case before us.

-.

J.fr

I

<:-----

III
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Ritchie,
through his lawyer, has the right to examine the full contents
of the CYS records. The court found that this right of access
is required by both the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause. We discuss these constitutional
provisions in turn.
A
The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face
those who testify against him, and the right to conduct crossexamination. Delaware v. Fensterer, - - U . S . - - , - (1985) (per curiam). Ritchie does not allege a violation of
the former right. He was not excluded from any part of the
trial, nor did the prosecutor improperly introduce out-ofcourt statements as substantive evidence, thereby depriving
Ritchie of the right to "confront" the declarant. See Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980). Cf. United States v. Inadi,
- - U. S. - - (1986). Instead, Ritchie claims that by denying him access to the information necessary to prepare his
v. Richmond School Board, 416 U. S. 696, 722, n. 28 (1974) ("This Court
has been inclined to follow a 'pragmatic approach' to the question of finality") (citation omitted).

"JhaJ(/ ~ wW -.j; ./<F«<<r.r~a0~r /)"<=?P4J' -icJ'Hf~
~a/ /~ ~~P«cu.Rd~ ~dv~~cl~~~ 4
~~ ~ ~ j~
0
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defense, the trial court interfered with his right of crossexamination.
Ritchie argues that he could not effectively question his
daughter because, without the CYS material, he did not
know which types of questions would best expose the weaknesses in her testimony. Had the files been disclosed,
Ritchie argues that he might have been able to show that the
daughter made statements to the CYS counselor that were
inconsistent with her trial statements, or perhaps to reveal
that the girl acted with an improper motive. Of course, the
right to cross-examine includes the opportunity to show that
a witness is biased, or that the testimony is exaggerated or
unbelievable. United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 50 (1984);
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 316 (1974). Because this
type of evidence can make the difference between conviction
and acquittal, see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264, 269
(1959), Ritchie argues that the failure to disclose information
that might have made cross-examination more effective undermines the Confrontation Clause's purpose of increasing
the accuracy of the truth-finding process at trial. See
United States v. Inadi, supra, at--.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted this argument,
relying in part on our decision in Davis v. Alaska, supra. In
Davis the trial judge prohibited defense counsel from questioning a witness about the latter's juvenile criminal record,
because a state statute made this information presumptively
confidential. We found that this restriction on cross-examination violated the Confrontation Clause, despite Alaska's
legitimate interest in protecting the identity of juvenile
offenders. 415 U. S., at 318-320. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court apparently interpreted our decision in Davis
to mean that a statutory privilege cannot be maintained when
a defendant asserts a need, prior to trial, for the protected
information that might be used at trial to impeach or otherwise undermine a witness' testimony. See-- Pa., at - - ,
502 A. 2d, at 152-153.

..
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If we were to accept this broad interpretation of Davis, the
effect would be to transform the Confrontation Clause into a
constitutionally-compelled rule of pretrial discovery. Nothing in the case law supports such a view. The opinions of
this Court show that the right of confrontation is a trial right,
designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of
questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-examination. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 157 (1970)
("[I]t is the literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time
of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the
Confrontation Clause."); Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719, 725
(1968) ("The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.").
The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does not
include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any
and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony. 8 Normally the right to confront one's accusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at
trial to question witnesses. Delaware v. Fensterer, supra,
at - - . In short, the Confrontation Clause only guarantees
"an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective." Id., at - - (emphasis in
original). See also Ohio v. Roberts, supra, at 73, n. 12 (except in "extraordinary cases, no inquiry into 'effectiveness'
[of cross-examination] is required").
We reaffirmed this interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause last term in Delaware v. Fensterer, supra. In that
case, the defendant was convicted in part on the testimony of
the State's expert witness, who could not remember which
8

This is not to suggest, of course, that there are no protections for pretrial discovery in criminal cases. See discussion in Part III(B), post. We
simply hold that with respect to this issue, the Confrontation Clause only
protects a defendant's trial rights, and does not compel the pretrial production of information that might be useful in preparing for trial. Also, we
hardly need say that nothing in our opinion today is intended to alter a trial
judge's traditional power to control the scope of cross-examination by prohibiting questions that are prejudicial, irrelevant, or otherwise improper.
See Delaware v. VanArsdall,- U. S . - , - (1986).
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scientific test he had used to form his opinion. Although this
inability to recall frustrated defense counsel's efforts to discredit the testimony, we held that there had been no Sixth
Amendment violation. The Court found that the right of
confrontation was not implicated, "for the trial court did not
limit the scope or nature of defense counsel's cross-examination in any way." - - U. S., at--. Fensterer was in full
accord with our earlier decisions, that have upheld a Confrontation Clause infringement claim on this issue only when
there was a specific statutory or court-imposed restriction at
trial on the scope of questioning. 9
The lower court's reliance on Davis v. Alaska therefore is
misplaced. There the state court had prohibited defense
counsel from questioning the witness about his criminal
record, even though that evidence might have affected the
witness' credibility. The constitutional error in that case
was not that Alaska made this information confidential; it
was that the defendant was denied the right "to expose to the
jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness."
9
See, e. g., Delaware v. VanArsdall, supra (denial of right to crossexamine to show bias); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974); Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973) (denial of right to impeach own witness);
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U. S. 129 (1968) (denial of right to ask witness' real
name and address at trial); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965) (denial of right to cross-examine codefendant). Moreover, the Court normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted
interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial. Compare
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300 311-313 (1967) (no Confrontation Clause
violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's
name at pretrial hearing), with Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53
(1957) (on the facts presented, Government required to disclose informant's
name at trial). See generally, Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause,
73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 125-126 (1974) ("The right of confrontation is exclusively a trial right . . . . It does not ... require the government to
produce witnesses whose statements are not used at trial, or to produce
the underlying information on which the witnesses base their testimony.")
(footnotes omitted) (hereinafter Westen).

..
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415 U. S., at 318. Similarly, in this case the Confrontation
Clause was not violated by the withholding of the CYS file; it
only would have been impermissible for the judge to have
prevented Ritchie's lawyer from cross-examining the daughter. Because defense counsel was able to cross-examine all
of the trial witnesses fully, we find that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court erred in holding that the failure to disclose
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause.
B

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also suggested that the
failure to disclose the CYS file violated the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of compulsory process. Ritchie asserts
that the trial court's ruling prevented him from learning the
names of the "witnesses in his favor," as well as other evidence that might be contained in the file. Although the basis
for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling on this point is
unclear, it apparently concluded that the right of compulsory
process includes the right to have the State's assistance in
uncovering arguably useful information, without regard to
the existence of a state-created restriction-here, the confidentiality of the files.
1

This Court has had little occasion to discuss the contours of
the Compulsory Process Clause. The first and most celebrated analysis came from a Virginia federal court in 1807,
during the treason and misdemeanor trials of Aaron Burr.
Chief Justice Marshall, who presided as trial judge, ruled
that Burr's compulsory process rights entitled him to serve a
subpoena on President Jefferson, requesting the production
of allegedly incriminating evidence. 10 United States v. Burr,
The evidence consisted of a letter that was sent to President Jefferson
by General James Wilkinson that allegedly showed that Burr was planning
to invade Mexico and set up a separate government under his control.
After being ordered to do so, Jefferson eventually turned over an edited
version of the letter. For an excellent summary of the Burr case and its
implications for compulsory process, see Westen 101-108.
10
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25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (CCD Va. 1807). Despite the
implications of the Burr decision for federal criminal procedure, the Compulsory Process Clause rarely was a factor in
this Court's decisions during the next 160 years. 11 More recently, however, the Court has articulated some of the specific rights secured by this part of the Sixth Amendment.
Our cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants
have the right to the Government's assistance in compelling
the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to
put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt. 12
This Court has never squarely held that the Compulsory
Process Clause guarantees the right to discover the identity
of witnesses, or to require the Government to produce exculpatory evidence. But cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S.
683, 709, 711 (1974) (suggesting that the clause may require
the production of evidence). Instead, the Court traditionally
has evaluated claims such as those raised by Ritchie under
the broader protections of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Bagley,-U. S . - (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
See also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470 (1973). Because
the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to this type of case
is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth Amendment precedents addressing the fundamental fairness of trials establish
a clear framework for review, we adopt a due process analysis for purposes of this case. Although we conclude that
compulsory process provides no greater protections in this
"The pre-1967 cases that mention compulsory process do not provide an
extensive analysis of the clause. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375,
378, n. 1 (1966); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 442 (1932);
United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 169, 173 (1891); Ex parte Harding,
120 U. S. 782 (1887). See generally, Westen 108, and n. 164.
12
See, e. g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973); Cool v.
United States, 409 U. S. 100 (1972) (per curiam); Washington v. Texas,
388 U. S. 14 (1967). Cf. Webb v. Texas, 409 U. S. 95 (1972) (per curiam)
(decision based on Due Process Clause).

...
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area than those afforded by due process, we need not decide
today whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory
Process Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is enough to conclude that on these facts, Ritchie's
claims more properly are considered by reference to due
process.
2

It is well-settled that the Government has the obligation to
turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to
the accused and material to guilt or punishment. United
States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland,
supra, at 87. Although courts have used different terminologies to define "materiality," a majority of this Court has
agreed, "[e]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense , the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." United States v. Bagley;
supra, at-- (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.); id., at-- (opinion of WHITE, J.).
At this stage, of course, it is impossible to say whether any
information in the CYS records may be relevant to Ritchie's
claim of innocence, because neither the prosecution nor defense counsel has seen the information, and the trial judge acknowledged that he had not reviewed the full file. The Commonwealth, however, argues that no materiality inquiry is
required, because a statute renders the contents of the file
privileged. Requiring disclosure here, it is argued, would
override the Commonwealth's compelling interest in confidentiality on the mere speculation that the file "might" have
been useful to the defense.
Although we recognize that the public interest in protecting this type of sensitive information is strong, we do not
agree that this interest necessarily prevents disclosure in all
circumstances. This is not a case where a state statute
grants CYS the absolute authority to shield its files from all
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eyes. Cf. 42 P. S. § 5945.1(b) (unqualified statutory privilege for communications between sexual assault counselors
and victims). 13 Rather, the Pennsylvania law provides that
the information shall be disclosed in certain circumstances,
including when CYS is directed to do so by court order. 11
P. S. § 2215(a)(5). Given that the Pennsylvania legislature
contemplated some use of CYS records in judicial proceedings, we cannot conclude that the statute prevents all disclosure in criminal prosecutions. Specifically, we have no
reason to believe that relevant information would not be disclosed when a court of competent jurisdiction determines that
the information is "material" to the defense of the accused.
We therefore affirm the decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to the extent it orders a remand for further
proceedings. Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file reviewed by the trial court to determine whether it contains
information that p_!obably would have changed the outcome
of his trial. If it does, he must be given a new trial. If the
records maintained by CYS contain no such information, or if
the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
the lower court will be free to reinstate the prior conviction. 14
We express no opinion on whether the result in this case would have
been different if the statute had protected the CYS files from disclosure to
anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial personnel.
1
' The Commonwealth also argues that Ritchie is not entitled to disclosure because he did not make a particularized showing of what information
he was seeking or how it would be material. See Brief for Petitioner 18
(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 109-110 (1976) ("The mere
possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the
defense ... does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense.")).
See also United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S. 858, 869-871
(1982). The obligation to disclose exculpatory material, of course, does
not depend on the presence of a specific request. We note, however, that
the degree of specificity of Ritchie's request for the information may have a
bearing on the trial court's assessment on remand of the materiality of the
nondisclosure. See United States v. Bagley,-- U. S. - - , - - (1985)
(opinion of BLACKMUN, J.); id., at-- (opinion of WHITE , J.).
13

,.'
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c
This ruling does not end our analysis, because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did more than simply remand. It also
held that defense counsel must be allowed to examine all of
the confidential information, both relevant and irrelevant,
and present arguments in favor of disclosure. The court apparently concluded that whenever a defendant alleges that
protected evidence might be material, the appropriate
method of assessing this claim is to grant full access to the
disputed information, regardless of the State's interest in
confidentiality. We cannot agree.
A defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence does
not include the unsupervised authority to search through the
Commonwealth's files. See United States v. Bagley, supra,
at - - ; United States v. Agurs, supra, at - - . Although
the eye of an advocate may be helpful to a defendant in
ferreting out information, Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S.
855, 875 (1966), this Court has never held-even in the absence of a statute restricting disclosure-that a defendant
alone may make the determination as to the materiality of the
information. Settled practice is to the contrary. In the
typical case where a defendant makes only a general request
for exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, supra, it
is the State that decides which information must be disclosed.
Unless defense counsel becomes aware that other exculpatory evidence was withheld and brings it to the court's attention, 15 the prosecutor's decision on disclosure is final. Defense counsel has no constitutional right to conduct his own
search of the State's files to argue relevance. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545 (1977) ("There is no general
16
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2); Pa. R. Crim. P. 305(E) ("if at any time
during the course of the proceeding it is brought to the attention of the
court that a party has failed to comply with this rule [mandating disclosure
of exculpatory evidence], the court may . .. enter such . .. order as it
deems just under the circumstances.").

••
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constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady
does not create one.").
We find that Ritchie's interest (as well as that of the Commonwealth) in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by
requiring that the CYS files be submitted only to the trial
court for in camera review. Although this rule denies
Ritchie the benefits of an "advocate's eye," we note that the
trial court's discretion is not unbounded. If a defendant is
aware of specific information contained in the file (e. g. , the
medical report), he is free to request it directly from the
court, and argue in favor of its .m ateriality. Moreover, the
duty to disclose is ongoing; information that may be deemed
immaterial upon original examination may become important
as the proceedings progress, and the court would be obligated to release information m.aterial to the fairness of the
trial.
To allow full disclosure to defense counsel in this type of
case would sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth's compelling interest in protecting its child abuse information. If
the CYS records were made available to defendants, even
through counsel, it could have a seriously adverse effect on
Pennsylvania's efforts to uncover and treat abuse. Child
abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses except the victim. A child's feelings of vulnerability and guilt,
and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly
acute when the abuser is a parent. It therefore is essential
that the child have a state-designated person to whom he
may turn, and to do so with the assurance of confidentiality.
Relatives and neighbors who suspect abuse also will be more
willing to come forward if they know that their identities will
be protected. Recognizing this, the Commonwealth-like
all other States 16-has made a commendable effort to assure
16
All 50 states and the District of Columbia have statutes that protect
the confidentiality of their official records concerning child abuse. See
Brief for State of California, et a!. as Amicus Curiae 12, n. 1 (listing illus-

.
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victims and witnesses that they may speak to the CYS counselors without fear of general disclosure. The Commonwealth's purpose would be frustrated if this confidential material had to be disclosed upon demand to a defendant
charged with criminal child abuse, simply because a trial
court may not recognize exculpatory evidence. Neither
precedent nor common sense requires such a result.
IV
We agree that Ritchie is entitled to know whether the CYS
file contains information that may have changed the outcome
of his trial had it been disclosed. Thus we agree that a remand is necessary. We disagree with the decision of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the extent that it allows defense counsel access to the CYS file. An in camera review
by the trial court will serve Ritchie's interest without destroying the Commonwealth's need to protect the confidentiality of those involved in child-abuse investigations. The
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

trative statutes). See also Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting
Known and Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 Vill. L. Rev. 458,
508-512 (1978).
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PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONER v.
GEORGE F. RITCHIE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA, WESTERN DISTRICT
[February - , 1987]

JUSTICE POWELL announced the judgment of the Court )
and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts
I, II, III-B, III-C, and IV, and an opinion with respect to
Part III-A in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE,
and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join.
The question presented in this case is whether and to what
extent a State's interest in the confidentiality of its investigative files concerning child abuse must yield to a criminal defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to discover
favorable evidence.
I
As part of its efforts to combat child abuse, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has established Children and Youth
Services (CYS), a protective service agency charged with
investigating cases of suspected mistreatment and neglect.
In 1979, respondent George Ritchie was charged with rape,
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and corruption of a minor. The victim of the alleged attacks was his 13year-old daughter, who claimed that she had been assaulted
by Ritchie two or three times per week during the previous
four years. The girl reported the incidents to the police, and
the matter then was referred to the CYS.
During pretrial discovery, Ritchie served CYS with a subpoena, seeking access to the records concerning the daugh-
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ter. Ritchie requested disclosure of the file related to the
immediate charges, as well as certain records that he claimed
were compiled in 1978, when CYS investigated a separate report by an unidentified source that Ritchie's children were
being abused. 1 CYS refused to comply with the subpoena,
claiming that the records were privileged under Pennsylvania law. The relevant statute provides that all reports and
other information obtained in the course of an CYS investigation must be kept confidential, subject to 11 specific exceptions. 2 One of those exceptions is that the Agency may disclose the reports to a "court of competent jurisdiction
pursuant to a court order." Pa. Stat. Ann. , Title 11,
§ 2215(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
Ritchie moved to have CYS sanctioned for failing to honor
the subpoena, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion
Although the 1978 investigation took place during the period that the
daughter claimed she was being molested, it is undisputed that the daughter did not tell CYS about the assaults at that time. No criminal charges
were filed as a result of this earlier investigation.
2
The statute provides in part:
"(a) Except as provided in section 14 [Pa. Stat. Ann., Title 11, § 2214
(Purdon Supp. 1986)], reports made pursuant to this act including but not
limited to report summaries of child abuse . . . and written reports . . . as
well as any other information obtained, reports written or photographs or
X-rays taken concerning alleged instances of child abuse in the possession
of the department, a county children and youth social service agency or a
child protective service shall be confidential and shall only be made available to:
1

"(5) A court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order." Pa.
Stat. Ann. , Title 11, § 2215(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
At the time of trial the statute only provided five exceptions to the general
rule of confidentiality, including the exception for court-ordered disclosure.
The statute was amended in 1982 to increase the number of exceptions.
For example, the records now may be revealed to law enforcement officials
for use in criminal investigations. § 2215(a)(9). But, the identity of a person who reported the abuse or who cooperated in the investigation may not
be released if the disclosure would be detrimental to that person's safety.
§ 2215(c).

•,
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in chambers. Ritchie argued that he was entitled to the infonnation because the file might contain the names of favorable witnesses, as well as other, unspecified exculpatory evidence. He also requested disclosure of a medical report that
he believed was compiled during the 1978 CYS investigation.
Although the trial judge acknowledged that he had not examined the entire CYS file, he accepted a CYS representative's
assertion that there was no medical report in the record. 3
The judge then denied the motion and refused to order CYS
to disclose the files. 4 See App. 72a.
At trial, the main witness against Ritchie was his daughter. In an attempt to rebut her testimony, defense counsel
cross-examined the girl at length, questioning her on all aspects of the alleged attacks, and her reasons for not reporting
the incidents sooner. Except for routine evidentiary rulings, the trial judge placed no limitation on the scope of crossexamination. At the close of trial Ritchie was convicted by a
jury on all counts, and the judge sentenced him to 3 to 10
years in prison.
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Ritchie
claimed, inter alia, that the failure to disclose the contents of
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, as applied to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The court
3
The trial judge stated that he did not read "50 pages or more of an
extensive record." App. 72a. The judge had no knowledge of the case
before the pretrial hearing. See id., at 68a.
'There is no suggestion that the Commonwealth's prosecutor was given
access to the file at any point in the proceedings, or that he was aware of its
contents.
5
The Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution protects both the
right of confrontation and the right of compulsory process:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."
Both Clauses are made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 403-406 (1965) (Confrontation
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agreed that there had been a constitutional violation, and accordingly vacated the conviction and remanded for further
proceedings. 324 Pa. Super. 557, 472 A. 2d 220 (1984). The
Superior Court ruled, however, that the right of confrontation did not entitle Ritchie to the full disclosure that he
sought. It held that on remand, the trial judge first was to
examine the confidential material in camera, and release only
the verbatim statements made by the daughter to the CYS
counselor. But the full record then was to be made available
to Ritchie's lawyer, for the limited purpose of allowing him to
argue the relevance of the statements. The court stated
that the prosecutor also should be allowed to argue that the
failure to disclose the statements was harmless error. If the
trial judge determined that the lack of information was prejudicial, Ritchie would be entitled to a new trial. I d., at
567-568, 472 A. 2d, at 226.
On appeal by the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania agreed that the conviction must be vacated and
the case remanded to determine if a new trial is necessary.
509 Pa. 357, 502 A. 2d 148 (1985). But the court did not
agree that the search for material evidence must be limited to
the daughter's verbatim statements. Rather, it concluded
that Ritchie, through his lawyer, is entitled to review the entire file to search for any useful evidence. 6 It stated: "When
materials gathered become an arrow of inculpation, the person inculpated has a fundamental constitutional right to examine the provenance of the arrow and he who aims it." I d.,
at 367, 502 A. 2d, at 153. The Pennsylvania Court concluded
Clause); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (Compulsory
Process Clause).
.
6
The court noted that the trial court should take "appropriate steps" to
guard against improper dissemination of the confidential material, including, for example, "fashioning of appropriate protective orders, or conducting certain proceedings in camera." 509 Pa. 357, 368, n. 16, 502 A. 2d
148, 153, n. 16 (1985). These steps were to be taken, however, subject to
"the right of [Ritchie], through his counsel, to gain access to the information." Ibid.

~
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that by denying access to the file, the trial court order had
violated both the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory
Process Clause. The court was unpersuaded by the Commonwealth's argument that the trial judge already had examined the file and determined that it contained no relevant information. It ruled that the constitutional infirmity in this
trial court's order was that Ritchie was unlawfully denied the
opportunity to have the records reviewed by "the eyes and
the perspective of an advocate," who may see relevance in
places that a neutral judge would not. Ibid.
In light of the substantial and conflicting interests held by
the· Commonwealth and Ritchie, we granted certiorari. 476
U. S. - - (1986). We now affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
II

Before turning to the constitutional questions, we first
must address Ritchie's claim that the Court lacks jurisdiction, because the decision below is not a "final judgment or
decree." See 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3); Market Street R. Co . v.
Railroad Comm'n of California, 324 U. S. 548, 551 (1945).
Normally the finality doctrine contained in § 1257(3) is not
satisfied if the state courts still must conduct further substantive proceedings before the rights of the parties as to the
federal issues are resolved. Ibid.; Radio Station WOW , Inc .
v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 123-127 (1945). Ritchie argues
that under this standard the case is not final, because there
are several more proceedings scheduled in the Pennsylvania
courts: at a minimum there will be an in camera review of the
file , and the parties will present arguments on whether the
lack of disclosure was prejudicial; after that, there could be a
new trial on the merits. Ritchie claims that because the
Sixth Amendment issue may become moot at either of these
stages, we should decline review until these further proceedings are completed.
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Although it is true that this Court is without jurisdiction to
review an interlocutory judgment, it also is true that the
principles of finality have not been construed rigidly. As we
recognized in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469
(1975), there are at least four categories of cases in which
jurisdiction is proper even when there are further proceedings anticipated in the state court. One of these exceptions
states that the Court may consider cases:
"[W]here the federal claim has been finally decided, with
further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to
come, but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the
case. . . . [I]n these cases, if the party seeking interim
review ultimately prevails on the merits, the federal
issue will be mooted; if he were to lose on the merits,
however, the governing state law would not permit him
again to present his federal claims for review." I d., at
481.

We find that the case before us satisfies this standard because the Sixth Amendment issue will not survive for this
Court to review, regardless of the outcome of the proceedings on remand. If the trial court decides that the CYS files
do not contain relevant information, or that the nondisclosure
was harmless, the Commonwealth will have prevailed and
will have no basis to seek review. In this situation Ritchie's
conviction will be reinstated, and the issue of whether defense counsel should have been given access will be moot.
Should Ritchie appeal the trial court's decision, the Commonwealth's only method for preserving the constitutional issue
would be by cross-claims. Thus the only way that this Court
will be able to reach the Sixth Amendment issue is if Ritchie
eventually files a petition for certiorari on the trial Court's
adverse ruling, and the Commonwealth filed a cross-petition.
When a case is in this procedural posture, we have considered i: sufficiently final to justify review. See, e. g., New
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York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 651, n. 1 (1984); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 558, n. 6 (1983).
Alternatively, if Ritchie is found to have been prejudiced
by the withholding and is granted a new trial, the Commonwealth still will be unable to obtain a ruling from this Court.
On retrial Ritchie either Mll be convicted, in which case the
Commonwealth's ability to obtain review again will rest on
Ritchie's willingness to appeal; or he will be acquitted, in
which case the Commonwealth will be barred from seeking
review by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See ibid. ; California v. Stewart, 384 U. S. 436, 498, n. 71 (1966) (decided with
Miranda v. Arizona). Therefore, if this Court does not consider the constitutional claims now, there may well be no
opportunity to do so in the future. 7
As the dissent points out, post, at--, there is a third possibility. If
the trial court finds prejudicial error and orders a retrial, the Commonwealth may attempt to take an immediate appeal of this order. See Pa.
Rule of App. Proc. 31l(a). The dissent suggests that because the Commonwealth can raise the Sixth Amendment issue again in this appeal, respect for the finality doctrine should lead us to dismiss. But even if we
were persuaded that an immediate appeal would lie in this situation, it
would not necessarily follow that the constitutional issue will survive.
The appellate court could find that the failure to disclose was harmless,
precluding further review by the Commonwealth. Alternatively, the appellate court could agree that the error was prejudicial, thus permitting
the Commonwealth to claim that the Sixth Amendment does not compel
disclosure. But as the dissent recognizes, the Pennsylvania courts already
have considered and resolved this issue in its earlier proceedings; if the
Commonwealth were to raise it again in a new set of appeals , the courts
below would simply reject the claim under the law of the case doctrine.
Law of the case principles are not a bar to this Court's jurisdiction, of
course, and thus the dissent apparently would require the Commonwealth
to raise a fruitless Sixth Amendment claim in the trial court, the Superior
Court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court still another time before we
re-grant certiorari on the question that is now before us.
The goals of finality would be frustrated, rather than furthered, by these
wasteful and time-consuming procedures. Based on the unusual facts of
this case, the justifications for the finality doctrine-efficiency, judicial
restraint, and federalism , see Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326
7
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The Sixth Amendment issue has been finally decided by
the highest court of Pennsylvania, and unless we review that
decision, the harm that the Commonwealth seeks to avoidthe disclosure of the entire confidential file-will occur regardless of the result on remand. We thus cannot agree
with the suggestion in JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent that if we
were to dismiss this case .and it was resolved on other
grounds after disclosure of. the file, "the Commonwealth
would not have been harmed." Post, at 2. This hardly
could be true, because of the acknowledged public interest in
ensuring the confidentiality of CYS records. See n. 17,
infra. Although this consideration is not dispositive, we
have noted that "statutorily created finality requirements
should, if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial
collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries
to be suffered." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 331,
n. 11 (1976). We therefore reject Ritchie's claim that the
Court lacks jurisdiction, and turn to the merits of the case before us. 8
U. S. 120, 124 (1945); post, at ---would be ill served by another round
of litigation on an issue that has been authoritatively decided by the highest state court.
8
Nothing in our decision in United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 (1971),
requires a different result. In that case the respondent was served with a
subpoena requiring him to produce business records for a grand jury. The
District Court denied a motion to quash, and respondent appealed. We
concluded that the District Court order was not appealable. ld., at 532.
We rejected the contention that immediate review was necessary to avoid
the harm of disclosing otherwise protected material, noting that parties
who face such an order have the option of making the decision "final" simply by refusing to comply with the subpoena.
Although there are similarities between this case and Ryan, the analogy
is incomplete. In Ryan the Court was concerned about the "necessity for
expedition in the administration of the criminal law," id., at 533, an interest that would be undermined if all pretrial orders were immediately appealable. Ryan also rests on an implicit assumption that unless a party
resisting discovery is willing to risk being held in contempt, the significance of his claim is insufficient to justify interrupting the ongoing proceed-
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III
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Ritchie,
through his lawyer, has the right to examine the full contents
of the CYS records. · The court found that this right of access
is required by both the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause. We discuss these constitutional
provisions in turn.
A

The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face
those who testify against him, and the right to conduct crossexamination. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U. S. - - , - (1985) (per curiam). Ritchie does not allege a violation of
the former right. He was not excluded from any part of the
trial, nor did the prosecutor improperly introduce out-ofcourt statements as substantive evidence, thereby depriving
ings. That is not the situation before us. Here the trial already has
taken place, and the issue reviewed by the Commonwealth appellate
courts. The interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of delay,
rather than being hindered, would be best served by resolving the issue.
Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S., 469, 477-478 (1975) (exceptions to finality doctrine justified in part by need to avoid economic
waste and judicial delay).
We also reject Ritchie's suggestion that we should dismiss this action
and allow the case to return to the trial court, so that the Commonwealth
can formally refuse to comply with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision and be held in contempt. Here we are not faced merely with an individual's assertion that a subpoena is unduly burdensome, but with a holding of a State Supreme Court that the legislative interest in confidentiality
will not be given effect. The Commonwealth's interest in immediate review of this case is obvious and substantial. Contrary to JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent, we do not think that the finality doctrine requires a new
round of litigation and appellate review simply to give the Commonwealth
"the chance to decide whether to comply with the order." Post, at 6. See
n. 7, supra. To prolong the proceedings on this basis would be inconsistent with the "pragmatic" approach we normally have taken to finality questions. See generally, Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U. S. 696,
722-723, n. 28 (1974) ("This Court has been inclined to follow a 'pragmatic
approach' to the question of finality'') (citation omi~ted).
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Ritchie of the right to "confront" the declarant. See Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980). Cf. United States v. Inadi, 475
U. S. - - (1986). Instead, Ritchie claims that by denying
him access to the information necessary to prepare his defense, the trial court interfered with his right of crossexamination.
Ritchie argues that he could not effectively question his
daughter because, without the CYS material, he did not
lmow which types of questions would best expose the weaknesses in her testimony. Had the files been disclosed,
Ritchie argues that he might have been able to show that the
daughter made statements to the CYS counselor that were
inconsistent with her trial statements, or perhaps to reveal
that the girl acted with an improper motive. Of course, the
right to cross-examine includes the opportunity to show that
a witness is biased, or that the testimony is exaggerated or
unbelievable. United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 50 (1984);
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 316 (1974). Because this
type of evidence can make the difference between conviction
and acquittal, see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264, 269
(1959), Ritchie argues that the failure to disclose information
that might have made cross-examination more effective undermines the Confrontation Clause's purpose of increasing
the accuracy of the truth-finding process at trial. See
United States v. Inadi, supra, at--.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted this argument,
relying in part on our decision in Davis v. Alaska, supra. In
Davis the trial judge prohibited defense counsel from questioning a witness about the latter's juvenile criminal record,
because a state statute made this information presumptively
confidential. We found that this restriction on cross-examination violated the Confrontation Clause, despite Alaska's
legitimate interest in protecting the identity of juvenile
offenders. 415 U. S., at 318-320. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court apparently interpreted our decision in Davis
to mean that a statutory privilege cannot be maintained when
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a defendant asserts a need, prior to trial, for the protected
information that might be used at trial to impeach or otherwise undermine a witness' testimony. See 509 Pa., at
365-367, 502 A. 2d, at 152-153.
If we were to accept this broad interpretation of Davis, the
effect would be to transform the Confrontation Clause into a
constitutionally-compelled rule of pretrial discovery. Nothing in the case law supports such a view. The opinions of
this Court show that the right of confrontation is a trial right,
designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of
questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-examination. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 157 (1970)
("[I]t is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time
of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the
Confrontation Clause"); Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719, 725
(1968) ("The right to confrontation is basically a trial right").
The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does not
include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any
and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony. 9 Normally the right to confront one's accusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at
trial to question witnesses. Delaware v. Fensterer, supra,
at - - . In short, the Confrontation Clause only guarantees
"an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." I d., at - - (emphasis in original). See also Ohio v. Roberts, supra, at 73, n. 12
9
This is not to suggest, of course, that there are no protections for pretrial discovery in criminal cases. See discussion in Part III(B), infra.
We simply hold that with respect to this issue, the Confrontation Clause
only protects a defendant's trial rights, and does not compel the pretrial
production of information that might be useful in preparing for trial. Also,
we hardly need say that nothing in our opinion today is intended to alter a
trial judge's traditional power to control the scope of cross-examination by
prohibiting questions that are prejudicial, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. See Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U. S. - , (1986).

''
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(except in "extraordinary cases, no inquiry into 'effectiveness' [of cross-examination] is required").
We reaffinned this interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause last term in Delaware v. Fensterer, supra. In that
case, the defendant was convicted in part on the testimony of
the State's expert witness, who could not remember which
scientific test he had used to form his opinion. Although this
inability to recall frustrated defense counsel's efforts to discredit the testimony, we held that there had been no Sixth
Amendment violation. The Court found that the right of
confrontation was not implicated, "for the trial court did not
limit the scope or nature of defense counsel's cross-examination in any way." 474 U. S. , at--. Fensterer was in full
accord with our earlier decisions, that have upheld a Confrontation Clause infringement claim on this issue only when
there was a specific statutory or court-imposed restriction at
trial on the scope of questioning. 10
The lower court's reliance on Davis v. Alaska therefore is
misplaced. There the state court had prohibited defense
counsel from questioning the witness about his criminal
See, e. g., Delaware v. VanArsdall , supra (denial of right to crossexamine to show bias); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974); Chambers v.
Mississippi , 410 U. S. 284 (1973) (denial of right to impeach own witness);
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U. S. 129 (1968) (denial of right to ask witness' real
name and address at trial); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965) (denial of right to cross-examine codefendant). Moreover, the Court normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted
interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial. Compare
McCray v. Illinois , 386 U. S. 300, 311-313 (1967) (no Confrontation Clause
violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's
name at pretrial hearing), with Roviaro v. United States , 353 U. S. 53
(1957) (on the facts presented, Government required to disclose informant's
name at trial). See generally, Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause,
73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 125-126 (1974) ("The right of confrontation is exclusively a 'trial right' . . . . It does not ... require the government to
produce witnesses whose statements are not used at trial, or to produce
the underlying information on which its witnesses base their testimony")
(footnotes omitted) (hereinafter Westen) .
'
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record, even though that evidence might have affected the
witness' credibility. The constitutional error in that case
was not that Alaska made this information confidential; it
was that the defendant was denied the right "to expose to the
jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. "
415 U. S., at 318. Similarly, in this case the Confrontation
Clause was not violated by the withholding of the CYS file; it
only would have been impermissible for the judge to have
prevented Ritchie's lawyer from cross-examining the daughter. Because defense counsel was able to cross-examine all
of the trial witnesses fully, we find that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court erred in holding that the failure to disclose
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause.
B
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also suggested that the
failure to disclose the CYS file violated the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of compulsory process. Ritchie asserts
that the trial court's ruling prevented him from learning the
names of the "witnesses in his favor," as well as other evidence that might be contained in the file. Although the basis
for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling on this point is
unclear, it apparently concluded that the right of compulsory
process includes the right to have the State's assistance in
uncovering arguably useful information, without regard to
the existence of a state-created restriction-here, the confidentiality of the files.
1

This Court has had little occasion to discuss the contours of
the Compulsory Process Clause. The first and most celebrated analysis came from a Virginia federal court in 1807,
during the treason and misdemeanor trials of Aaron Burr.
Chief Justice Marshall, who presided as trial judge, ruled
that Burr's compulsory process rights entitled him to serve a
subpoena on President Jefferson, requesting the production
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of allegedly incriminating evidence. 11 United States v. Burr,
25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807). Despite the
implications of the Burr decision for federal criminal procedure, the Compulsory Process Clause rarely was a factor in
this Court's decisions during the next 160 years. 12 More recently, however, the Court has articulated some of the specific rights secured by this part of the Sixth Amendment.
Our cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants
have the right to the Government's assistance in compelling
the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to
put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt. 13
This Court has never squarely held that the Compulsory
Process Clause guarantees the right to discover the identity
of witnesses, or to require the Government to produce exculpatory evidence. But cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S.
683, 709, 711 (1974) (suggesting that the clause may require
the production of evidence). Instead, the Court traditionally
has evaluated claims such as those raised by Ritchie under
the broader protections of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Bagley, 473
U. S. 667 (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963).
See also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470 (1973). Because
" The evidence consisted of a letter that was sent to President Jefferson
by General James Wilkinson that allegedly showed that Burr was planning
to invade Mexico and set up a separate government under his control.
After being ordered to do so, Jefferson eventually turned over an edited
version of the letter. For an excellent summary of the Burr case and its
implications for compulsory process, see Westen 101-108.
12
The pre-1967 cases that mention compulsory process do not provide an
extensive analysis of the clause. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375,
378, n. 1 (1966); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 442 (1932);
United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 169, 173 (1891); Ex parte Harding,
120 U. S. 782 (1887). See generally, Westen 108, and n. 164.
"See, e. g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Cool v.
United States , 409 U. S. 100 (1972) (per curiam); Washington v. Texas,
388 U. S. 14 (1967). Cf. Webb v. Texas, 409 U. S. 95 (1972) (per curiam)
(decision based on Due Process Clause).
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the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to this type of case
is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth Amendment precedents addressing the fundamental fairness of trials establish
a clear framework for review, we adopt a due process analysis for purposes of this case. Although we conclude that
compulsory process provides no greater protections in this
area than those afforded by due process, we need not decide
today whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory
Process Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is enough to conclude that on these facts, Ritchie's
claims more properly are considered by reference to due
process.
2

It is well-settled that the Government has the obligation to
turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to
the accused and material to guilt or punishment. United
States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland,
supra, at 87. Although courts have used different terminologies to define "materiality," a majority of this Court has
agreed, "[e]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." United States v. Bagley,
supra, at 682 (opinion ofBLACKMUN, J.); see id., at 685 (opinion of WHITE, J.).
At this stage, of course, it is impossible to say whether any
information in the CYS records may be relevant to Ritchie's
claim of innocence, because neither the prosecution nor defense counsel has seen the information, and the trial judge acknowledged that he had not reviewed the full file. The Commonwealth, however, argues that no materiality inquiry is
required, because a statute renders the contents of the file
privileged. Requiring disclosure here, it is argued, would
override the Commonwealth's compelling interest in con-

'
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fidentiality on the mere speculation that the file "might" have
been useful to the defense.
Although we recognize that the public interest in protecting this type of sensitive information is strong, we do not
agree that this interest necessarily prevents disclosure in all
circumstances. This is not a case where a state statute
grants CYS the absolute authority to shield its files from all
eyes. Cf. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5945.1(b) (unqualified statutory privilege for communications between sexual assault
counselors and victims). 14 Rather, the Pennsylvania law
provides that the information shall be disclosed in certain circumstances, including when CYS is directed to do so by court
order. Pa. Stat. Ann., Title 11, §2215(a)(5) (Purdon Supp.
1986). Given that the Pennsylvania Legislature contemplated some use of CYS records in judicial proceedings, we
cannot conclude that the statute prevents all disclosure in
criminal prosecutions. In the absence of any apparent state
policy to the contrary, we therefore have no reason to believe
that relevant information would not be disclosed when a
court of competent jurisdiction determines that the information is "material" to the defense of the accused.
We therefore affirm the decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to the extent it orders a remand for further
proceedings. Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file reviewed by the trial court to determine whether it contains
information that probably would have changed the outcome
of his trial. If it does, he must be given a new trial. If the
records maintained by CYS contain no such information, or if
the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
the lower court will be free to reinstate the prior conviction. 15
''We express no opinion on whether the result in this case would have
been different if the statute had protected the CYS files from disclosure to
anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial personnel.
16
The Commonwealth also argues that Ritchie is not entitled to disclosure because he did not make a particularized showing of what information
he was seeking or how it would be material. See Brief for Petitioner 18
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c
This ruling does not end our analysis, because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did more than simply remand. It also
held that defense counsel must be allowed to examine all of
the confidential information, both relevant and irrelevant,
and present arguments in favor of disclosure. The court apparently concluded that whenever a defendant alleges that
protected evidence might be material, the appropriate
method of assessing this claim is to grant full access to the
. disputed information, regardless of the State's interest in
confidentiality. We cannot agree.
A defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence does
not include the unsupervised authority to search through the
Commonwealth's files. See United States v. Bagley, 473
U. S., at 675; United States v. Agurs , supra, at 111. Although the eye of an advocate may be helpful to a defendant
in ferreting out information, Dennis v. United States, 384
U. S. 855, 875 (1966), this Court has never held-even in the
absence of a statute restricting disclosure-that a defendant
alone may make the determination as to the materiality of the
information. Settled practice is to the contrary. In the
typical case where a defendant makes only a general request
for exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, 373
(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 109-110 (1976) ("The mere
possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the
defense ... does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense")).
Ritchie , of course, may not require the trial court to search through the
CYS file without first establishing a basis for his claim that it contains material evidence. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S. 858,
867 (1982) ("He inust at least make some plausible showing of how their
testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense").
Although the obligation to disclose exculpatory material does not depend
on the presence of a specific request, we note that the degree of specificity
of Ritchie's request may have a bearing on the trial court's assessment on
remand of the materiality of the nondisclosure. See United States v.
Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 682-683 (1985) (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.).

•..

•q. ' '
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U. S. 83, it is the State that decides which information must
be disclosed. Unless defense counsel becomes aware that
other exculpatory evidence was withheld and brings it to the
court's attention, 16 the prosecutor's decision on disclosure is
final. Defense counsel has no constitutional right to conduct
his own search of the State's files to argue relevance. See
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545, 559 (1977) ("There is
no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case,
and Brady did not create one").
We find that Ritchie's interest (as well as that of the Commonwealth) in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by
requiring that the CYS files be submitted only to the trial
court for in camera review. Although this rule denies
Ritchie the benefits of an "advocate's eye," we note that the
trial court's discretion is not unbounded. If a defendant is
aware of specific information contained in the file (e. g. , the
medical report), he is free to request it directly from the
court, and argue in favor of its materiality. Moreover, the
duty to disclose is ongoing; information that may be deemed
immaterial upon original examination may become important
as the proceedings progress, and the court would be obligated to release information material to the fairness of the
trial.
To allow full disclosure to defense counsel in this type of
case would sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth's compelling interest in protecting its child abuse information. If
the CYS records were made available to defendants, even
through counsel, it could have a seriously adverse effect on
Pennsylvania's efforts to uncover and treat abuse. Child
18
See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 16(d)(2); Pa. Rules Crim. Proc. 305(E) ("If
at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule [mandating
disclosure of exculpatory evidence], the court may . . . enter such .. .
order as it tieems just under the circumstances").
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abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses except the victim. A child's feelings of vulnerability and guilt,
and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly
acute when the abuser is a parent. It therefore is essential
that the child have state-designated person to whom he
may turn, and to do so with the assurance of confidentiality.
Relatives and neighbors who suspect abuse also will be more
willing to come forward if they know that their identities will
be protected. Recognizing this, the Commonwealth-like
all other States 17-has made a commendable effort to assure
victims and witnesses that they may speak to the CYS counselors without fear of general disclosure. The Commonwealth's purpose would be frustrated if this confidential
material had to be disclosed upon demand to a defendant
charged with criminal child abuse, simply because a trial
court may not recognize exculpatory evidence. Neither
precedent nor common sense requires such a result.

a

IV
We agree that Ritchie is entitled to know whether the CYS
file contains information that may have changed the outcome
of his trial had it been disclosed. Thus we agree that a remand is necessary. We disagree with the decision of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the extent that it allows defense counsel access to the CYS file. An in camera review
by the trial court will serve Ritchie's interest without destroying the Commonwealth's need to protect the confiden. tiality of those involved in child-abuse investigations. The
The importance of the public interest at issue in this case is evidenced
by the fact that all 50 States and the District of Columbia have statutes
that protect the confidentiality of their official records concerning child
abuse. See Brief for State of California, et al. as Amicus Curiae 12, n. 1
(listing illustrative statutes). See also Besharov, The Legal Aspects of
Reporting Known and Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 Vill. L.
Rev. 458, 508-512 (1978).
17

.
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decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. ~~ ~
We are a Court of limited jurisdiction. One of the basic
limits that Congress has imposed upon us is that we may only
review "[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision may be had." 28
U. S. C. § 1257. The purposes of this restriction are obvious, and include notions of efficiency, judicial restraint, and
federalism. See Local No. 438, Construction General Laborers Union v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542, 550 (1963); Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 124 (1945). Over
the years the Court has consistently applied a strict test of
finality to determine the reviewability of state court decisions
remanding cases for further proceedings, and the reviewability of pretrial discovery orders. Given the plethora of such
decisions and orders and the fact that they often lead to the
settlement or termination of litigation, the application of
these strict rules has unquestionably resulted in this Court
not reviewing countless cases that otherwise might have
been reviewed. Despite that consequence-indeed, in my
judgment, because of that consequence-I regard the rule as
wise and worthy of preservation.
I
In Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975), the
Court recognized some limited exceptions to the general prin-

3
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ciple that this Court may not review cases in which further
proceedings are anticipated in the state court. One of these
exceptions applies "where the federal claim has been finally
decided, with further proceedings in the state courts to come,
but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had,
whatever the outcome of the case." ld., at 481. The concern, of course, is that the petitioning party not be put in a
position where he might eventually lose on the merits, but
would have never had an opportunity to present his federal
claims for review. I d. The most common example of this
phenomenon is where a state seeks review of an appellate
court's order that evidence be suppressed. In such a case, if
the state were forced to proceed to trial prior to seeking
review in this Court, it could conceivably lose its case at
trial, and, because of the double jeopardy rule, never have a
chance to use what we might have held to be admissible evidence. See e. g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 651,
n. 1 (1984).
This case does not fit into that exception. Were we to
decline review at this time there are three possible scenarios
on remand. @, the Children and ~h Services (CYS)
might refuse to produce the documents under penalty of contempt, in which case appeals could be taken, and this Court
could obtain proper jurisdiction. See United States v. Ryan,
402 U. S. 530 (1971). ~' if CYS were to produce
the documents, the trial court might ~d t~ error.. to be
harmless, in which case Richie's conviction would stand and
the Commonwealth would not have been harmed by our having OeClfried to r-eview tfie case at this stage. ~' the
trial court could
___....., determine that Richie's lack of access to the
documents was constitutionally prejudicial, and thus order a
new trial. If the Commonwealth would then have no recourse but to proceed to trial with the risk of an unreviewable
acquittal, I agree that the Cox exception would apply.

--
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Under Pennsylvania law, however, the Commonwealth
would have the opportunity for an immediate interlocutory
appeal of the new trial order.
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 311 affords the
Commonwealth a right to an interlocutor~ ~peal in criminal
cases where it "clrums that the lower court committed an
error of law." An argument that the trial court erred in
evaluating the constitutionally harmless error issue would
certainly qualify under that provision. 1 Moreover, the Commonwealth could, if necessary, reassert the constitutional arguments that it now makes here. Although the claims would
undoubtedly be rejected in Pennsylvania under the law of the
case doctrine, this would not bar this Court from reviewing
the claims. See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939, 946 (1983);
Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U. S. 255, 261-262 (1982); see generally Stern, Gressman & Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice 132
(6th ed. 1986).
The fact that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania cannot
irrevocably lose this case on the federal constitutional issue
without having an opportunity to present that issue to this
Court takes this case out of the Cox exception that the Court
relies upon. Nonetheless, the Court now makes th~on
ish,ing arg!lm~nt that we should hear this case now because if
Richie's conviction is reinstated on remand, "the issue of
'See Commonwealth v. Blevins, 453 Pa. 481, 482-483, 309 A. 2d 421,
422 (1973) (whether "the testimony offered at trial by the Commonwealth
was insufficient to support the jury's finding" is appealable issue of Jaw);
Commonwealth v. Melton, 402 Pa. 628, 629, 168 A. 2d 328, 329 (1961) (citing case "where a new trial is granted to a convicted defendant on the sole
ground that introduction of certain evidence at his trial was prejudicial
error" as example of appealable issue of law); Commonwealth v. Durah-El,
344 Pa. Super. 511, 514, n. 2, 496 A. 2d 1222, 1224, n. 2 (Super. Ct. 1985)
(whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel is appealable as asserted "error of law"); Commonwealth v. Carney, 310 Pa. Super.
549, 551, n. 1, 456 A. 2d 1072, 1073, n. 1 (Super. Ct. 1983) (whether curative instruction was sufficient to remedy improper remark of prosecution
witness is appealable as asserted "error of Jaw").

,;;- ~ •
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whether defense counsel should have been given access will
be moot," and the Court will lose its chance to pass on this
constitutional issue. Ante, at 6. This argument is wholly
contrary to our long tradition of avoiding, not reaching out to
decide, constitutional decisions when a case may be disposed
of on other grounds for legitimate reasons. See Ashwander
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 397 U. S. 288, 346-47 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring); Rescue Army v. Municipal
Court, 331 U. S. 549, 571 (1947). Indeed, the Court has
explained that it is precisely the policy against unnecessary
constitutional adjudication that demands strict application of
the finality requirement. Republic Gas Co. v. Oklahoma,
334 u. s. 62, 70-71 (1948).
II

The Court also suggests that a reason for hearing the case
now is that if CYS is forced to disclose the documents the
confidentiality will be breached and subsequent review will
be too late. Ante, at 7-8, and n. 7. This argument fails in ~
light of the longstanding rule that if disclosure will, in and of
~
itself, be harmful, the remedy is for the individual to decline
to roduce the docum~ immediately appeal any contemp order t at 1s issued. This rule is exemplified by our
decision in United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 (1971), a
case in which a district court denied a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum commanding the respondent to produce
certain documents located in Kenya. The Court of Appeals
held that the order was appealable but we reversed,
explaining:
"Respondent asserts no challenge to the continued validity of our holding in Cobbledick v. United States, 309
U. S. 323 (1940), that one to whom a subpoena is directed may not appeal the denial of a motion to quash
that subpoena but must either obey its commands or
refuse to do so and contest the validity of the subpoena
if he is subsequently cited for contempt on account of his
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failure to obey. Respondent, however, argues that
Cobbledick does not apply in the circumstances before us
because, he asserts, unless immediate review of the District Court's order is available to him, he will be forced to
undertake a substantial burden in complying with the
subpoena, and will therefore be 'powerless to avert the
mischief of the order.' Perlman v. United States, 247
u. s. 7, 13 (1918).
"We think that respondent's assertion misapprehends
the thrust of our cases. Of course, if he complies with
the subpoena he will not thereafter be able to undo the
substantial effort he has exerted in order to comply.
But compliance is not the only course open to respondent. If, as he claims, the subpoena is unduly burdensome or otherwise unlawful, he may refuse to comply
and litigate those questions in the event that contempt
or similar proceedings are brought against him. Should
his contentions be rejected at that time by the trial
court, they will then be ripe for appellate review. But
we have consistently held that the necessity for expedition in the administration of the criminal law justifies
putting one who seeks to resist the production of desired
information to a choice between compliance with a trial
court's order to produce prior to any review of that
order, and resistance to that order with the concomitant
possibility of an adjudication of contempt if his claims are
rejected on appeal. Cobbledick v. United States, supra;
Alexander v. United States, 201 U. S. 117 (1906); cf.
United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251 (1966); DiBella v.
United States, 369 U. S. 121 (1962); Carroll v. United
States, 354 U. S. 394 (1957). Only in the limited class of
cases where denial of immediate review would render
impossible any review whatsoever of an individual's
claims have we allowed exceptions to this princip . '
I d., at 532-533.
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In the case before us today, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has instructed the trial court to order Children and
Youth Services (CYS) to produce certain documents for
inspection by the trial court and respondent's counsel.
Although compliance with the order might be burdensome for
a different reason than the burden of obtaining documents in
Kenya, the burden of disclosure is sufficiently troublesome to
CYS that it apparently objects to compliance. 2 But as was
true in the Ryan case, it has not yet been given the chance to
decide whether to comply with the order and therefore has
not satisfied the condition for appellate review that we had,
until today, consistently imposed. 3
2
It is not clear to what extent counsel for the Commonwealth in this case
represents CYS, or whether he only represents the Office of the District
Attorney of Allegheny County. CYS is certainly not a party to this case;
in fact it has filed an amicus curiae brief expressing its views. That CYS
is not a party to the case makes it all the more inappropriate for the Court
to relax the rule of finality in order to spare CYS the need to appeal a
contempt order if it fails to produce the documents.
8
The Court has recognized a limited exception to this principle where
the documents at issue are in the hands of a third party who has no independent interest in preserving their confidentiality. See Perlman v.
United States, 247 U. S. 7 (1918); see also United States v. Ryan, 402
U. S. 530, 533 (1971). This case presents a far different situation. As far
as the disclosure of the documents goes, it is CYS, not the prosecutor, that
claims a duty to preserve their confidentiality and to implement Pennsylvania's Child Protective Services Law. See Brief of Amicus Curiae County
of Allegheny, Pennsylvania on behalf of Allegheny County Children and
Youth Services in Support of Petitioner, at 2.
Nor does this case come within the exception of United States v. Nixon,
418 U. S. 683, 691-692 (1974), where the Court did not require the President of the United States to subject himself to contempt in order to appeal
the District Court's rejection of his assertion of executive privilege. As
Judge Friendly explained, the rationale of that decision is unique to the
presidency and is "wholly inapplicable" to other government agents. See
National Super Suds, Inc v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 591 F . 2d
174, 177 (CA21979); see also Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., 726 F.
2d 591 (CA9 1984); United States v. Winner, 641 F. 2d 825, 830 (CAlO
1981); In re Attorney General of the United States, 596 F . 2d 58, 62 (CA2),
cert. denied, 444 U. S. 903 (1979); but see In re Grand Jury Proceedings
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III

b~

Finally, the Court seems to rest on the rationale that)ihis (
respondent has already been tried, immediate review in this
particular case will expedite the termination of the litigation.
See ante, at 7, n. 7. I am not persuaded that this is so-if
we had not granted certiorari, the trial court might have reviewed the documents and found that they are harmless a
year ago-but even if it were, the efficient enforcement of
the finality rule precludes a case-by-case inquiry to determine whether its application is appropriate. Only by adhering to our firm rules of finality can we discourage timeconsuming pieCemeal lftigatTon.Of course, once the case is here and has been heard, there
is natural reluctance to hold that the Court lacks jurisdiction.
~
It is misguided, however, to strain and find jurisdiction in the
name of short-term efficiency when the long-term effect of
the relaxation of the finality requirement will so clearly be
inefficient. If the Court's goal is expediting the termination
of litigation, the worst thing it can do is to extend an openended invitation to litigants to interrupt state proceedings
with interlocutory visits to this Court.
I would therefore dismiss the writ because the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is not final.

I

(Wright II), 654 F. 2d 268, 270 (CA3), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 1098 (1981);
Branch v. Phillips Petroleum, 638 F. 2d 873, 877-879 (CA5 1981) .
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONER v. GEORGE
F. RITCHIE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA, WESTERN DISTRICT
[January-, 1987]

JusTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether and to what
extent a State's interest in the confidentiality of its investigative files concerning child abuse must yield to a criminal defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to discover
favorable evidence.
I
As part of its efforts to combat child abuse, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has established Children and Youth
Services (CYS), a protective service agency charged with
investigating cases of suspected mistreatment and neglect.
In 1979 respondent George Ritchie was charged with rape,
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and corruption of a minor. The victim of the alleged attacks was his 13year-old daughter, who claimed that she had been assaulted
by Ritchie two or three times per week during the previous
four years. The girl reported the incidents to the police, and
the matter then was referred to the CYS.
During pre-trial discovery, Ritchie served CYS with a subpoena, seeking access to the records concerning the daughter. Ritchie requested disclosure of the file related to the
immediate charges, as well as certain records that he claimed
were compiled in 1978, when CYS investigated a separate report by an unidentified source that Ritchie's children were

85-1347-0PINION
PENNSYLVANIA v. RITCHIE

2

being abused. 1 CYS refused to comply with the subpoena,
claiming that the records were privileged under Pennsylvania law. The relevant statute provides that all reports and
other information obtained in the course of an CYS investigation must be kept confidential, subject to eleven specific exceptions. 2 One of those exceptions is that the Agency may
disclose the reports to a "court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order." 11 P . S. § 2215(a)(5).
Ritchie moved to have CYS sanctioned for failing to honor
the subpoena, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion
in chambers. Ritchie argued that he was entitled to the information because the file might contain the names of favorable witnesses, as well as other, unspecified exculpatory evidence. He also requested disclosure of a medical report that
he believed was compiled during the 1978 CYS investigation.
Although the trial judge aclmowledged that he had not exam1

Although the 1978 investigation took place during the period that the
daughter claimed she was being molested, it is undisputed that the daughter did not tell CYS about the assaults at that time. No criminal charges
were filed as a result of this earlier investigation.
z The statute provides in part:
Except as provided in section 14 [11 P. S. § 2214], reports made pursuant
to this act including but not limited to report summaries of child abuse . . .
and written reports ... as well as any other information obtained, reports
written or photographs or X-rays taken concerning alleged instances of
child abuse in the possession of the department, a county children and
youth social service agency or a child protective service shall be confidential and shall only be made available to:
(5) A court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order. 11
P. S. § 2215(a).
At the time of trial the statute only provided five exceptions to the general
rule of confidentiality, including the exception for court-ordered disclosure.
The statute was amended in 1982 to increase the number of exceptions.
For example, the records now may be revealed to law enforcement officials
for use in criminal investigations. § 2215(a)(9). But, the identity of a person who reported the abuse or who cooperated in the investigation may not
be released if the disclosure would be detrimental to that person's safety.
§ 2215(c).
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ined the entire CYS file, he accepted a CYS representative's
assertion that there was no medical report in the record. 3
The judge then denied the motion and refused to order CYS
to disclose the files. 4 See App. 72a.
At trial, the main witness against Ritchie was his daughter. In an attempt to rebut her testimony, defense counsel
cross-examined the girl at length, questioning her on all aspects of the alleged attacks, and her reasons for not reporting
the incidents sooner. Except for routine evidentiary rulings, the trial judge placed no limitation on the scope of crossexamination. At the close of trial Ritchie was convicted by a
jury on all counts, and the judge sentenced him to three to
ten years in prison.
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Ritchie
claimed, inter alia, that the failure to:rlisclose the contents of
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, as applied to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.S The court
agreed that there had been a constitutional violation, and accordingly vacated the conviction and remanded for further
proceedings. 324 Pa. Super. 557, 472 A. 2d 220 (1984). The
Superior Court ruled, however, that the right of confrontaThe trial judge stated that he did not read "50 pages or more of an
extensive record." App. 72a. The judge had no knowledge of the case
before the pretrial hearing. See id. , at 68a.
' There is no suggestion that the Commonwealth's prosecutor was given
access to the file at any point in the proceedings, or that he was aware of its
contents.
5
The Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution protects both the
right of confrontation and the right of compulsory process:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .. . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."
Both clauses are made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 403-406 (1965) (Confrontation
Clause); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (Compulsory
Process Clause).
3

·~
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tion did not entitle Ritchie to the full disclosure that he
sought. It held that on remand, the trial judge first was to
examine the confidential material in camera, and release only
the verbatim statements made by the daughter to the CYS
counselor. But the full record then was to be made available
to Ritchie's lawyer, for the limited purpose of allowing him to
argue the relevance of the statements. The court stated
that the prosecutor also should be allowed to argue that the
failure to disclose the statements was harmless error. If the
trial judge determined that the lack of information was prejudicial, Ritchie would be entitled to a new trial. I d., at - - , ·
472 A. 2d, at 226.
On appeal by the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania agreed that the conviction must be vacated and
the case remanded to determine if a . hew trial is necessary.
509 Pa. 357, 502 A. 2d 148 (1985). But the court did not
agree that the search for material evidence must be limited to
the daughter's verbatim statements. Rather, it concluded
that Ritchie, through his lawyer, is entitled to review the entire file to search for any useful evidence. 6 It stated: "When
materials gathered become an arrow of inculpation, the person inculpated has a fundamental constitutional right to examine the provenance of the arrow and he who aims it." !d.,
at - - , 502 A. 2d, at 153. The Pennsylvania Court concluded that by denying access to the file, the trial court order
had violated both the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause. The court was unpersuaded by the
Commonwealth's argument that the trial judge already had
examined the file and determined that it contained no rele8
The court noted that the trial court should take "appropriate steps" to
guard against improper dissemination of the confidential material, including, for example, "fashioning appropriate protective orders or conducting
certain proceedings in camera." 509 Pa. 357, - , n. 16, 502 A. 2d 148,
- , n. 16 (1985). These steps were to be taken, however, subject to "the
right of [Ritchie], through his counsel, to gain access to the information."
Ibid.

·.
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vant information. It ruled that the constitutional infirmity
in this trial court's order was that Ritchie was unlawfully denied the opportunity to have the records reviewed by "the
eyes and the perspective of an advocate," who may see relevance in places that a neutral judge would not. Ibid.
In light ofthe substantial and conflicting interests held by
the Commonwealth and Ritchie, we granted certiorari. - U. S. - -. We now affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
II

Before turning to the constitutional questions, we first
must address Ritchie's claim that the Court lacks jurisdiction, because the decision below is not a "final judgment or
decree." See 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3); Market Street R . Co. v.
Railroad Commission of California, 324 U. S. 548, 551
(1945). Normally the finality doctrine contained in § 1257(3)
is not satisfied if the state courts still must conduct further
substantive proceedings before the rights of the parties as to
the federal issues are resolved. Ibid.; Radio Station WOW,
Inc. v. Johnson , 326 U. S. 120, 123-127 (1945). Ritchie argues that under this standard the case is not final, because
there are several more proceedings scheduled in the Pennsylvania courts: at a minimum there will be an in camera review
of the file, and the parties will present arguments on whether
the lack of disclosure was prejudicial; after that, there could
be a new trial on the merits. Ritchie claims that because the
Sixth Amendment issue may become moot at either of these
stages, we should decline review until these further proceedings are completed.
Although it is true that this Court is without jurisdiction to
review an interlocutory judgment, it also is true that the
principles of finality have not been construed rigidly. As we
recognized in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469
(1975), there are at least four categories of cases in which
jurisdiction is proper even when there are further proceed-
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ings anticipated in the state court. One of these exceptions
states that the Court may consider cases:
"where the federal claim has been finally decided, with
further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to
come, but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had, whatever the outcome of the case. . . . [I]n
these cases, if the party seeking interim review ultimately prevails on the merits, the federal issue will be
mooted; if he were to lose on the merits, however, the
governing state law would not permit him again to present his federal claims for review." !d., at 481.
We find that the case before us satisfies this standard because the Sixth Amendment issue will not survive for this
Court to review, regardless of the ol,ltcome of the proceedings on remand. If the trial court de.c1des that the CYS files
do not contain relevant information, or that the nondisclosure
was harmless, the Commonwealth will have prevailed and
will have no basis to seek review. In this situation Ritchie's
conviction will be reinstated, and the issue of whether defense counsel should have been given access will be moot.
Should Ritchie appeal the trial court's decision, the Commonwealth's only method for preserving the constitutional issue
would be by cross-claims. Thus the only way that this Court
will be able to reach the Sixth Amendment issue is if Ritchie
eventually files a petition for certiorari on the trial Court's
adverse ruling, and the Commonwealth filed a cross-petition.
When a case is in this procedural posture, we have considered it sufficiently final to justify review. See, e. g., New
York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 651, n. 1 (1984); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 558, n. 6 (1983).
Alternatively, if Ritchie is found to have been prejudiced
by the withholding and is granted a new trial, the Commonwealth still will be unable to obtain a ruling from this Court.
On retrial Ritchie either will be convicted, in which case the
Commonwealth's ability to obtain review again will rest on
Ritchie's willingness to appeal; or he will be acquitted, in
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which case the Commonwealth will be barred from seeking
review by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See ibid. ; California v. Stewart, 384 U. S. 436, 498, n. 71 (1966) (decided with
Miranda v. Arizona). Therefore, if this Court does not consider the constitutional claims now, there may well be no
opportunity to do so in the future. 7
The Sixth Amendment issue has been finally decided by
the highest court of Pennsylvania, and unless we review that
decision, the harm that the Commonwealth seeks to avoidthe disclosure of the entire confidential file-will occur regardless of the result on remand. We thus cannot agree
with the suggestion in JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent that if we
7
As the dissent points out, post, at--, there is a third possibility. If
the trial court finds prejudicial error and ord.ers a retrial, the Commonwealth may attempt to take an immediate appeal of this order. See Pa. R.
App. P. 311. The dissent suggests that because the Commonwealth can
raise the Sixth Amendment issue again in this appeal, respect for the finality doctrine should lead us to dismiss. But even if we were persuaded that
an immediate appeal would lie in this situation, it would not necessarily follow that the constitutional issue will survive. The appellate court could
find that the failure to disclose was harmless, precluding further review by
the Commonwealth. Alternatively, the appellate court could agree that
the error was prejudicial, thus permitting the Commonwealth to claim that
the Sixth Amendment does not compel disclosure. But as the dissent recognizes, the Pennsylvania courts already have considered and resolved this
issue in its earlier proceedings; if the Commonwealth were to raise it again
in a new set of appeals, the courts below would simply reject the claim
under the law of the case doctrine. Law of the case principles are not a
bar to this Court's jurisdiction, of course, and thus the dissent apparently
would require the Commonwealth to raise a fruitless Sixth Amendment
claim in the trial court, the Superior Court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court still another time before we re-grant certiorari on the question that
is now before us.
The goals of finality would be frustrated , rather than furthered, by these
wasteful and time-consuming procedures. Based on the unusual facts of
this case, the justifications for the finality doctrine-efficiency, judicial
restraint, and federalism, see Radio Station WOW, Inc . v. Johnson , 326
U. S. 120, 124 (1945); post, at ---would be ill served by another round
of litigation on an issue that has been authoritatively decided by the highest state court.

,...
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were to dismiss this case and it was resolved on other
grounds after disclosure of the file, ''the Commonwealth
would not have been harmed." Post, at 2. This hardly
could be true, because of the acknowledged public interest in
ensuring the confidentiality of CYS records. See n. 17,
infra. Although this consideration is not dispositive, we
have noted that "statutorily created finality requirements,
should if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial
collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries
to be suffered." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 331,
n. 11 (1976). We therefore reject Ritchie's claim that the
Court lacks jurisdiction, and turn to the merits of the case before us. 8
Nothing in our decision in New York v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971),
requires a different result. In that case the respondent was served with a
subpoena requiring him to produce business records for a grand jury. The
District Court denied a motion to quash, and respondent appealed. We
concluded that the District Court order was not appealable. ld., at 532.
We rejected the contention that immediate review was necessary to avoid
the hann of disclosing otherwise protected material, noting that parties
who face such an order have the option of making the decision "final" simply by refusing to comply with the subpoena.
Although there are similarities between this case and Ryan, the analogy
is incomplete. In Ryan the Court was concerned about the "necessity for
expedition in the administration of the criminal law," id., at 533, an interest that would be undermined if all pretrial orders were immediately appealable. Ryan also rests on an implicit assumption that unless a party
resisting discovery is willing to risk being held in contempt, the significance of his claim is insufficient to justify interrupting the ongoing proceedings. That is not the situation before us. Here the trial already has
taken place, and the issue reviewed by the Commonwealth appellate
courts. The interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of delay,
rather than being hindered, would be best served by resolving the issue.
Cf. Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U. S., 469, 477-478 (1975) (exceptions
to finality doctrine justified in part by need to avoid economic waste and
judicial delay).
We also reject Ritchie's suggestion that we should dismiss this action
and allow the case to return to the trial court, so that the Commonwealth
can fonnally refuse to comply with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deci- •
8
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III
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Ritchie,
through his lawyer, has the right to examine the full contents
of the CYS records. The court found that this right of access
is required by both the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause. We discuss these constitutional
provisions in turn.

A
J.•(

-

.

The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face
those who testify against him, and the right to conduct crossexamination. Delaware v. Fensterer, - - U . S . - - , - (1985) (per curiam). Ritchie does not allege a violation of
the fonner right. He was not excluded from any part of the
trial, nor did the prosecutor improperly introduce out-ofcourt statements as substantive evidence, thereby depriving
Ritchie of the right to "confront" the declarant. See Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980). Cf. United States v. Iruuii,
- - U. S. - - (1986). Instead, Ritchie claims that by denying him access to the infonnation necessary to prepare his
defense, the trial court interfered with his right of crossexamination.
Ritchie argues that he could not effectively question his
daughter because, without the CYS material, he did not
sion and be held in contempt. Here we are not faced merely with an individual's assertion that a subpoena is unduly burdensome, but with a holding of a State Supreme Court that the legislative interest in confidentiality
will not be given effect. The Commonwealth's interest in immediate review of this case is obvious and substantial. Contrary to JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent, we do not think that the finality doctrine requires a new
round of litigation and appellate review simply to give the Commonwealth
"the chance to decide whether to comply with the order." Post, at 6. See
n. 7, supra. To prolong the proceedings on this basis would be inconsistent with the ''pragmatic" approach we normally have taken to finality questions. See generally, Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U. S. 696,
722, n. 28 (1974) ("This Court has been inclined to follow a 'pragmatic approach' to the question of finality'') (citation omitted).

...

·-

· .·

.
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know which types of questions would best expose the weaknesses in her testimony. Had the files been disclosed,
Ritchie argues that he might have been able to show that the
daughter made statements to the CYS counselor that were
inconsistent with her trial statements, or perhaps to reveal
that the girl acted with an improper motive. Of course, the
right to cross-examine includes the opportunity to show that
a witness is biased, or that the testimony is exaggerated or
unbelievable. United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 50 (1984);
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 316 (1974). Because this
type of evidence can make the difference between conviction
and acquittal, see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264, 269
(1959), Ritchie argues that the failure to disclose information
that might have made cross-examination more effective undermines the Confrontation Clause's- purpose of increasing
the accuracy of the truth-finding process at trial. See
United States v. Inadi, supra, at--.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted this argument,
relying in part on our decision in Davis v. Alaska, supra. In
Davis the trial judge prohibited defense counsel from questioning a witness about the latter's juvenile criminal record,
because a state statute made this information presumptively
confidential. We found that this restriction on cross-examination violated the Confrontation Clause, despite Alaska's
legitimate interest in protecting the identity of juvenile
offenders. 415 U. S., at 318-320. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court apparently interpreted our decision in Davis
to mean that a statutory privilege cannot be maintained when
a defendant asserts a need, prior to trial, for the protected
information that might be used at trial to impeach or otherwise undermine a witness' testimony. See - - Pa., at--,
502 A. 2d, at 152-153.
If we were to accept this broad interpretation of Davis, the
effect would be to transform the Confrontation Clause into a
constitutionally-compelled rule of pretrial discovery. Nothing in the case law supports such a view. The opinions of •

.'
"

•
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this Court show that the right of confrontation is a trial right,
designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of
questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-examination. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 157 (1970)
("[I]t is the literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time
of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the
Confrontation Clause."); Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719, 725
(1968) ("The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.").
The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does not
include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any
and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony. 9 Normally the right to confront one's accusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at
trial to question witnesses. Delaware v. Fensterer, supra,
at - - . In short, the Confrontation .Clause only guarantees
"an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective." ld., at - - (emphasis in
original). See also Ohio v. Roberts, supra, at 73, n. 12 (except in "extraordinary cases, no inquiry into 'effectiveness'
[of cross-examination] is required").
We reaffirmed this interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause last term in Delaware v. Fensterer, supra. In that
case, the defendant was convicted in part on the testimony of
the State's expert witness, who could not remember which
scientific test he had used to form his opinion. Although this
inability to recall frustrated defense counsel's efforts to discredit the testimony, we held that there had been no Sixth
Amendment violation. The Court found that the right of
• This is not to suggest, of course, that there are no protections for pretrial discovery in criminal cases. See discussion in Part III(B), post. We
simply hold that with respect to this issue, the Confrontation Clause only
protects a defendant's trial rights, and does not compel the pretrial production of information that might be useful in preparing for trial. Also, we
hardly need say that nothing in our opinion today is intended to alter a trial
judge's traditional power to control the scope of cross-examination by prohibiting questions that are prejudicial, irrelevant, or otherwise improper.
See Delaware v. VanArsdall,- U. S. - , - (1986).
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confrontation was not implicated, "for the trial court did not
limit the scope or nature of defense counsel's cross-examination in any way." - - U. S., at - - . F ensterer was in full
accord with our earlier decisions, that have upheld a Confrontation Clause infringement claim on this issue only when
there was a specific statutory or court-imposed restriction at
trial on the scope of questioning. 10
The lower court's reliance on Davis v. Alaska therefore is
misplaced. There the state court had prohibited defense
counsel from questioning the witness about his criminal
record, even though that evidence might have affected the
witness' credibility. The constitutional error in that case
was not that Alaska made this information confidential; it
was that the defendant was denied the right "to expose to the
jury the facts from which jurors . ... .. could appropriately
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness."
415 U. S., at 318. Similarly, in this case the Confrontation
Clause was not violated by the withholding of the CYS file; it
only would have been impermissible for the judge to have
prevented Ritchie's lawyer from cross-examining the daugh-

Jr•r - .

10

See, e. g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, mpra (denial of right to crossexamine to show bias); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974); Chambers v.
Misaissippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973) (denial of right to impeach own witness);
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U. S. 129 (1968) (denial of right to ask witness' real
name and address at trial); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965) (denial of right to cross-examine codefendant). Moreover, the Court normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted
interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial. Compare
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300 311-313 (1967) (no Confrontation Clause
violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's
name at pretrial hearing), with Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53
(1957) (on the facts presented, Government required to disclose informant's
name at trial). See generally, Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause,
73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 125-126 (1974) ("The right of confrontation is exclusively a trial right . . . . It does not ... require the government to
produce witnesses whose statements are not used at trial, or to produce
the underlying information on which the witnesses base their testimony.")
(footnotes omitted) (hereinafter Westen).

' '
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ter. Because defense counsel was able to cross-examine all
of the trial witnesses fully, we find that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court erred in holding that the failure to disclose
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause.

J.•r - .

B
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also suggested that the
failure to disclose the CYS file violated the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of compulsory process. Ritchie asserts
that the trial court's ruling prevented him from learning the
names of the "witnesses in his favor," as well as other evidence that might be contained in the file. Although the basis
for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling on this point is
unclear, it apparently concluded that the right of compulsory
process includes the right to have the State's assistance in
uncovering arguably useful information, without regard to
the existence of a state-created restriction-here, the confidentiality of the files.
1
This Court has had little occasion to discuss the contours of
the Compulsory Process Clause. The first and most celebrated analysis came from a Virginia federal court in 1807,
during the treason and misdemeanor trials of Aaron Burr.
Chief Justice Marshall, who presided as trial judge, ruled
that Burr's compulsory process rights entitled him to serve a
subpoena on President Jefferson, requesting the production
of allegedly incriminating evidence. 11 United States v. Burr,
25 F. Cas. 30,35 (No. 14,692d) (CCD Va. 1807). Despite the
implications of the Burr decision for federal criminal procedure, the Compulsory Process Clause rarely was a factor in
11

The evidence consisted of a letter that was sent to President Jefferson
by General James Wilkinson that allegedly showed that Burr was planning
to invade Mexico and set up a separate government under his control.
After being ordered to do so, Jefferson eventually turned over an edited
version of the letter. For an excellent summary of the Burr case and its
implications for compulsory process, see Westen 101-108.

•
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this Court's decisions during the next 160 years. 12 More recently, however, the Court has articulated some of the specific rights secured by this part of the Sixth Amendment.
Our cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants
have the right to the Government's assistance in compelling
the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to
put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt. 13
This Court has never squarely held that the Compulsory
Process Clause guarantees the right to discover the identity
of witnesses, or to require the Government to produce exculpatory evidence. But cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S.
683, 709, 711 (1974) (suggesting that the clause may require
the production of evidence). Instead, the Court traditionally
has evaluated claims such as those raised by Ritchie under
the broader protections of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Bagley,-U.S.- (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963).
See also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470 (1973). Because
the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to this type of case
is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth Amendment precedents addressing the fundamental fairness of trials establish
a clear framework for review, we adopt a due process analysis for purposes of this case. Although we conclude that
compulsory process provides no greater protections in this
area than those afforded by due process, we need not decide
today whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory
Process Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amend12
The pre-1967 cases that mention compulsory process do not provide an
extensive analysis of the clause. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375,
378, n. 1 (1966); Blackmer v. United States , 284 U. S. 421, 442 (1932);
United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 169, 173 (1891); Ex parte Harding,
120 U. S. 782 (1887). See generally, Westen 108, and n. 164.
13
See, e. g. , Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973); Cool v.
United States, 409 U. S. 100 (1972) (per curiam); Washington v. Texas ,
388 U. S. 14 (1967). Cf. Webb v. Texas, 409 U. S. 95 (1972) (per curiam)
(decision based on Due Process Clause).
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ment. It is enough to conclude that on these facts, Ritchie's
claims more properly are considered by reference to due
process.
2
It is well-settled that the Government has the obligation to
turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to
the accused and material to guilt or punishment. United
States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland,
supra, at 87. Although courts have used different terminologies to define "materiality," a majority of this Court has
agreed, "[e]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." United States v. Bagley,
supra, at-- (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.); id., at-- (opinion of WHITE, J.).
At this stage, of course, it is impossible to say whether any
information in the CYS records may be relevant to Ritchie's
claim of innocence, because neither the prosecution nor defense counsel has seen the information, and the trial judge aclmowledged that he had not reviewed the full file. The Commonwealth, however, argues that no materiality inquiry is
required, because a statute renders the contents of the file
privileged. Requiring disclosure here, it is argued, would
override the Commonwealth's compelling interest in confidentiality on the mere speculation that the file "might" have
been useful to the defense.
Although we recognize that the public interest in protecting this type of sensitive information is strong, we do not
agree that this interest necessarily prevents disclosure in all
circumstances. This is not a case where a state statute
grants CYS the absolute authority to shield its files from all
eyes. Cf. 42 P. S. §5945.1(b) (unqualified statutory privilege for communications between sexual assault counselors
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and victims). 14 Rather, the Pennsylvania law provides that
the information shall be disclosed in certain circumstances,
including when CYS is directed to do so by cgurt order. 11
P. S. § 2215(a)(5). Given that the Pennsylvania legislature
contemplated some use of CYS records in judicial proceedings, we cannot conclude that the statute prevents all disclosure in criminal prosecutions. In the absence of any apparent state policy to the contrary, we therefore have no
reason to believe that relevant information would not be disclosed when a court of competent jurisdiction determines that
the information is "material" to the defense of the accused.
We therefore affirm the decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to the extent it orders a remand for further
proceedings. Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file reviewed by the trial court to determine whether it contains
information that probably would have changed the outcome
of his trial. If it does, he must be given a new trial. If the
records maintained by CYS contain no such information, or if
the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
the lower court will be free to reinstate the prior conviction. 15
"We express no opinion on whether the result in this case would have
been different if the statute had protected the CYS files from disclosure to
anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial personnel.
15
The Commonwealth also argues that Ritchie is not entitled to disclosure because he did not make a particularized showing of what information
he was seeking or how it would be material. See Brief for Petitioner 18
(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 109-110 (1976) ("The mere
possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the
defense .. . does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense.")).
Ritchie, of course, may not require the trial court to search through the
CYS file without first establishing a basis for his claim that it contains material evidence. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S. 858,
867 (1982) ("He must at least make a plausible showing how their testimony
would have been both material and favorable to his defense"). The obligation to disclose exculpatory material, of course, does not depend on the
presence of a specific request. We note, however, that the degree of
specificity of Ritchie's request for the information may have a bearing on
the trial court's assessment on remand of the materiality of the nondisclo-
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c
This ruling does not end our analysis, because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did more than simply remand. It also
held that defense counsel must be allowed to examine all of
the confidential information, both relevant and irrelevant,
and present arguments in favor of disclosure. The court apparently concluded that whenever a defendant alleges that
protected evidence might be material, the appropriate
method of assessing this claim is to grant full access to the
disputed information, regardless of the State's interest in
confidentiality. We cannot agree.
A defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence does
not include the unsupervised authority to search through the
Commonwealth's files . See United States v. Bagley, supra,
at--; United States v. Agurs, supra, at--. Although
the eye of an advocate may be helpful to a defendant in
ferreting out information, Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S.
855, 875 (1966), this Court has never held-even in the absence of a statute restricting disclosure-that a defendant
alone may make the determination as to the materiality of the
information. Settled practice is to the contrary. In the
typical case where a defendant makes only a general request
for exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, supra, it
is the State that decides which information must be disclosed.
Unless defense counsel becomes aware that other exculpatory evidence was withheld and brings it to the court's attention, 16 the prosecutor's decision on disclosure is final. Defense counsel has no constitutional right to conduct his own
search of the State's files to argue relevance. See Weathersure. See United States v. Bagley,- U . S . - , - (1985) (opinion
of BLACKMUN, J.); id., a t - (opinion of WHITE, J.).
18
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2); Pa. R. Crim. P. 305(E) ("if at any time
during the course of the proceeding it is brought to the attention of the
court that a party has failed to comply with this rule [mandating disclosure
of exculpatory evidence], the court may ... enter such ... order as it
deems just under the circumstances.") .

..

'
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ford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545 (1977) ("There is no general
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady
does not create one.").
We find that Ritchie's interest (as well as that of the Commonwealth) in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by
requiring that the CYS files be submitted only to the trial
court for in camera review. Although this rule denies
Ritchie the benefits of an "advocate's eye," we note that the
trial court's discretion is not unbounded. If a defendant is
aware of specific information contained in the file (e. g., the
medical report), he is free to request it directly from the
court, and argue in favor of its materiality. Moreover, the
duty to disclose is ongoing; information that may be deemed
immaterial upon original examination may become important
as the proceedings progress, and the court would be obligated to release information material to the fairness of the
trial.
To allow full disclosure to defense counsel in this type of
case would sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth's compelling interest in protecting its child abuse information. If
the CYS records were made available to defendants, even
through counsel, it could have a seriously adverse effect on
Pennsylvania's efforts to uncover and treat abuse. Child
abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses except the victim. A child's feelings of vulnerability and guilt,
and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly
acute when the abuser is a parent. It therefore is essential
that the child have a state-designated person to whom he
may turn, and to do so with the assurance of confidentiality.
Relatives and neighbors who suspect abuse also will be more
willing to come forward if they know that their identities will
be protected. Recognizing this, the Commonwealth-like
all other States 17-has made a commendable effort to assure
17

The importance of the public interest at issue in this case is evidenced
by the fact that all 50 states and the District of Columbia have statutes that

j•
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victims and witnesses that they may speak to the CYS counselors without fear of general disclosure. The Commonwealth's purpose would be frustrated if this confidential
material had to be disclosed upon demand to a defendant
charged with criminal child abuse, simply because a trial
court may not recognize exculpatory evidence. Neither
precedent nor common sense requires such a result.
IV
We agree that Ritchie is entitled to know whether the CYS
file contains information that may have changed the outcome
of his trial had it been disclosed. Thus we agree that a remand is necessary. We disagree with the decision of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the extent that it allows defense counsel access to the CYS file. ___An in camera review
by the trial court will serve Ritchie's interest without destroying the Commonwealth's need to protect the confidentiality of those involved in child-abuse investigations. The
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

protect the confidentiality of their official records concerning child abuse.
See Brief for State of California, et al. as Amicus Curiae 12, n. 1 (listing
illustrative statutes). See also Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting
Known and Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 Vill. L. Rev. 458,
508-512 (1978).
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I am writing separately and in brief.
It should
be around to you by the end of the week.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-1347

PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONER v.
GEORGE F. RITCHIE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
. PENNSYLVANIA, WESTERN DISTRICT
[February - , 1987]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether and to what
extent a State's interest in the confidentiality of its investigative files concerning child abuse must yield to a criminal defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to discover
favorable evidence.
I
As part of its efforts to combat child abuse, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has established Children and Youth
Services (CYS), a protective service agency charged with
investigating cases of suspected mistreatment and neglect.
In 1979, respondent George Ritchie was charged with rape,
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and corruption of a minor. The victim of the alleged attacks was his 13year-old daughter, who claimed that she had been assaulted
by Ritchie two or three times per week during the previous
four years. The girl reported the incidents to the police, and
the matter then was referred to the CYS.
During pretrial discovery, Ritchie served CYS with a subpoena, seeking access to the records concerning the daughter. Ritchie requested disclosure of the file related to the
immediate charges, as well as certain records that he claimed
were compiled in 1978, when CYS investigated a separate report by an unidentified source that Ritchie's children were
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being abused. 1 CYS refused to comply with the subpoena,
claiming that the records were privileged under Pennsylvania law. The relevant statute provides that all reports and
other information obtained in the course of an CYS investigation must be kept confidential, subject to 11 specific exceptions. 2 One of those exceptions is that the Agency may disclose the reports to a "court of competent jurisdiction
pursuant to a court order." Pa. Stat. Ann., Title 11,
§ 2215(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
Ritchie moved to have CYS sanctioned for failing to honor
the subpoena, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion
in chambers. Ritchie argued that he was entitled to the information because the file might contain the names of favorable witnesses, as well as other, unspecified exculpatory evidence. He als? requested disclosure of a medical report that
1

Although the 1978 investigation took place during the period that the
daughter claimed she was being molested, it is undisputed that the daughter did not tell CYS about the assaults at that time. No criminal charges
were filed as a result of this earlier investigation.
2
The statute provides in part:
"(a) Except as provided in section 14 [Pa. Stat. Ann., Title 11, § 2214
(Purdon Supp. 1986)], reports made pursuant to this act including but not
limited to report summaries of child .abuse ... and written reports .. . as
well as any other information obtained, reports written or photographs or
X-rays taken concerning alleged instances of child abuse in the possession
of the department, a county children and youth social service agency or a
child protective service shall be confidential and shall only be made available to:
"(5) A court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order." Pa.
Stat. Ann., Title 11, § 2215(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
At the time of trial the statute only provided five exceptions to the general
rule of confidentiality, including the exception for court-ordered disclosure.
The statute was amended in 1982 to increase the number of exceptions.
For example, the records now may be revealed to law enforcement officials
for use in criminal investigations. § 2215(a)(9). But, the identity of a person who reported the abuse or who cooperated in the investigation may not
be released if the disclosure would be detrimental to that person's safety.
§ 2215(c).
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he believed was compiled during the 1978 CYS investigation.
Although the trial judge acknowledged that he had not examined the entire CYS file, he accepted a CYS representative's
assertion that there was no medical report in the record. 3
The judge then denied the motion and refused to order CYS
to disclose the files. 4 See App. 72a.
At trial, the main witness against Ritchie was his daughter. In an attempt to rebut her testimony, defense counsel
cross-examined the girl at length, questioning her on all aspects of the alleged attacks, and her reasons for not reporting
the incidents sooner. Except for routine evidentiary rulings, the trial judge placed no limitation on the scope of crossexamination. At the close of trial Ritchie was convicted by a
jury on all counts, and the judge sentenced him to 3 to 10
years in prison.
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Ritchie
claimed, inter alia, that the failure to disclose the contents of
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, as applied to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The court
agreed that there had been a constitutional violation, and accordingly vacated the conviction and remanded for further
3

The trial judge stated that he did not read "50 pages or more of an
extensive record." App. 72a. The judge had no knowledge of the case
before the pretrial hearing. See id., at 68a.
• There is no suggestion that the Commonwealth's prosecutor was given
access to the file at any point in the proceedings, or that he was aware of its
contents.
.
5
The Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution protects both the
right of confrontation and the right of compulsory process:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."
Both Clauses are made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 403-406 (1965) (Confrontation
Clause); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (Compulsory
Process Clause).
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proceedings. 324 Pa. Super. 557, 472 A. 2d 220 (1984). The
Superior Court ruled, however, that the right of confrontation did not entitle Ritchie to the full disclosure that he
sought. It held that on remand, the trial judge first was to
examine the confidential material in camera, and release only
the verbatim statements made by the daughter to the CYS
counselor. But the full record then was to be made available
to Ritchie's lawyer, for the limited purpose of allowing him to
argue the relevance of the statements. The court stated
that the prosecutor also should be allowed to argue that the
failure to disclose the statements was harmless error. If the
trial judge determined that the lack of information was prejudicial, Ritchie would be entitled to a new trial. I d., at
567-568, 472 A. 2d, at 226.
On appeal by the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania agreed that the conviction must be vacated and
the case remanded to determine if a new trial is necessary.
509 Pa. 357, 502 A. 2d 148 (1985). But the court did not
agree that the search for material evidence must be limited to
the daughter's verbatim statements. Rather, it concluded
that Ritchie, through his lawyer, is entitled to review the entire file to search for any useful evidence. 6 It stated: "When
materials gathered become an arrow of inculpation, the person inculpated has a fundamental constitutional right to examine the provenance of the arrow and he who aims it." I d.,
at 367, 502 A. 2d, at 153. The Pennsylvania Court concluded
that by denying access to the file, the trial court order had
violated both the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory
Process Clause. The court was unpersuaded by the Com6
The court noted that the trial court should take "appropriate steps" to
guard against improper dissemination of the confidential material, including, for example, "fashioning appropriate protective orders of or conducting certain proceedings in camera." 509 Pa. 357, 368, n. 16, 502 A. 2d
148, 153, n. 16 (1985). These steps were to be taken, however, subject to
"the right of [Ritchie], through his counsel, to gain access to the information." Ibid.
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monwealth's argument that the trial judge already had examined the file and determined that it contained no relevant information. It ruled that the constitutional infirmity in this
trial court's order was that Ritchie was unlawfully denied the
opportunity to have the records reviewed by "the eyes and
the perspective of an advocate," who may see relevance in
places that a neutral judge would not. Ibid.
In light of the substantial and conflicting interests held by
the Commonwealth and Ritch~e, we granted certiorari. 476
U. S. - - (1986). We now affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
II
Before turning to the constitutional questions, we first
must address Ritchie's claim that the Court lacks jurisdiction, because the decision below is not a "final judgment or
decree." See 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3); Market Street R. Co. v.
Railroad Comm'n of California, 324 U. S. 548, 551 (1945).
Normally the finality doctrine contained in § 1257(3) is not
satisfied if the state courts still must conduct further substantive proceedings before the rights ofthe parties as to the
federal issues are resolved. Ibid.; Radio Station WOW, Inc.
v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 123-127 (1945). Ritchie argues
that under this standard the case is not final, because there
are several more proceedings scheduled in the Pennsylvania
courts: at a minimum there will be an in camera review of the
file, and the parties will present arguments on whether the
lack of disclosure was prejudicial; after that, there could be a
new trial on the merits. Ritchie claims that because the
Sixth Amendment issue may become moot at either of these
stages, we should decline review until these further proceedings are completed.
Although it is true that this Court is without jurisdiction to
review an interlocutory judgment, it also is true that the
principles of finality have not been construed rigidly. As we
recognized in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469
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(1975), there are at least four categories of cases in which
jurisdiction is proper even when there are further proceedings anticipated in the state court. One of these exceptions
states that the Court may consider cases:
"[W]here the federal claim has been finally decided, with
further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to
come, but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the
case. . . . [I]n these cases, if the party seeking interim
review ultimately prevails on the merits, the federal
issue will be mooted; if he were to lose on the merits,
however, the governing state law would not permit him
again to present his federal claims for review." I d. , at
481.

We find that the case before us satisfies this standard because the Sixth Amendment issue will not survive for this
Court to review, regardless of the outcome of the proceedings on remand. If the trial court decides that the CYS files
do not contain relevant information, or that the nondisclosure
was harmless, the Commonwealth will have prevailed and
will have no basis to seek review. In this situation Ritchie's
conviction will be reinstated, and the issue of whether defense counsel should have been given access will be moot.
Should Ritchie appeal the trial court's decision, the Commonwealth's only method for preserving the constitutional issue
would be by cross-claims. Thus the only way that this Court
will be able to reach the Sixth Amendment issue is if Ritchie
eventually files a petition for certiorari on the trial Court's
adverse ruling, and the Commonwealth filed a cross-petition.
When a case is in this procedural posture, we have considered it sufficiently final to justify review. See, e. g., New
York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 651, n. 1 (1984); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 558, n. 6 (1983).
Alternatively, if Ritchie is found to have been prejudiced
by the withholding and is granted a new trial, the Commonwealth still will be unable to obtain a ruling from this Court.

I...:

4:
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On retrial Ritchie either will be convicted, in which case the
Commonwealth's ability to obtain review again will rest on
Ritchie's willingness to appeal; or he will be acquitted, in
which case the Commonwealth will be barred from seeking
review by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See ibid.; California v. Stewart, 384 U. S. 436, 498, n. 71 (1966) (decided with
Miranda v. Arizona). Therefore, if this Court does not consider the constitutional claims now, there may well be no
opportunity to do so in the future. 7
The Sixth Amendment issue has been finally decicted by
the highest court of Pennsylvania, and unless we review that
decision, the harm that the Commonwealth seeks to avoid7
As the dissent points out, post, at - -, there is a third possibility. If
the trial court finds prejudicial error and orders a retrial, the Commonwealth may attempt to take an immediate appeal of this order. See Pa.
Rule of App. Proc. 311. The dissent suggests that because the Commonwealth can raise the Sixth Amendment issue again in this appeal, respect
for the finality doctrine should lead us to dismiss. But even if we were
persuaded that an immediate appeal would lie in this situation, it would not
necessarily follow that the constitutional issue will survive. The appellate
court could find that the failure to disclose was harmless, precluding further review by the Commonwealth. Alternatively, the appellate court
could agree that the error was prejudicial, thus permitting the Commonwealth to claim that the Sixth Amendment does not compel disclosure.
But as the dissent recognizes, the Pennsylvania courts already have considered and resolved this issue in its earlier proceedings; if the Commonwealth were to raise it again in a new set of appeals, the courts below
would simply reject the claim under the law of the case doctrine. Law of
the case principles are not a bar to this Court's jurisdiction, of course, and
thus the dissent apparently would require the Commonwealth to raise a
fruitless Sixth Amendment claim in the trial court, the Superior Court, and
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court still another time before we re-grant certiorari on the question that is now before us.
The goals of finality would be frustrated, rather than furthered, by these
wasteful and time-consuming procedures. Based on the unusual facts of
this case, the justifications for the finality doctrine--efficiency, judicial
restraint, and federalism, see Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326
U. S. 120, 124 (1945); post, at ---would be ill served by another round
of litigation on an issue that has been authoritatively decided by the highest state court.
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the disclosure of the entire confidential file-will occur regardless of the result on remand. We thus cannot agree
with the suggestion in JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent that if we
were to dismiss this case and it was resolved on other
grounds after disclosure of the file, "the Commonwealth
would not have been harmed." Post, at 2. This hardly
could be true, because of the acknowledged public interest in
ensuring the confidentiality of CYS records.
See n . 17,
infra. Although this consideration is not dispositive, we
have noted that "statutorily created finality requirements
should , if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial
collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries
to be suffered." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S . 319, 331,
n . 11 (1976). We therefore reject Ritchie's claim that the
Court lacks jurisdiction, and turn to the merits of the case before us. 8
8
Nothing in our decision in United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 (1971),
requires a different result. In that case the respondent was served with a
subpoena requiring him to produce business records for a grand jury. The
District Court denied a motion to quash, and respondent appealed. We
concluded that the District Court order was not appealable. Id., at 532.
We rejected the contention that immediate review was necessary to avoid
the harm of disclosing otherwise protected material, noting that parties
who face such an order have the option of making the decision "final" simply by refusing to comply with the subpoena.
Although there are similarities between this case and Ryan, the analogy
is incomplete. In Ryan the Court was concerned about the "necessity for
expedition in the administration of the criminal law," id. , at 533, an interest that would be undermined if all pretrial orders were immediately appealable. Ryan also rests on an implicit assumption that unless a party
resisting discovery is willing to risk being held in contempt, the significance of his claim is insufficient to justify interrupting the ongoing proceedings. That is not the situation before us. Here the trial already has
taken place, and the issue reviewed by the Commonwealth appellate
courts. The interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of delay,
rather than being hindered, would be best served by resolving the issue.
Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S., 469, 477-478 (1975) (exceptions to finality doctrine justified in part by need to avoid economic
waste and judicial delay).
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III
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Ritchie,
through his lawyer, has the right to examine the full contents
of the CYS records. The court found that this right of access
is required by both the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause. We discuss these constitutional
provisions in turn.
A
The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face
those who testify against him, and the right to conduct crossexamination. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S.--, - (1985) (per curiam). Ritchie does not allege a violation of
the former right. He was not excluded from any part of the
trial, nor did the prosecutor improperly introduce out-ofcourt statements as substantive evidence, thereby depriving
Ritchie of the right to "confront" the declarant. See Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980). Cf. United States v. Inadi, 475
U. S. - - (1986). Instead, Ritchie claims that by denying
him access to the information necessary to prepare his deWe also reject Ritchie's suggestion that we should dismiss this action
and allow the case to return to the trial court, so that the Commonwealth
can formally refuse to comply with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision and be held in contempt. Here we are not faced merely with an individual's assertion that a subpoena is unduly burdensome, but with a holding of a State Supreme Court that the legislative interest in confidentiality
will not be given effect. The Commonwealth's interest in immediate review of this case is obvious and substantial. Contrary to JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent, we do not think that the finality doctrine requires a new
round of litigation and appellate review simply to give the Commonwealth
"the chance to decide whether to comply with the order." Post, at 6. See
n. 7, supra. To prolong the proceedings on this basis would be inconsistent with the "pragmatic" approach we normally have taken to finality questions. See generally, Bradley v. Richmond School Bd. , 416 U. S. 696,
722-723, n. 28 (1974) ("This Court has been inclined to follow a 'pragmatic
approach' to the question of finality") (citation omitted).
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fense, the trial court interfered with his right of crossexamination.
.
Ritchie argues that he could not effectively question his
daughter because, without the CYS material, he did not
know which types of questions would best expose the weaknesses in her testimony. Had the files been disclosed,
Ritchie argues that he might have been able to show that the
daughter made statements to the CYS counselor that were
inconsistent with her trial statements, or perhaps to reveal
that the girl acted with an improper motive. Of course, the
right to cross-examine includes the opportunity to show that
a witness is biased, or that the testimony is exaggerated or
unbelievable. United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 50 (1984);
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 316 (1974). Because this
type of evidence can make the difference between conviction
and acquittal, see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264, 269
(1959), Ritchie argues that the failure to disclose information
that might have made cross-examination more effective undermines the Confrontation Clause's purpose of increasing
the accuracy of the truth-finding process at trial. See
United States v. Inadi, supra, at--.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted this argument,
relying in part on our decision in Davis v. Alaska, supra. In
Davis the trial judge prohibited defense counsel from questioning a witness about the latter's juvenile criminal record,
because a state statute made this information presumptively
confidential. We found that this restriction on cross-examination violated the Confrontation Clause, despite Alaska's
legitimate interest in protecting the identity of juvenile
offenders. 415 U. S., at 318-320. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court apparently interpreted our decision in Davis
to mean that a statutory privilege cannot be maintained when
a defendant asserts a need, prior to trial, for the protected
information that might be used at trial to impeach or otherwise undermine a witness' testimony. See 509 Pa., at
365-367, 502 A. 2d, at 152-153 .

......
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If we were to accept this broad interpretation of Davis, the
effect would be to transform the Confrontation Clause into a
constitutionally-compelled rule of pretrial discovery. Nothing in the case law supports such a view. The opinions of
this Court show that the right of confrontation is a trial right,
designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of
questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-examination. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 157 (1970)
("[I]t is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time
of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the
Confrontation Clause"); Barber v. Page , 390 U. S. 719, 725
(1968) ("The right to confrontation is basically a trial right").
The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does not
include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any
and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony. 9 Normally the right to confront one's accusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at
trial to question witnesses. Delaware v. Fensterer, supra,
at - - . In short, the Confrontation Clause only guarantees
"an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective." !d., at - - (emphasis in
original). See also Ohio v. Roberts, supra, at 73, n. 12 (except in "extraordinary cases, no inquiry into 'effectiveness'
[of cross-examination] is required").
We reaffirmed this interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause last term in Delaware v. Fensterer, supra. In that
case, the defendant was convicted in part on the testimony of
the State's expert witness, who could not remember which
This is not to suggest, of course, that there are no protections for pretrial discovery in criminal cases. See discussion in Part III(B), infra.
We simply hold that with respect to this issue, the Confrontation Clause
only protects a defendant's trial rights, and does not compel the pretrial
production of information that might be useful in preparing for trial. Also,
we hardly need say that nothing in our opinion today is intended to alter a
trial judge's traditional power to control the scope of cross-examination by
prohibiting questions that are prejudicial, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. See Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U. S. - , - (1986).
9
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scientific test he had used to form his opinion. Although this
inability to recall frustrated defense counsel's efforts to discredit the testimony, we held that there had been no Sixth
Amendment violation. The Court found that the right of
confrontation was not implicated, "for the trial court did not
limit the scope or nature of defense counsel's cross-examination in any way." 474 U. S., at--. Fensterer was in full
accord with our earlier decisions, that have upheld a Confrontation Clause infringement claim on this issue only when
there was a specific statutory or court-imposed restriction at
trial on the scope of questioning. 10
The lower court's reliance on Davis v. Alaska therefore is
misplaced. There the state court had prohibited defense
counsel from questioning the witness about his criminal
record, even though that evidence might have affected the
witness' credibility. The constitutional error in that case
was not that Alaska made this information confidential; it
was that the defendant was denied the right "to expose to the
jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness."
10

See, e. g., Delaware v. VanArsdall, supra (denial of right to crossexamine to show bias); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974); Chambers v.
Mississippi , 410 U. S. 284 (1973) (denial of right to impeach own witness);
Smith v. Illinois , 390 U. S. 129 (1968) (denial of right to ask witness' real
name and address at trial); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965) (denial of right to cross-examine codefendant). Moreover, the Court normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted
interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial. Compare
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300, 311-313 (1967) (no Confrontation Clause
violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant's
name at pretrial hearing), with Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53
(1957) (on the facts presented, Government required to disclose informant's
name at trial). See generally, Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause,
73 Mich. L. Rev. 71 , 125-126 (1974) ("The right of confrontation is exclusively a 'trial right' . . . . It does not . .. require the government to
produce witnesses whose statements are not used at trial, or to produce
the underlying information on which its witnesses base their testimony")
(footnotes omitted) (hereinafter Westen).
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415 U. S., at 318. Similarly, in this case the Confrontation
Clause was not violated by the withholding of the CYS file; it
only would have been impermissible for the judge to have
prevented Ritchie's lawyer from cross-examining the daughter. Because defense counsel was able to cross-examine all
of the trial witnesses fully, we find that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court erred in holding that the failure to disclose
the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause.
B
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also suggested that the
failure to disclose the CYS file violated the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of compulsory process. Ritchie asserts
that the trial court's ruling prevented him from learning the
names of the "witnesses in his favor," as well as other evidence that might be contained in the file. Although the basis
for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling on this point is
unclear, it apparently concluded that the right of compulsory
process includes the right to have the State's assistance in
uncovering arguably useful information, without regard to
the existence of a state-created restriction-here, the confidentiality of the files.
1

This Court has had little occasion to discuss the contours of
the Compulsory Process Clause. The first and most celebrated analysis came from a Virginia federal court in 1807,
during the treason and misdemeanor trials of Aaron Burr.
Chief Justice Marshall, who presided as trial judge, ruled
that Burr's compulsory process rights entitled him to serve a
subpoena on President Jefferson, requesting the production
of allegedly incriminating evidence. 11 United States v. Burr,
11
The evidence consisted of a letter that was sent to President Jefferson
by General James Wilkinson that allegedly showed that Burr was planning
to invade Mexico and set up a separate government under his control.
After being ordered to do so, Jefferson eventually turned over an edited
version of the letter. For an excellent summary of the Burr case and its
implications for compulsory process, see Westen 101-108.

•
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25 F . Cas. 30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807). Despite the
implications of the Burr decision for federal criminal procedure, the Compulsory Process Clause rarely was a factor in
this Court's decisions during the next 160 years. 12 More recently, however, the Court has articulated some of the specific rights secured by this part of the Sixth Amendment.
Our cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants
have the right to the Government's assistance in compelling
the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to
put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt. 13
This Court has never squarely held that the Compulsory
Process Clause guarantees the right to discover the identity
of witnesses, or to require the Government to produce exculpatory evidence. But cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S.
683, 709, 711 (1974) (suggesting that the clause may require
the production of evidence). Instead, the Court traditionally
has evaluated claims such as those raised by Ritchie under
the broader protections of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Bagley, 473
U. S. (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963).
See also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470 (1973). Because
the applicability of the Si~th Amendment to this type of case
is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth Amendment precedents addressing the fundamental fairness of trials establish
a clear framework for review, we adopt a due process analysis for purposes of this case. Although we conclude that
compulsory process provides no greater protections in this
12

The pre-1967 cases that mention compulsory process do not provide an
extensive analysis of the clause. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375,
378, n. 1 (1966); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 442 (1932);
United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 169, 173 (1891); Ex parte Harding,
120 U. S. 782 (1887). See generally, Westen 108, and n. 164.
13
See, e. g. , Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973); Cool v.
United States, 409 U. S. 100 (1972) (per curiam); Washington v. Texas ,
388 U. S. 14 (1967). Cf. Webb v. Texas , 409 U. S. 95 (1972) (per curiam)
(decision based on Due Process Clause).

•
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area than those afforded by due process, we need not decide
today whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory
Process Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is enough to conclude that on these facts, Ritchie's
claims more properly are considered by reference to due
process.
2

It is well-settled that the Government has the obligation to
turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to
the accused and material to guilt or punishment. United
States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland,
supra, at 87. Although courts have used different terminologies to define "materiality," a majority of this Court has
agreed, "[e]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." United States v. Bagley,
supra, at-- (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.); id., at-- (opinion of WHITE, J.).
At this stage, of course, it is impossible to say whether any
information in the CYS records may be relevant to Ritchie's
claim of innocence, because neither the prosecution nor defense counsel has seen the information, and the trial judge acknowledged that he had not reviewed the full file. The Commonwealth, however, argues that no materiality inquiry is
required, because a statute renders the contents of the file
privileged. Requiring disclosure here, it is argued, would
override the Commonwealth's compelll.ng interest in confidentiality on the mere speculation that the file "might" have
been useful to the defense.
Although we recognize that the public interest in protecting this type of sensitive information is strong, we do not
agree that this interest necessarily prevents disclosure in all
circumstances. This is not a case where a state statute
grants CYS the absolute authority to shield its files from all
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eyes. Cf. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5945.1(b) (unqualified statutory privilege for communications between sexual assault
counselors and victims). 14 Rather, the Pennsylvania law
provides that the information shall be disclosed in certain circumstances, including when CYS is directed to do so by court
order. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tilte 11, §2215(a)(5) (Purdon Supp.
1986). Given that the Pennsylvania Legislature contemplated some use of CYS records in judicial proceedings, we
cannot conclude that the statute prevents all disclosure in
criminal prosecutions. In the absence of any apparent state
policy to the contrary, we therefore have no reason to believe
that relevant information would not be disclosed when a
court of competent jurisdiction determines that the information is "material" to the defense of the accused.
We therefore affirm the decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to the extent it orders a remand for further
proceedings. Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file reviewed by the trial court to determine whether it contains
information that probably would have changed the outcome
of his trial. If it does, he must be given a new trial. If the
records maintained by CYS contain no such information, or if
the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
the lower court will be free to reinstate the prior conviction. 15
14

We express no opinion on whether the result in this case would have
been different if the statute had protected the CYS files from disclosure to
anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial personnel.
16
The Commonwealth also argues that Ritchie is not entitled to disclosure because he did not make a particularized showing of what information
he was seeking or how it would be material. See Brief for Petitioner 18
(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 109-110 (1976) ("The mere
possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the
defense . .. does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense")).
Ritchie , of course, may not require the trial court to search through the
CYS file without first establishing a basis for his claim that it contains material evidence. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S. 858,
867 (1982) ("He must at least make some plausible showing of how their
testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense").
The obligation to disclose exculpatory material, of course, does not depend

li'

•

85-1347-0PINION
PENNSYLVANIA v. RITCHIE

17

c
This ruling does not end our analysis, because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did more than simply remand. It also
held that defense counsel must be allowed to examine all of
the confidential information, both relevant and irrelevant,
and present arguments in favor of disclosure. The court apparently concluded that whenever a defendant alleges that
protected evidence might be material, the appropriate
method of assessing this -claim is to grant full access to the
disputed information, regardless of the State's interest in
confidentiality. We cannot agree.
A defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence does
not include the unsupervised authority to search through the
Commonwealth's files. See United States v. Bagley, 473
U. S., at--; United States v. Agurs, supra, at--. Although the eye of an advocate may be helpful to a defendant
in ferreting out information, Dennis v. United States, 384
U. S. 855, 875 (1966), this Court has never held-even in the
absence of a statute restricting disclosure-that a defendant
alone may make the determination as to the materiality of the
information. Settled practice is to the contrary. In the
typical case where a defendant makes only a general request
for exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U. S. 83, it is the State that decides which information must
be disclosed. Unless defense counsel becomes aware that
other exculpatory evidence was withheld and brings it to the
court's attention, 16 the prosecutor's decision on disclosure is
on the presence of a specific request. We note, however, that the degree
of specificity of Ritchie's request for the infonnation may have a bearing on
the trial court's assessment on remand of the materiality of the nondisclosure. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. - , - (1985) (opinion of
BLACKMUN, J.); id., a t - (opinion of WHITE, J.).
18
See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 16(d)(2); Pa. Rules Crim. Proc. 305(E) ("If
at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule [mandating
disclosure of exculpatory evidence], the court may ... enter such ...
order as it deems just under the circumstances").
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final. Defense counsel has no constitutional right to conduct
his own search of the State's files to argue relevance. See
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545, 559 (1977) ("There is
no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case,
and Brady did not create one").
We find that Ritchie's interest (as well as that of the Commonwealth) in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by
requiring that the CYS files be submitted only to the trial
court for in camera review. Although this rule denies
Ritchie the benefits of an "advocate's eye," we note that the
trial court's discretion is not unbounded. If a defendant is
aware of specific information contained in the file (e. g. , the
medical report), he is free to request it directly from the
court, and argue in favor of its materiality. Moreover, the
duty to disclose is ongoing; information that may be deemed
immaterial upon original examination may become important
as the proceedings progress, and the court would be obligated to release information material to the fairness of the
trial.
To allow full disclosure to defense counsel in this type of
case would sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth's compelling interest in protecting its child abuse information. If
the CYS records were made available to defendants, even
through counsel, it could have a seriously adverse effect on
Pennsylvania's efforts to uncover and treat abuse. Child
abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses except the victim. A child's feelings of vulnerability and guilt,
and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly
acute when the abuser is a parent. It therefore is essential
that the child have a state-designated person to whom he
may turn, and to do so with the assurance of confidentiality.
Relatives and neighbors who suspect abuse also will be more
willing to come forward if they know that their identities will
be protected. Recognizing this, the Commonwealth-like

'1:
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all other States 17-has made a commendable effort to assure
victims and witnesses that they may speak to the CYS counselors without fear of general disclosure. The Commonwealth's purpose would be frustrated if this confidential
material had to be disclosed upon demand to a defendant
charged with criminal child abuse, simply because a trial
court may not recognize exculpatory evidence. Neither
precedent nor common sense requires such a result.
IV
We agree that Ritchie is entitled to know whether the CYS
file contains information that may have changed the outcome
of his trial had it been disclosed. Thus we agree that a remand is necessary. We disagree with the decision of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the extent that it allows defense counsel access to the CYS file. An in camera review
by the trial court will serve Ritchie's interest without destroying the Commonwealth's need to protect the confidentiality of those involved in child-abuse investigations. The
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

17

The importance of the public interest at issue in this case is evidenced
by the fact that all 50 States and the District of Columbia have statutes
that protect the confidentiality of their official records concerning child
abuse. See Brief for State of California, et al. as Amicus Curiae 12, n. 1
(listing illustrative statutes). See also Besharov, The Legal Aspects of
Reporting Known and Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 Vill. L.
Rev. 458, 508-512 (1978).
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